Remove ECDH client auth code.

Remove incomplete non-functional ECDH client authentication code.

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
This commit is contained in:
Dr. Stephen Henson 2015-12-12 17:41:18 +00:00
parent 57be4444c6
commit c66ce5eb23
3 changed files with 29 additions and 114 deletions

View File

@ -4722,14 +4722,8 @@ int ssl3_get_req_cert_type(SSL *s, unsigned char *p)
p[ret++] = SSL3_CT_DSS_SIGN; p[ret++] = SSL3_CT_DSS_SIGN;
#endif #endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
if ((alg_k & (SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe)) && (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION)) {
if (nostrict || !(alg_a & SSL_aRSA))
p[ret++] = TLS_CT_RSA_FIXED_ECDH;
if (nostrict || !(alg_a & SSL_aECDSA))
p[ret++] = TLS_CT_ECDSA_FIXED_ECDH;
}
/* /*
* ECDSA certs can be used with RSA cipher suites as well so we don't * ECDSA certs can be used with RSA cipher suites too so we don't
* need to check for SSL_kECDH or SSL_kECDHE * need to check for SSL_kECDH or SSL_kECDHE
*/ */
if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION) { if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION) {

View File

@ -2470,35 +2470,7 @@ psk_err:
else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) { else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
const EC_GROUP *srvr_group = NULL; const EC_GROUP *srvr_group = NULL;
EC_KEY *tkey; EC_KEY *tkey;
int ecdh_clnt_cert = 0;
int field_size = 0; int field_size = 0;
/*
* Did we send out the client's ECDH share for use in premaster
* computation as part of client certificate? If so, set
* ecdh_clnt_cert to 1.
*/
if ((alg_k & (SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe)) && (s->cert != NULL)) {
/*-
* XXX: For now, we do not support client
* authentication using ECDH certificates.
* To add such support, one needs to add
* code that checks for appropriate
* conditions and sets ecdh_clnt_cert to 1.
* For example, the cert have an ECC
* key on the same curve as the server's
* and the key should be authorized for
* key agreement.
*
* One also needs to add code in ssl3_connect
* to skip sending the certificate verify
* message.
*
* if ((s->cert->key->privatekey != NULL) &&
* (s->cert->key->privatekey->type ==
* EVP_PKEY_EC) && ...)
* ecdh_clnt_cert = 1;
*/
}
if (s->s3->peer_ecdh_tmp != NULL) { if (s->s3->peer_ecdh_tmp != NULL) {
tkey = s->s3->peer_ecdh_tmp; tkey = s->s3->peer_ecdh_tmp;
@ -2535,30 +2507,10 @@ psk_err:
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB); SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
goto err; goto err;
} }
if (ecdh_clnt_cert) { /* Generate a new ECDH key pair */
/* if (!(EC_KEY_generate_key(clnt_ecdh))) {
* Reuse key info from our certificate We only need our SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
* private key to perform the ECDH computation. goto err;
*/
const BIGNUM *priv_key;
tkey = s->cert->key->privatekey->pkey.ec;
priv_key = EC_KEY_get0_private_key(tkey);
if (priv_key == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
if (!EC_KEY_set_private_key(clnt_ecdh, priv_key)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
goto err;
}
} else {
/* Generate a new ECDH key pair */
if (!(EC_KEY_generate_key(clnt_ecdh))) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
goto err;
}
} }
/* /*
@ -2581,34 +2533,29 @@ psk_err:
goto err; goto err;
} }
if (ecdh_clnt_cert) { /*
/* Send empty client key exch message */ * First check the size of encoding and allocate memory
n = 0; * accordingly.
} else { */
/* encoded_pt_len =
* First check the size of encoding and allocate memory EC_KEY_key2buf(clnt_ecdh, POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
* accordingly.
*/
encoded_pt_len =
EC_KEY_key2buf(clnt_ecdh, POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
&encodedPoint, NULL); &encodedPoint, NULL);
if (encoded_pt_len == 0) { if (encoded_pt_len == 0) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB); SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
goto err; goto err;
}
n = encoded_pt_len;
*p = n; /* length of encoded point */
/* Encoded point will be copied here */
p += 1;
/* copy the point */
memcpy(p, encodedPoint, n);
/* increment n to account for length field */
n += 1;
} }
n = encoded_pt_len;
*p = n; /* length of encoded point */
/* Encoded point will be copied here */
p += 1;
/* copy the point */
memcpy(p, encodedPoint, n);
/* increment n to account for length field */
n += 1;
/* Free allocated memory */ /* Free allocated memory */
OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint); OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
EC_KEY_free(clnt_ecdh); EC_KEY_free(clnt_ecdh);

View File

@ -2497,37 +2497,11 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_key_exchange(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
} }
if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0L) { if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0L) {
/* Client Publickey was in Client Certificate */ /* We don't support ECDH client auth */
al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, goto f_err;
SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
goto f_err;
}
if (((clnt_pub_pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer))
== NULL) || (clnt_pub_pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC)) {
/*
* XXX: For now, we do not support client authentication
* using ECDH certificates so this branch (n == 0L) of the
* code is never executed. When that support is added, we
* ought to ensure the key received in the certificate is
* authorized for key agreement. ECDH_compute_key implicitly
* checks that the two ECDH shares are for the same group.
*/
al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ECDH_CERTS);
goto f_err;
}
if (EC_POINT_copy(clnt_ecpoint,
EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_pub_pkey->
pkey.ec)) == 0) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
goto err;
}
s->statem.no_cert_verify = 1;
} else { } else {
/* /*
* Get client's public key from encoded point in the * Get client's public key from encoded point in the