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Assume TLS 1.0 when ClientHello fragment is too short.

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This commit is contained in:
Bodo Möller
2001-10-25 06:09:51 +00:00
parent cfc781be6e
commit ba1c602281
2 changed files with 21 additions and 7 deletions
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19
ssl/s23_srvr.c
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@@ -232,9 +232,9 @@ int ssl23_accept(SSL *s)
}
}
end:
s->in_handshake--;
if (cb != NULL)
cb(s,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_EXIT,ret);
s->in_handshake--;
return(ret);
}
@@ -339,17 +339,22 @@ int ssl23_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
/* We must look at client_version inside the Client Hello message
* to get the correct minor version.
* However if we have only a pathologically small fragment of the
* Client Hello message, this would be difficult, we'd have
* to read at least one additional record to find out.
* This doesn't usually happen in real life, so we just complain
* for now.
*/
* Client Hello message, this would be difficult, and we'd have
* to read more records to find out.
* No known SSL 3.0 client fragments ClientHello like this,
* so we simply assume TLS 1.0 to avoid protocol version downgrade
* attacks. */
if (p[3] == 0 && p[4] < 6)
{
#if 0
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL23_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_RECORD_TOO_SMALL);
goto err;
#else
v[1] = TLS1_VERSION_MINOR;
#endif
}
v[1]=p[10]; /* minor version according to client_version */
else
v[1]=p[10]; /* minor version according to client_version */
if (v[1] >= TLS1_VERSION_MINOR)
{
if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1))