Update from 0.9.8-stable.

This commit is contained in:
Dr. Stephen Henson 2009-06-15 15:00:19 +00:00
parent 5bb9e1b4d4
commit f1ed5fa827
2 changed files with 10 additions and 8 deletions

View File

@ -793,6 +793,11 @@
Changes between 0.9.8k and 0.9.8l [xx XXX xxxx] Changes between 0.9.8k and 0.9.8l [xx XXX xxxx]
*) Don't check self signed certificate signatures in X509_verify_cert():
it just wastes time without adding any security. As a useful side effect
self signed root CAs with non-FIPS digests are now usable in FIPS mode.
[Steve Henson]
*) In dtls1_process_out_of_seq_message() the check if the current message *) In dtls1_process_out_of_seq_message() the check if the current message
is already buffered was missing. For every new message was memory is already buffered was missing. For every new message was memory
allocated, allowing an attacker to perform an denial of service attack allocated, allowing an attacker to perform an denial of service attack

View File

@ -1609,7 +1609,11 @@ static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
while (n >= 0) while (n >= 0)
{ {
ctx->error_depth=n; ctx->error_depth=n;
if (!xs->valid)
/* Skip signature check for self signed certificates. It
* doesn't add any security and just wastes time.
*/
if (!xs->valid && xs != xi)
{ {
if ((pkey=X509_get_pubkey(xi)) == NULL) if ((pkey=X509_get_pubkey(xi)) == NULL)
{ {
@ -1619,13 +1623,6 @@ static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
if (!ok) goto end; if (!ok) goto end;
} }
else if (X509_verify(xs,pkey) <= 0) else if (X509_verify(xs,pkey) <= 0)
/* XXX For the final trusted self-signed cert,
* this is a waste of time. That check should
* optional so that e.g. 'openssl x509' can be
* used to detect invalid self-signatures, but
* we don't verify again and again in SSL
* handshakes and the like once the cert has
* been declared trusted. */
{ {
ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE; ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE;
ctx->current_cert=xs; ctx->current_cert=xs;