This change updates the DTLS code to match the constant-time CBC
behaviour in the TLS.
(cherry picked from commit 9f27de170d1b7bef3d46d41382dc4dafde8b3900)
The previous CBC patch was bugged in that there was a path through enc()
in s3_pkt.c/d1_pkt.c which didn't set orig_len. orig_len would be left
at the previous value which could suggest that the packet was a
sufficient length when it wasn't.
(cherry picked from commit 6cb19b7681f600b2f165e4adc57547b097b475fd)
This patch makes the decoding of SSLv3 and TLS CBC records constant
time. Without this, a timing side-channel can be used to build a padding
oracle and mount Vaudenay's attack.
This patch also disables the stitched AESNI+SHA mode pending a similar
fix to that code.
In order to be easy to backport, this change is implemented in ssl/,
rather than as a generic AEAD mode. In the future this should be changed
around so that HMAC isn't in ssl/, but crypto/ as FIPS expects.
(cherry picked from commit e130841bccfc0bb9da254dc84e23bc6a1c78a64e)
This change adds CRYPTO_memcmp, which compares two vectors of bytes in
an amount of time that's independent of their contents. It also changes
several MAC compares in the code to use this over the standard memcmp,
which may leak information about the size of a matching prefix.
(cherry picked from commit 2ee798880a246d648ecddadc5b91367bee4a5d98)
client hello message. Previously this could only be retrieved on an initial
connection and it was impossible to determine the cipher IDs of any uknown
ciphersuites.
(backport from HEAD)
by a certificate chain. Add additional tests to handle client
certificates: checks for matching certificate type and issuer name
comparison.
Print out results of checks for each candidate chain tested in
s_server/s_client.
(backport from HEAD)
possible to have different stores per SSL structure or one store in
the parent SSL_CTX. Include distint stores for certificate chain
verification and chain building. New ctrl SSL_CTRL_BUILD_CERT_CHAIN
to build and store a certificate chain in CERT structure: returing
an error if the chain cannot be built: this will allow applications
to test if a chain is correctly configured.
Note: if the CERT based stores are not set then the parent SSL_CTX
store is used to retain compatibility with existing behaviour.
(backport from HEAD)
details in s_client.
Also add ctrl to set client certificate types. If not used sensible values
will be included based on supported signature algorithms: for example if
we don't include any DSA signing algorithms the DSA certificate type is
omitted.
Fix restriction in old code where certificate types would be truncated
if it exceeded TLS_CT_NUMBER.
(backport from HEAD)
the permitted signature algorithms for server and client authentication
are the same but it is now possible to set different algorithms for client
authentication only.
(backport from HEAD)
is required by client or server. An application can decide which
certificate chain to present based on arbitrary criteria: for example
supported signature algorithms. Add very simple example to s_server.
This fixes many of the problems and restrictions of the existing client
certificate callback: for example you can now clear existing certificates
and specify the whole chain.
(backport from HEAD)
the certificate can be used for (if anything). Set valid_flags field
in new tls1_check_chain function. Simplify ssl_set_cert_masks which used
to have similar checks in it.
Add new "cert_flags" field to CERT structure and include a "strict mode".
This enforces some TLS certificate requirements (such as only permitting
certificate signature algorithms contained in the supported algorithms
extension) which some implementations ignore: this option should be used
with caution as it could cause interoperability issues.
(backport from HEAD)
Only store encoded versions of peer and configured signature algorithms.
Determine shared signature algorithms and cache the result along with NID
equivalents of each algorithm.
(backport from HEAD)
TLS v1.2. These are sent as an extension for clients and during a certificate
request for servers.
TODO: add support for shared signature algorithms, respect shared algorithms
when deciding which ciphersuites and certificates to permit.
(backport from HEAD)
