ECDH downgrade bug fix.
Fix bug where an OpenSSL client would accept a handshake using an
ephemeral ECDH ciphersuites with the server key exchange message omitted.
Thanks to Karthikeyan Bhargavan for reporting this issue.
CVE-2014-3572
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit b15f876964)
			
			
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							@@ -4,6 +4,13 @@
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 Changes between 1.0.1j and 1.0.1k [xx XXX xxxx]
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  *) Abort handshake if server key exchange message is omitted for ephemeral
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     ECDH ciphersuites.
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     Thanks to Karthikeyan Bhargavan for reporting this issue.
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     (CVE-2014-3572)
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     [Steve Henson]
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  *) Ensure that the session ID context of an SSL is updated when its
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     SSL_CTX is updated via SSL_set_SSL_CTX.
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@@ -1277,6 +1277,8 @@ int ssl3_get_key_exchange(SSL *s)
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	int encoded_pt_len = 0;
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#endif
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	EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
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	/* use same message size as in ssl3_get_certificate_request()
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	 * as ServerKeyExchange message may be skipped */
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	n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
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@@ -1287,14 +1289,26 @@ int ssl3_get_key_exchange(SSL *s)
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		&ok);
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	if (!ok) return((int)n);
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	alg_k=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
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	if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE)
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		{
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		/*
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		 * Can't skip server key exchange if this is an ephemeral
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		 * ciphersuite.
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		 */
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		if (alg_k & (SSL_kEDH|SSL_kEECDH))
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			{
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			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
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			al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
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			goto f_err;
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			}
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#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
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		/* In plain PSK ciphersuite, ServerKeyExchange can be
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		   omitted if no identity hint is sent. Set
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		   session->sess_cert anyway to avoid problems
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		   later.*/
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		if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)
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		if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK)
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			{
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			s->session->sess_cert=ssl_sess_cert_new();
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			if (s->ctx->psk_identity_hint)
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@@ -1339,9 +1353,7 @@ int ssl3_get_key_exchange(SSL *s)
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	/* Total length of the parameters including the length prefix */
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	param_len=0;
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	alg_k=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
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	alg_a=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
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	EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
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	al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
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