Commit Graph

1305 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Matt Caswell
65f1d188c5 Fix source where indent will not be able to cope
Conflicts:
	apps/ciphers.c
	ssl/s3_pkt.c

Conflicts:
	crypto/ec/ec_curve.c

Conflicts:
	crypto/ec/ec_curve.c
	ssl/s3_clnt.c
	ssl/s3_srvr.c
	ssl/ssl_sess.c

Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
2015-01-22 09:41:47 +00:00
Matt Caswell
a25d0527b7 Additional comment changes for reformat of 1.0.0
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
2015-01-22 09:41:42 +00:00
Matt Caswell
89f6c5b492 Further comment amendments to preserve formatting prior to source reformat
(cherry picked from commit 4a7fa26ffd65bf36beb8d1cb8f29fc0ae203f5c5)

Conflicts:
	crypto/x509v3/pcy_tree.c

Conflicts:
	apps/apps.c
	ssl/ssltest.c

Conflicts:
	apps/apps.c
	crypto/ec/ec2_oct.c
	crypto/ec/ecp_nistp224.c
	crypto/ec/ecp_nistp256.c
	crypto/ec/ecp_nistp521.c
	ssl/s3_cbc.c
	ssl/ssl_sess.c
	ssl/t1_lib.c

Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
2015-01-22 09:41:33 +00:00
Tim Hudson
f326f6544d mark all block comments that need format preserving so that
indent will not alter them when reformatting comments

(cherry picked from commit 1d97c84351)

Conflicts:
	crypto/bn/bn_lcl.h
	crypto/bn/bn_prime.c
	crypto/engine/eng_all.c
	crypto/rc4/rc4_utl.c
	crypto/sha/sha.h
	ssl/kssl.c
	ssl/t1_lib.c

Conflicts:
	crypto/rc4/rc4_enc.c
	crypto/x509v3/v3_scts.c
	crypto/x509v3/v3nametest.c
	ssl/d1_both.c
	ssl/s3_srvr.c
	ssl/ssl.h
	ssl/ssl_locl.h
	ssl/ssltest.c
	ssl/t1_lib.c

Conflicts:
	crypto/asn1/a_sign.c
	crypto/bn/bn_div.c
	crypto/dsa/dsa_asn1.c
	crypto/ec/ecp_nistp224.c
	crypto/ec/ecp_nistp256.c
	crypto/ec/ecp_nistp521.c
	crypto/ec/ecp_nistputil.c
	crypto/modes/gcm128.c
	crypto/opensslv.h
	ssl/d1_both.c
	ssl/heartbeat_test.c
	ssl/s3_clnt.c
	ssl/s3_srvr.c
	ssl/ssl_sess.c
	ssl/t1_lib.c
	test/testutil.h

Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
2015-01-22 09:41:18 +00:00
Matt Caswell
b095884a58 A memory leak can occur in dtls1_buffer_record if either of the calls to
ssl3_setup_buffers or pqueue_insert fail. The former will fail if there is a
malloc failure, whilst the latter will fail if attempting to add a duplicate
record to the queue. This should never happen because duplicate records should
be detected and dropped before any attempt to add them to the queue.
Unfortunately records that arrive that are for the next epoch are not being
recorded correctly, and therefore replays are not being detected.
Additionally, these "should not happen" failures that can occur in
dtls1_buffer_record are not being treated as fatal and therefore an attacker
could exploit this by sending repeated replay records for the next epoch,
eventually causing a DoS through memory exhaustion.

Thanks to Chris Mueller for reporting this issue and providing initial
analysis and a patch. Further analysis and the final patch was performed by
Matt Caswell from the OpenSSL development team.

CVE-2015-0206

Reviewed-by: Dr Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 652ff0f4796eecd8729b4690f2076d1c7ccb2862)
2015-01-08 14:14:56 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
f7fe3d235a Unauthenticated DH client certificate fix.
Fix to prevent use of DH client certificates without sending
certificate verify message.

If we've used a client certificate to generate the premaster secret
ssl3_get_client_key_exchange returns 2 and ssl3_get_cert_verify is
never called.

We can only skip the certificate verify message in
ssl3_get_cert_verify if the client didn't send a certificate.

Thanks to Karthikeyan Bhargavan for reporting this issue.
CVE-2015-0205
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
2015-01-08 14:14:56 +00:00
Matt Caswell
b2688c9161 Follow on from CVE-2014-3571. This fixes the code that was the original source
of the crash due to p being NULL. Steve's fix prevents this situation from
occuring - however this is by no means obvious by looking at the code for
dtls1_get_record. This fix just makes things look a bit more sane.

Conflicts:
	ssl/d1_pkt.c

Reviewed-by: Dr Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
2015-01-08 14:14:29 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
bf6fa208b5 Fix crash in dtls1_get_record whilst in the listen state where you get two
separate reads performed - one for the header and one for the body of the
handshake record.

CVE-2014-3571

Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
2015-01-08 11:25:45 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
f66f76a24a fix error discrepancy
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 4a4d415857)
2015-01-07 18:11:07 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
08a88774bd Only allow ephemeral RSA keys in export ciphersuites.
OpenSSL clients would tolerate temporary RSA keys in non-export
ciphersuites. It also had an option SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA which
enabled this server side. Remove both options as they are a
protocol violation.

Thanks to Karthikeyan Bhargavan for reporting this issue.
(CVE-2015-0204)
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>

(cherry picked from commit 4b4c1fcc88)

Conflicts:
	CHANGES
	doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_options.pod
2015-01-06 13:18:46 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
802a070bb6 ECDH downgrade bug fix.
Fix bug where an OpenSSL client would accept a handshake using an
ephemeral ECDH ciphersuites with the server key exchange message omitted.

Thanks to Karthikeyan Bhargavan for reporting this issue.

CVE-2014-3572
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>

(cherry picked from commit b15f876964)

Conflicts:
	CHANGES
2015-01-05 23:52:28 +00:00
Adam Langley
40c2812f56 Premaster secret handling fixes
From BoringSSL
- Send an alert when the client key exchange isn't correctly formatted.
- Reject overly short RSA ciphertexts to avoid a (benign) out-of-bounds memory access.

Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 4aecfd4d9f)
2014-12-17 14:04:14 +01:00
Matt Caswell
2e3e3d278e Add OPENSSL_NO_ECDH guards
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 7f9edfd23a)
2014-12-16 10:22:20 +00:00
Matt Caswell
2ececf59de Remove extraneous white space, and add some braces
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 55e530265a)
2014-12-16 00:11:02 +00:00
Matt Caswell
a60536348b DTLS fixes for signed/unsigned issues
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 1904d21123)
2014-12-16 00:11:02 +00:00
Matt Caswell
9d410579a7 Checkout return value of dtls1_output_cert_chain
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 9beb948c0d)
2014-12-15 21:29:49 +00:00
Matt Caswell
4f90ef0c5b Check return value of ssl3_output_cert_chain
Based on commit 66f96fe2d5 by Steve Henson

Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit ce5ddefc43)
2014-12-15 21:29:49 +00:00
Matt Caswell
eae2bb2f1f Fix memory leak in s2_srvr.c if BUF_MEM_grow fails
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit d04a1e0b5b)
2014-12-13 00:06:10 +00:00
Matt Caswell
c313270836 Fixed memory leak if BUF_MEM_grow fails
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit bb1ddd3d9a)
2014-12-13 00:06:10 +00:00
Matt Caswell
ec5c25b3b4 Fixed memory leak in the event of a failure of BUF_MEM_grow
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 41bf250130)
2014-12-08 16:51:01 +00:00
Matt Caswell
38afaa48ec Fix memory leak in SSL_new if errors occur.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 76e6509085)
2014-12-08 16:51:01 +00:00
Matt Caswell
954818fe60 Remove incorrect code inadvertently introduced through commit 59669b6ab.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>

Conflicts:
	ssl/d1_lib.c
2014-12-04 14:25:09 +00:00
Matt Caswell
027381f68c Remove "#if 0" code
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 4bb8eb9ce4)
2014-12-03 09:43:49 +00:00
Matt Caswell
a900b3b51c Only use the fallback mtu after 2 unsuccessful retransmissions if it is less
than the mtu we are already using

Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 047f21593e)
2014-12-03 09:43:49 +00:00
Matt Caswell
ceb4c684e4 If we really get a situation where the underlying mtu is less than the minimum
we will support then dtls1_do_write can go into an infinite loop. This commit
fixes that.

Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit d3d9eef316)
2014-12-03 09:43:49 +00:00
Matt Caswell
a8da754d84 Fix dtls_query_mtu so that it will always either complete with an mtu that is
at least the minimum or it will fail.
There were some instances in dtls1_query_mtu where the final mtu can end up
being less than the minimum, i.e. where the user has set an mtu manually. This
shouldn't be allowed. Also remove dtls1_guess_mtu that, despite having
logic for guessing an mtu, was actually only ever used to work out the minimum
mtu to use.

Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 1620a2e49c)
2014-12-03 09:43:49 +00:00
Matt Caswell
8ccb44e6f5 Remove instances in libssl of the constant 28 (for size of IPv4 header + UDP)
and instead use the value provided by the underlying BIO. Also provide some
new DTLS_CTRLs so that the library user can set the mtu without needing to
know this constant. These new DTLS_CTRLs provide the capability to set the
link level mtu to be used (i.e. including this IP/UDP overhead). The previous
DTLS_CTRLs required the library user to subtract this overhead first.

Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 59669b6abf)

Conflicts:
	ssl/d1_both.c
	ssl/ssl.h
	ssl/ssl_lib.c
2014-12-03 09:43:47 +00:00
Matt Caswell
8724f9f9cf The first call to query the mtu in dtls1_do_write correctly checks that the
mtu that we have received is not less than the minimum. If its less it uses the
minimum instead. The second call to query the mtu does not do that, but
instead uses whatever comes back. We have seen an instance in RT#3592 where we
have got an unreasonably small mtu come back. This commit makes both query
checks consistent.

Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 6abb0d1f8e)
2014-12-03 09:38:10 +00:00
Matt Caswell
6d41cbb63a The SSL_OP_NO_QUERY_MTU option is supposed to stop the mtu from being
automatically updated, and we should use the one provided instead.
Unfortunately there are a couple of locations where this is not respected.

Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 001235778a)
2014-12-03 09:38:10 +00:00
Matt Caswell
04a73c844f Verify that we have a sensible message len and fail if not
RT#3592 provides an instance where the OPENSSL_assert that this commit
replaces can be hit. I was able to recreate this issue by forcing the
underlying BIO to misbehave and come back with very small mtu values. This
happens the second time around the while loop after we have detected that the
MTU has been exceeded following the call to dtls1_write_bytes.

Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit cf75017bfd)
2014-12-03 09:38:10 +00:00
Richard Levitte
d93112abc6 [PR3597] Advance to the next state variant when reusing messages.
Previously, state variant was not advanced, which resulted in state
being stuck in the st1 variant (usually "_A").

This broke certificate callback retry logic when accepting connections
that were using SSLv2 ClientHello (hence reusing the message), because
their state never advanced to SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C variant required
for the retry code path.

Reported by Yichun Zhang (agentzh).

Signed-off-by: Piotr Sikora <piotr@cloudflare.com>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
2014-11-28 23:31:53 +01:00
Matt Caswell
7f3490e685 Fixed warning in ssl2_enc
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 2db95e094d)
2014-11-27 21:58:32 +00:00
Matt Caswell
dcf7a2dc4a Check EVP_Cipher return values for SSL2
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 5fc8bb6ab7)
2014-11-27 21:58:32 +00:00
Matt Caswell
6ff76b3347 Add checks to the return value of EVP_Cipher to prevent silent encryption failure.
PR#1767

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 244d0955ad)
2014-11-27 21:58:31 +00:00
Matt Caswell
3b12515180 Remove redundant checks in ssl_cert_dup. This was causing spurious error messages when using GOST
PR#3613

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit fc3968a25c)
2014-11-27 20:55:52 +00:00
Matt Caswell
e1b1d82aab Fixed memory leak due to incorrect freeing of DTLS reassembly bit mask
PR#3608

Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 8a35dbb6d8)
2014-11-26 10:18:15 +00:00
Matt Caswell
c25456633c Corrected comments in ssl.h about SSLv23_method and friends
PR#3574

Reviewed-by: Dr. Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 3a0765882c)
2014-11-25 22:28:42 +00:00
Bodo Moeller
2a303a5834 Fix and improve SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV documentation.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
2014-10-21 22:41:07 +02:00
Bodo Moeller
8d81dfd0a6 When processing ClientHello.cipher_suites, don't ignore cipher suites
listed after TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV.

RT: 3575
Reviewed-by: Emilia Kasper <emilia@openssl.org>
2014-10-21 22:32:44 +02:00
Kurt Roeckx
69c163ac81 Keep old method in case of an unsupported protocol
When we're configured with no-ssl3 and we receive an SSL v3 Client Hello, we set
the method to NULL.  We didn't used to do that, and it breaks things.  This is a
regression introduced in 62f45cc27d.  Keep the old
method since the code is not able to deal with a NULL method at this time.

CVE-2014-3569, PR#3571

Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 392fa7a952)
2014-10-21 21:15:58 +02:00
Geoff Thorpe
9bf3ff1ca0 Fix no-ssl3 configuration option
CVE-2014-3568

Reviewed-by: Emilia Kasper <emilia@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
2014-10-15 08:49:50 -04:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
74f77d40a9 Fix for session tickets memory leak.
CVE-2014-3567

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
2014-10-15 08:49:50 -04:00
Richard Levitte
802feda7fc Spaces were added in some strings for better readability. However, those spaces do not belong in file names, so when picking out the individual parts, remove the spaces
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
2014-10-15 11:32:17 +02:00
Richard Levitte
cdad6ad015 Adjust VMS build to Unix build. Most of all, make it so the disabled
algorithms MD2 and RC5 don't get built.
Also, disable building the test apps in crypto/des and crypto/pkcs7, as
they have no support at all.

Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>

Conflicts:
	crypto/crypto-lib.com
	makevms.com
	ssl/ssl-lib.com
2014-10-15 11:32:17 +02:00
Richard Levitte
7e29be228e Make sure that disabling the MAYLOSEDATA3 warning is only done when the compiler supports it. Otherwise, there are warnings about it lacking everywhere, which is quite tedious to read through while trying to check for other warnings.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>

Conflicts:
	ssl/ssl-lib.com
2014-10-15 11:32:15 +02:00
Bodo Moeller
68828f167c Oops -- fix typo in coment added with TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV support.
Reviewed-by: Steve Henson <steve@openss.org>
2014-10-15 04:25:41 +02:00
Bodo Moeller
59dcfa21e5 Support TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
2014-10-15 04:05:57 +02:00
Emilia Kasper
9a6940a349 RT3067: simplify patch
(Original commit adb46dbc6d)

Use the new constant-time methods consistently in s3_srvr.c

Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 455b65dfab)

Conflicts:
	ssl/Makefile
2014-09-24 15:58:20 +02:00
Adam Langley
c36ceb0b15 This change alters the processing of invalid, RSA pre-master secrets so
that bad encryptions are treated like random session keys in constant
time.

(cherry picked from commit adb46dbc6d)

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
2014-09-24 15:56:09 +02:00
Emilia Kasper
904fcce0c6 RT3066: rewrite RSA padding checks to be slightly more constant time.
Also tweak s3_cbc.c to use new constant-time methods.
Also fix memory leaks from internal errors in RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP_mgf1

This patch is based on the original RT submission by Adam Langley <agl@chromium.org>,
as well as code from BoringSSL and OpenSSL.

Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org>

Conflicts:
	crypto/rsa/rsa_oaep.c
2014-09-24 14:35:03 +02:00