Don't crash when processing a zero-length, TLS >= 1.1 record.
The previous CBC patch was bugged in that there was a path through enc()
in s3_pkt.c/d1_pkt.c which didn't set orig_len. orig_len would be left
at the previous value which could suggest that the packet was a
sufficient length when it wasn't.
(cherry picked from commit 6cb19b7681
)
(cherry picked from commit 2c948c1bb218f4ae126e14fd3453d42c62b93235)
Conflicts:
ssl/s3_enc.c
This commit is contained in:

committed by
Dr. Stephen Henson

parent
2928cb4c82
commit
b3a959a337
@@ -246,7 +246,6 @@ int dtls1_enc(SSL *s, int send)
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}
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}
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#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
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#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
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rec->orig_len = rec->length;
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if ((bs != 1) && !send)
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if ((bs != 1) && !send)
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return tls1_cbc_remove_padding(s, rec, bs, mac_size);
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return tls1_cbc_remove_padding(s, rec, bs, mac_size);
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}
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}
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@@ -367,6 +367,7 @@ dtls1_process_record(SSL *s)
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/* decrypt in place in 'rr->input' */
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/* decrypt in place in 'rr->input' */
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rr->data=rr->input;
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rr->data=rr->input;
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rr->orig_len=rr->length;
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enc_err = s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s,0);
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enc_err = s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s,0);
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if (enc_err <= 0)
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if (enc_err <= 0)
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10
ssl/s3_enc.c
10
ssl/s3_enc.c
@@ -433,6 +433,15 @@ void ssl3_cleanup_key_block(SSL *s)
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s->s3->tmp.key_block_length=0;
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s->s3->tmp.key_block_length=0;
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}
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}
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/* ssl3_enc encrypts/decrypts the record in |s->wrec| / |s->rrec|, respectively.
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*
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* Returns:
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* 0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publically invalid (i.e. too
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* short etc).
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* 1: if the record's padding is valid / the encryption was successful.
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* -1: if the record's padding is invalid or, if sending, an internal error
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* occured.
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*/
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int ssl3_enc(SSL *s, int send)
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int ssl3_enc(SSL *s, int send)
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{
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{
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SSL3_RECORD *rec;
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SSL3_RECORD *rec;
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@@ -503,6 +512,7 @@ int ssl3_enc(SSL *s, int send)
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if (s->read_hash != NULL)
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if (s->read_hash != NULL)
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mac_size = EVP_MD_size(s->read_hash);
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mac_size = EVP_MD_size(s->read_hash);
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if ((bs != 1) && !send)
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if ((bs != 1) && !send)
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return ssl3_cbc_remove_padding(s, rec, bs, mac_size);
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return ssl3_cbc_remove_padding(s, rec, bs, mac_size);
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}
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}
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@@ -352,8 +352,13 @@ again:
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/* decrypt in place in 'rr->input' */
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/* decrypt in place in 'rr->input' */
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rr->data=rr->input;
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rr->data=rr->input;
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rr->orig_len=rr->length;
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enc_err = s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s,0);
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enc_err = s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s,0);
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/* enc_err is:
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* 0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publically invalid.
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* 1: if the padding is valid
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* -1: if the padding is invalid */
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if (enc_err == 0)
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if (enc_err == 0)
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{
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{
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/* SSLerr() and ssl3_send_alert() have been called */
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/* SSLerr() and ssl3_send_alert() have been called */
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11
ssl/t1_enc.c
11
ssl/t1_enc.c
@@ -528,6 +528,15 @@ err:
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return(0);
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return(0);
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}
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}
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/* tls1_enc encrypts/decrypts the record in |s->wrec| / |s->rrec|, respectively.
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*
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* Returns:
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* 0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publically invalid (i.e. too
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* short etc).
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* 1: if the record's padding is valid / the encryption was successful.
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* -1: if the record's padding/AEAD-authenticator is invalid or, if sending,
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* an internal error occured.
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*/
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int tls1_enc(SSL *s, int send)
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int tls1_enc(SSL *s, int send)
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{
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{
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SSL3_RECORD *rec;
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SSL3_RECORD *rec;
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@@ -628,8 +637,6 @@ int tls1_enc(SSL *s, int send)
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}
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}
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#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
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#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
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rec->orig_len = rec->length;
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ret = 1;
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ret = 1;
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if (s->read_hash != NULL)
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if (s->read_hash != NULL)
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mac_size = EVP_MD_size(s->read_hash);
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mac_size = EVP_MD_size(s->read_hash);
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