The format script didn't correctly recognise some ASN.1 macros and
didn't reformat some files as a result. Fix script and reformat
affected files.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 437b14b533fe7f7408e3ebca6d5569f1d3347b1a)
Conflicts:
crypto/asn1/x_long.c
This should be a one off operation (subsequent invokation of the
script should not move them)
This commit is for the 0.9.8 changes
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Add aes_core.c to the list of files not processed by openssl-format-source
Conflicts:
crypto/aes/aes_core.c
Conflicts:
crypto/aes/aes_core.c
Conflicts:
crypto/aes/aes_core.c
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Sometimes it fails to format them very well, and sometimes it corrupts them!
This commit moves some particularly problematic ones.
Conflicts:
crypto/bn/bn.h
crypto/ec/ec_lcl.h
crypto/rsa/rsa.h
demos/engines/ibmca/hw_ibmca.c
ssl/ssl.h
ssl/ssl3.h
Conflicts:
crypto/ec/ec_lcl.h
ssl/tls1.h
Conflicts:
crypto/ec/ecp_nistp224.c
crypto/evp/evp.h
ssl/d1_both.c
ssl/ssl.h
ssl/ssl_lib.c
Conflicts:
crypto/bio/bss_file.c
crypto/ec/ec_lcl.h
crypto/evp/evp.h
crypto/store/str_mem.c
crypto/whrlpool/wp_block.c
crypto/x509/x509_vfy.h
ssl/ssl.h
ssl/ssl3.h
ssl/ssltest.c
ssl/t1_lib.c
ssl/tls1.h
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
This warning breaks the build in 1.0.0 and 0.9.8
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit b1ffc6ca1c387efad0772c16dfe426afef45dc4f)
Windows 8 SDKs complain that GetVersion() is deprecated.
We only use GetVersion like this:
(GetVersion() < 0x80000000)
which checks if the Windows version is NT based. Use a macro check_winnt()
which uses GetVersion() on older SDK versions and true otherwise.
(cherry picked from commit a4cc3c8041104896d51ae12ef7b678c31808ce52)
Conflicts:
apps/apps.c
crypto/bio/bss_log.c
Backported by Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openss.org>
By using non-DER or invalid encodings outside the signed portion of a
certificate the fingerprint can be changed without breaking the signature.
Although no details of the signed portion of the certificate can be changed
this can cause problems with some applications: e.g. those using the
certificate fingerprint for blacklists.
1. Reject signatures with non zero unused bits.
If the BIT STRING containing the signature has non zero unused bits reject
the signature. All current signature algorithms require zero unused bits.
2. Check certificate algorithm consistency.
Check the AlgorithmIdentifier inside TBS matches the one in the
certificate signature. NB: this will result in signature failure
errors for some broken certificates.
3. Check DSA/ECDSA signatures use DER.
Reencode DSA/ECDSA signatures and compare with the original received
signature. Return an error if there is a mismatch.
This will reject various cases including garbage after signature
(thanks to Antti Karjalainen and Tuomo Untinen from the Codenomicon CROSS
program for discovering this case) and use of BER or invalid ASN.1 INTEGERs
(negative or with leading zeroes).
CVE-2014-8275
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 208a6012be3077d83df4475f32dd1b1446f3a02e)
Conflicts:
crypto/dsa/dsa_vrf.c
According to X6.90 null, object identifier, boolean, integer and enumerated
types can only have primitive encodings: return an error if any of
these are received with a constructed encoding.
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit f5e4b6b5b566320a8d774f9475540f7d0e6a704d)
Conflicts:
crypto/asn1/asn1_err.c
