ssl/*: remove SSL3_RECORD->orig_len to restore binary compatibility.
This commit is contained in:
21
ssl/s3_cbc.c
21
ssl/s3_cbc.c
@@ -116,7 +116,9 @@ int ssl3_cbc_remove_padding(const SSL* s,
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good = constant_time_ge(rec->length, padding_length+overhead);
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/* SSLv3 requires that the padding is minimal. */
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good &= constant_time_ge(block_size, padding_length+1);
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rec->length -= good & (padding_length+1);
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padding_length = good & (padding_length+1);
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rec->length -= padding_length;
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rec->type |= padding_length<<8; /* kludge: pass padding length */
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return (int)((good & 1) | (~good & -1));
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}
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@@ -203,7 +205,9 @@ int tls1_cbc_remove_padding(const SSL* s,
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good <<= sizeof(good)*8-1;
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good = DUPLICATE_MSB_TO_ALL(good);
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rec->length -= good & (padding_length+1);
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padding_length = good & (padding_length+1);
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rec->length -= padding_length;
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rec->type |= padding_length<<8; /* kludge: pass padding length */
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/* We can always safely skip the explicit IV. We check at the beginning
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* of this function that the record has at least enough space for the
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@@ -218,7 +222,6 @@ int tls1_cbc_remove_padding(const SSL* s,
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rec->data += block_size;
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rec->input += block_size;
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rec->length -= block_size;
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rec->orig_len -= block_size;
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}
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return (int)((good & 1) | (~good & -1));
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@@ -246,7 +249,7 @@ int tls1_cbc_remove_padding(const SSL* s,
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*/
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void ssl3_cbc_copy_mac(unsigned char* out,
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const SSL3_RECORD *rec,
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unsigned md_size)
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unsigned md_size,unsigned orig_len)
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{
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#if defined(CBC_MAC_ROTATE_IN_PLACE)
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unsigned char rotated_mac_buf[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE*2];
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@@ -265,7 +268,7 @@ void ssl3_cbc_copy_mac(unsigned char* out,
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unsigned div_spoiler;
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unsigned rotate_offset;
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OPENSSL_assert(rec->orig_len >= md_size);
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OPENSSL_assert(orig_len >= md_size);
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OPENSSL_assert(md_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
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#if defined(CBC_MAC_ROTATE_IN_PLACE)
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@@ -273,8 +276,8 @@ void ssl3_cbc_copy_mac(unsigned char* out,
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#endif
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/* This information is public so it's safe to branch based on it. */
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if (rec->orig_len > md_size + 255 + 1)
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scan_start = rec->orig_len - (md_size + 255 + 1);
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if (orig_len > md_size + 255 + 1)
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scan_start = orig_len - (md_size + 255 + 1);
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/* div_spoiler contains a multiple of md_size that is used to cause the
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* modulo operation to be constant time. Without this, the time varies
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* based on the amount of padding when running on Intel chips at least.
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@@ -287,9 +290,9 @@ void ssl3_cbc_copy_mac(unsigned char* out,
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rotate_offset = (div_spoiler + mac_start - scan_start) % md_size;
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memset(rotated_mac, 0, md_size);
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for (i = scan_start; i < rec->orig_len;)
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for (i = scan_start; i < orig_len;)
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{
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for (j = 0; j < md_size && i < rec->orig_len; i++, j++)
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for (j = 0; j < md_size && i < orig_len; i++, j++)
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{
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unsigned char mac_started = constant_time_ge(i, mac_start);
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unsigned char mac_ended = constant_time_ge(i, mac_end);
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