Check for potentially exploitable overflows in asn1_d2i_read_bio
BUF_mem_grow and BUF_mem_grow_clean. Refuse attempts to shrink buffer in CRYPTO_realloc_clean. Thanks to Tavis Ormandy, Google Security Team, for discovering this issue and to Adam Langley <agl@chromium.org> for fixing it. (CVE-2012-2110)
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@@ -60,6 +60,11 @@
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#include "cryptlib.h"
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#include <openssl/buffer.h>
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/* LIMIT_BEFORE_EXPANSION is the maximum n such that (n+3)/3*4 < 2**31. That
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* function is applied in several functions in this file and this limit ensures
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* that the result fits in an int. */
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#define LIMIT_BEFORE_EXPANSION 0x5ffffffc
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BUF_MEM *BUF_MEM_new(void)
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{
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BUF_MEM *ret;
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@@ -105,6 +110,12 @@ int BUF_MEM_grow(BUF_MEM *str, size_t len)
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str->length=len;
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return(len);
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}
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/* This limit is sufficient to ensure (len+3)/3*4 < 2**31 */
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if (len > LIMIT_BEFORE_EXPANSION)
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{
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BUFerr(BUF_F_BUF_MEM_GROW,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
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return 0;
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}
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n=(len+3)/3*4;
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if (str->data == NULL)
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ret=OPENSSL_malloc(n);
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@@ -142,6 +153,12 @@ int BUF_MEM_grow_clean(BUF_MEM *str, size_t len)
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str->length=len;
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return(len);
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}
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/* This limit is sufficient to ensure (len+3)/3*4 < 2**31 */
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if (len > LIMIT_BEFORE_EXPANSION)
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{
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BUFerr(BUF_F_BUF_MEM_GROW,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
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return 0;
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}
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n=(len+3)/3*4;
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if (str->data == NULL)
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ret=OPENSSL_malloc(n);
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