ssl/*: remove SSL3_RECORD->orig_len to restore binary compatibility.
This commit is contained in:
12
ssl/d1_pkt.c
12
ssl/d1_pkt.c
@@ -379,7 +379,7 @@ dtls1_process_record(SSL *s)
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int enc_err;
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SSL_SESSION *sess;
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SSL3_RECORD *rr;
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unsigned int mac_size;
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unsigned int mac_size, orig_len;
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unsigned char md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
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rr= &(s->s3->rrec);
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@@ -410,7 +410,7 @@ dtls1_process_record(SSL *s)
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/* decrypt in place in 'rr->input' */
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rr->data=rr->input;
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rr->orig_len=rr->length;
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orig_len=rr->length;
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enc_err = s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s,0);
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/* enc_err is:
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@@ -447,10 +447,10 @@ printf("\n");
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* therefore we can safely process the record in a different
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* amount of time if it's too short to possibly contain a MAC.
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*/
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if (rr->orig_len < mac_size ||
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if (orig_len < mac_size ||
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/* CBC records must have a padding length byte too. */
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(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE &&
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rr->orig_len < mac_size+1))
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orig_len < mac_size+1))
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{
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al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
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SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
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@@ -465,12 +465,12 @@ printf("\n");
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* without leaking the contents of the padding bytes.
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* */
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mac = mac_tmp;
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ssl3_cbc_copy_mac(mac_tmp, rr, mac_size);
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ssl3_cbc_copy_mac(mac_tmp, rr, mac_size, orig_len);
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rr->length -= mac_size;
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}
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else
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{
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/* In this case there's no padding, so |rec->orig_len|
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/* In this case there's no padding, so |orig_len|
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* equals |rec->length| and we checked that there's
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* enough bytes for |mac_size| above. */
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rr->length -= mac_size;
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