Make libssl opaque. Move all structures that were previously protected by

OPENSSL_NO_SSL_INTERN into internal header files.

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
This commit is contained in:
Matt Caswell
2015-01-27 20:11:24 +00:00
parent 4de8385796
commit b6ba401497
6 changed files with 1039 additions and 1050 deletions

View File

@@ -380,62 +380,6 @@ extern "C" {
# define TLS1_HB_REQUEST 1
# define TLS1_HB_RESPONSE 2
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL_INTERN
typedef struct ssl3_record_st {
/* type of record */
/*
* r
*/ int type;
/* How many bytes available */
/*
* rw
*/ unsigned int length;
/*
* How many bytes were available before padding was removed? This is used
* to implement the MAC check in constant time for CBC records.
*/
/*
* rw
*/ unsigned int orig_len;
/* read/write offset into 'buf' */
/*
* r
*/ unsigned int off;
/* pointer to the record data */
/*
* rw
*/ unsigned char *data;
/* where the decode bytes are */
/*
* rw
*/ unsigned char *input;
/* only used with decompression - malloc()ed */
/*
* r
*/ unsigned char *comp;
/* epoch number, needed by DTLS1 */
/*
* r
*/ unsigned long epoch;
/* sequence number, needed by DTLS1 */
/*
* r
*/ unsigned char seq_num[8];
} SSL3_RECORD;
typedef struct ssl3_buffer_st {
/* at least SSL3_RT_MAX_PACKET_SIZE bytes, see ssl3_setup_buffers() */
unsigned char *buf;
/* buffer size */
size_t len;
/* where to 'copy from' */
int offset;
/* how many bytes left */
int left;
} SSL3_BUFFER;
# endif
# define SSL3_CT_RSA_SIGN 1
# define SSL3_CT_DSS_SIGN 2
@@ -465,154 +409,6 @@ typedef struct ssl3_buffer_st {
/* Set if we encrypt then mac instead of usual mac then encrypt */
# define TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC 0x0100
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL_INTERN
typedef struct ssl3_state_st {
long flags;
int delay_buf_pop_ret;
unsigned char read_sequence[8];
int read_mac_secret_size;
unsigned char read_mac_secret[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
unsigned char write_sequence[8];
int write_mac_secret_size;
unsigned char write_mac_secret[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
unsigned char server_random[SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE];
unsigned char client_random[SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE];
/* flags for countermeasure against known-IV weakness */
int need_empty_fragments;
int empty_fragment_done;
/* The value of 'extra' when the buffers were initialized */
int init_extra;
SSL3_BUFFER rbuf; /* read IO goes into here */
SSL3_BUFFER wbuf; /* write IO goes into here */
SSL3_RECORD rrec; /* each decoded record goes in here */
SSL3_RECORD wrec; /* goes out from here */
/*
* storage for Alert/Handshake protocol data received but not yet
* processed by ssl3_read_bytes:
*/
unsigned char alert_fragment[2];
unsigned int alert_fragment_len;
unsigned char handshake_fragment[4];
unsigned int handshake_fragment_len;
/* partial write - check the numbers match */
unsigned int wnum; /* number of bytes sent so far */
int wpend_tot; /* number bytes written */
int wpend_type;
int wpend_ret; /* number of bytes submitted */
const unsigned char *wpend_buf;
/* used during startup, digest all incoming/outgoing packets */
BIO *handshake_buffer;
/*
* When set of handshake digests is determined, buffer is hashed and
* freed and MD_CTX-es for all required digests are stored in this array
*/
EVP_MD_CTX **handshake_dgst;
/*
* Set whenever an expected ChangeCipherSpec message is processed.
* Unset when the peer's Finished message is received.
* Unexpected ChangeCipherSpec messages trigger a fatal alert.
*/
int change_cipher_spec;
int warn_alert;
int fatal_alert;
/*
* we allow one fatal and one warning alert to be outstanding, send close
* alert via the warning alert
*/
int alert_dispatch;
unsigned char send_alert[2];
/*
* This flag is set when we should renegotiate ASAP, basically when there
* is no more data in the read or write buffers
*/
int renegotiate;
int total_renegotiations;
int num_renegotiations;
int in_read_app_data;
struct {
/* actually only needs to be 16+20 */
unsigned char cert_verify_md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE * 2];
/* actually only need to be 16+20 for SSLv3 and 12 for TLS */
unsigned char finish_md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE * 2];
int finish_md_len;
unsigned char peer_finish_md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE * 2];
int peer_finish_md_len;
unsigned long message_size;
int message_type;
/* used to hold the new cipher we are going to use */
const SSL_CIPHER *new_cipher;
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
DH *dh;
# endif
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
EC_KEY *ecdh; /* holds short lived ECDH key */
# endif
/* used when SSL_ST_FLUSH_DATA is entered */
int next_state;
int reuse_message;
/* used for certificate requests */
int cert_req;
int ctype_num;
char ctype[SSL3_CT_NUMBER];
STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_names;
int use_rsa_tmp;
int key_block_length;
unsigned char *key_block;
const EVP_CIPHER *new_sym_enc;
const EVP_MD *new_hash;
int new_mac_pkey_type;
int new_mac_secret_size;
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
const SSL_COMP *new_compression;
# else
char *new_compression;
# endif
int cert_request;
} tmp;
/* Connection binding to prevent renegotiation attacks */
unsigned char previous_client_finished[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
unsigned char previous_client_finished_len;
unsigned char previous_server_finished[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
unsigned char previous_server_finished_len;
int send_connection_binding; /* TODOEKR */
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
/*
* Set if we saw the Next Protocol Negotiation extension from our peer.
*/
int next_proto_neg_seen;
# endif
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
/*
* ALPN information (we are in the process of transitioning from NPN to
* ALPN.)
*/
/*
* In a server these point to the selected ALPN protocol after the
* ClientHello has been processed. In a client these contain the protocol
* that the server selected once the ServerHello has been processed.
*/
unsigned char *alpn_selected;
unsigned alpn_selected_len;
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
/*
* This is set to true if we believe that this is a version of Safari
* running on OS X 10.6 or newer. We wish to know this because Safari on
* 10.8 .. 10.8.3 has broken ECDHE-ECDSA support.
*/
char is_probably_safari;
# endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
# endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
} SSL3_STATE;
# endif
/* SSLv3 */
/*