diff --git a/CHANGES b/CHANGES
index c3bb94052..c91552ca1 100644
--- a/CHANGES
+++ b/CHANGES
@@ -4,6 +4,43 @@
 
  Changes between 1.0.1j and 1.0.1k [xx XXX xxxx]
 
+  *) Fix various certificate fingerprint issues.
+
+     By using non-DER or invalid encodings outside the signed portion of a
+     certificate the fingerprint can be changed without breaking the signature.
+     Although no details of the signed portion of the certificate can be changed
+     this can cause problems with some applications: e.g. those using the
+     certificate fingerprint for blacklists.
+
+     1. Reject signatures with non zero unused bits.
+
+     If the BIT STRING containing the signature has non zero unused bits reject
+     the signature. All current signature algorithms require zero unused bits.
+
+     2. Check certificate algorithm consistency.
+
+     Check the AlgorithmIdentifier inside TBS matches the one in the
+     certificate signature. NB: this will result in signature failure
+     errors for some broken certificates.
+
+     Thanks to Konrad Kraszewski from Google for reporting this issue.
+
+     3. Check DSA/ECDSA signatures use DER.
+
+     Reencode DSA/ECDSA signatures and compare with the original received
+     signature. Return an error if there is a mismatch.
+
+     This will reject various cases including garbage after signature
+     (thanks to Antti Karjalainen and Tuomo Untinen from the Codenomicon CROSS
+     program for discovering this case) and use of BER or invalid ASN.1 INTEGERs
+     (negative or with leading zeroes).
+
+     Further analysis was conducted and fixes were developed by Stephen Henson
+     of the OpenSSL core team.
+
+     (CVE-2014-8275)
+     [Steve Henson]
+
    *) Do not resume sessions on the server if the negotiated protocol
       version does not match the session's version. Resuming with a different
       version, while not strictly forbidden by the RFC, is of questionable
diff --git a/crypto/asn1/a_verify.c b/crypto/asn1/a_verify.c
index fc84cd3d1..a571009ab 100644
--- a/crypto/asn1/a_verify.c
+++ b/crypto/asn1/a_verify.c
@@ -90,6 +90,12 @@ int ASN1_verify(i2d_of_void *i2d, X509_ALGOR *a, ASN1_BIT_STRING *signature,
 		ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_VERIFY,ASN1_R_UNKNOWN_MESSAGE_DIGEST_ALGORITHM);
 		goto err;
 		}
+
+	if (signature->type == V_ASN1_BIT_STRING && signature->flags & 0x7)
+		{
+		ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_VERIFY, ASN1_R_INVALID_BIT_STRING_BITS_LEFT);
+		goto err;
+		}
 	
 	inl=i2d(data,NULL);
 	buf_in=OPENSSL_malloc((unsigned int)inl);
@@ -146,6 +152,12 @@ int ASN1_item_verify(const ASN1_ITEM *it, X509_ALGOR *a,
 		return -1;
 		}
 
+	if (signature->type == V_ASN1_BIT_STRING && signature->flags & 0x7)
+		{
+		ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_VERIFY, ASN1_R_INVALID_BIT_STRING_BITS_LEFT);
+		return -1;
+		}
+
 	EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx);
 
 	/* Convert signature OID into digest and public key OIDs */
diff --git a/crypto/dsa/dsa_asn1.c b/crypto/dsa/dsa_asn1.c
index 605853437..473af873e 100644
--- a/crypto/dsa/dsa_asn1.c
+++ b/crypto/dsa/dsa_asn1.c
@@ -176,13 +176,25 @@ int DSA_verify(int type, const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len,
 	     const unsigned char *sigbuf, int siglen, DSA *dsa)
 	{
 	DSA_SIG *s;
+	const unsigned char *p = sigbuf;
+	unsigned char *der = NULL;
+	int derlen = -1;
 	int ret=-1;
 
 	s = DSA_SIG_new();
 	if (s == NULL) return(ret);
-	if (d2i_DSA_SIG(&s,&sigbuf,siglen) == NULL) goto err;
+	if (d2i_DSA_SIG(&s,&p,siglen) == NULL) goto err;
+	/* Ensure signature uses DER and doesn't have trailing garbage */
+	derlen = i2d_DSA_SIG(s, &der);
+	if (derlen != siglen || memcmp(sigbuf, der, derlen))
+		goto err;
 	ret=DSA_do_verify(dgst,dgst_len,s,dsa);
 err:
+	if (derlen > 0)
+		{
+		OPENSSL_cleanse(der, derlen);
+		OPENSSL_free(der);
+		}
 	DSA_SIG_free(s);
 	return(ret);
 	}
diff --git a/crypto/ecdsa/ecs_vrf.c b/crypto/ecdsa/ecs_vrf.c
index ef9acf7b6..2836efe5e 100644
--- a/crypto/ecdsa/ecs_vrf.c
+++ b/crypto/ecdsa/ecs_vrf.c
@@ -57,6 +57,7 @@
  */
 
 #include "ecs_locl.h"
+#include "cryptlib.h"
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
 #include <openssl/engine.h>
 #endif
@@ -84,13 +85,25 @@ int ECDSA_verify(int type, const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len,
 		const unsigned char *sigbuf, int sig_len, EC_KEY *eckey)
  	{
 	ECDSA_SIG *s;
+	const unsigned char *p = sigbuf;
+	unsigned char *der = NULL;
+	int derlen = -1;
 	int ret=-1;
 
 	s = ECDSA_SIG_new();
 	if (s == NULL) return(ret);
-	if (d2i_ECDSA_SIG(&s, &sigbuf, sig_len) == NULL) goto err;
+	if (d2i_ECDSA_SIG(&s, &p, sig_len) == NULL) goto err;
+	/* Ensure signature uses DER and doesn't have trailing garbage */
+	derlen = i2d_ECDSA_SIG(s, &der);
+	if (derlen != sig_len || memcmp(sigbuf, der, derlen))
+		goto err;
 	ret=ECDSA_do_verify(dgst, dgst_len, s, eckey);
 err:
+	if (derlen > 0)
+		{
+		OPENSSL_cleanse(der, derlen);
+		OPENSSL_free(der);
+		}
 	ECDSA_SIG_free(s);
 	return(ret);
 	}
diff --git a/crypto/x509/x_all.c b/crypto/x509/x_all.c
index e06602d65..fef55f89d 100644
--- a/crypto/x509/x_all.c
+++ b/crypto/x509/x_all.c
@@ -72,6 +72,8 @@
 
 int X509_verify(X509 *a, EVP_PKEY *r)
 	{
+	if (X509_ALGOR_cmp(a->sig_alg, a->cert_info->signature))
+		return 0;
 	return(ASN1_item_verify(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(X509_CINF),a->sig_alg,
 		a->signature,a->cert_info,r));
 	}