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ssl/*: revert "remove SSL_RECORD->orig_len" and merge "fix IV".

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Revert is appropriate because binary compatibility is not an issue
in 1.1.
This commit is contained in:
Andy Polyakov
2013-02-08 10:20:48 +01:00
parent 32620fe9d1
commit dd7e60bd70
7 changed files with 43 additions and 59 deletions
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12
ssl/s3_pkt.c
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@@ -290,7 +290,7 @@ static int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s)
unsigned char *p;
unsigned char md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
short version;
unsigned mac_size, orig_len;
unsigned mac_size;
size_t extra;
rr= &(s->s3->rrec);
@@ -400,7 +400,7 @@ fprintf(stderr, "Record type=%d, Length=%d\n", rr->type, rr->length);
/* decrypt in place in 'rr->input' */
rr->data=rr->input;
orig_len=rr->length;
rr->orig_len=rr->length;
enc_err = s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s,0);
/* enc_err is:
@@ -436,10 +436,10 @@ printf("\n");
* therefore we can safely process the record in a different
* amount of time if it's too short to possibly contain a MAC.
*/
if (orig_len < mac_size ||
if (rr->orig_len < mac_size ||
/* CBC records must have a padding length byte too. */
(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE &&
orig_len < mac_size+1))
rr->orig_len < mac_size+1))
{
al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
@@ -454,12 +454,12 @@ printf("\n");
* without leaking the contents of the padding bytes.
* */
mac = mac_tmp;
ssl3_cbc_copy_mac(mac_tmp, rr, mac_size, orig_len);
ssl3_cbc_copy_mac(mac_tmp, rr, mac_size);
rr->length -= mac_size;
}
else
{
/* In this case there's no padding, so |orig_len|
/* In this case there's no padding, so |rec->orig_len|
* equals |rec->length| and we checked that there's
* enough bytes for |mac_size| above. */
rr->length -= mac_size;