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@ -381,7 +381,8 @@
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*) Since 0.9.8b, ciphersuite strings naming explicit ciphersuites
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match only those. Before that, "AES256-SHA" would be interpreted
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as a pattern and match "AES128-SHA" too since we currently only
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as a pattern and match "AES128-SHA" too (since AES128-SHA got
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the same strength classification in 0.9.7h) as we currently only
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have a single AES bit in the ciphersuite description bitmap.
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That change, however, also applied to ciphersuite strings such as
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"RC4-MD5" that intentionally matched multiple ciphersuites --
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@ -1366,6 +1367,17 @@
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differing sizes.
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[Richard Levitte]
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Changes between 0.9.7k and 0.9.7l [xx XXX xxxx]
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*) Change ciphersuite string processing so that an explicit
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ciphersuite selects this one ciphersuite (so that "AES256-SHA"
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will no longer include "AES128-SHA"), and any other similar
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ciphersuite (same bitmap) from *other* protocol versions (so that
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"RC4-MD5" will still include both the SSL 2.0 ciphersuite and the
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SSL 3.0/TLS 1.0 ciphersuite). This is a backport combining
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changes from 0.9.8b and 0.9.8d.
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[Bodo Moeller]
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Changes between 0.9.7j and 0.9.7k [05 Sep 2006]
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*) Avoid PKCS #1 v1.5 signature attack discovered by Daniel Bleichenbacher
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