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Fix horrible (and hard to track down) bug in ssl23_get_client_hello:

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In case of a restart, v[0] and v[1] were incorrectly initialised.
This was interpreted by ssl3_get_client_key_exchange as an RSA decryption
failure (don't ask me why) and caused it to create a _random_ master key
instead (even weirder), which obviously led to incorrect input to
ssl3_generate_master_secret and thus caused "block cipher pad is
wrong" error messages from ssl3_enc for the client's Finished message.
Arrgh.
This commit is contained in:
Bodo Möller
1999-08-18 17:14:42 +00:00
parent 6e4a3b5529
commit de1915e48c
3 changed files with 13 additions and 2 deletions
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8
ssl/s23_srvr.c
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@@ -195,10 +195,11 @@ int ssl23_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
int type=0,use_sslv2_strong=0;
int v[2];
/* read the initial header */
v[0]=v[1]=0;
if (s->state == SSL23_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A)
{
/* read the initial header */
v[0]=v[1]=0;
if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s)) goto err;
n=ssl23_read_bytes(s,7);
@@ -244,6 +245,7 @@ int ssl23_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
type=1;
if (s->options & SSL_OP_NON_EXPORT_FIRST)
/* not only confusing, but broken! */
{
STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
SSL_CIPHER *c;
@@ -337,6 +339,8 @@ next_bit:
/* we have a SSLv3/TLSv1 in a SSLv2 header */
type=2;
p=s->packet;
v[0] = p[3];
v[1] = p[4];
n=((p[0]&0x7f)<<8)|p[1];
if (n > (1024*4))
{