dead code cleanup: #if 0 in ssl
I left many "#if 0" lines, usually because I thought we would probably want to revisit them later, or because they provided some useful internal documentation tips. Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
This commit is contained in:
@@ -204,23 +204,10 @@ int SSL_clear(SSL *s)
|
||||
s->hit = 0;
|
||||
s->shutdown = 0;
|
||||
|
||||
#if 0
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Disabled since version 1.10 of this file (early return not
|
||||
* needed because SSL_clear is not called when doing renegotiation)
|
||||
*/
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* This is set if we are doing dynamic renegotiation so keep
|
||||
* the old cipher. It is sort of a SSL_clear_lite :-)
|
||||
*/
|
||||
if (s->renegotiate)
|
||||
return (1);
|
||||
#else
|
||||
if (s->renegotiate) {
|
||||
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CLEAR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
|
||||
s->type = 0;
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -230,9 +217,6 @@ int SSL_clear(SSL *s)
|
||||
s->client_version = s->version;
|
||||
s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
|
||||
s->rstate = SSL_ST_READ_HEADER;
|
||||
#if 0
|
||||
s->read_ahead = s->ctx->read_ahead;
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
|
||||
if (s->init_buf != NULL) {
|
||||
BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf);
|
||||
@@ -326,9 +310,6 @@ SSL *SSL_new(SSL_CTX *ctx)
|
||||
s->msg_callback_arg = ctx->msg_callback_arg;
|
||||
s->verify_mode = ctx->verify_mode;
|
||||
s->not_resumable_session_cb = ctx->not_resumable_session_cb;
|
||||
#if 0
|
||||
s->verify_depth = ctx->verify_depth;
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
s->sid_ctx_length = ctx->sid_ctx_length;
|
||||
OPENSSL_assert(s->sid_ctx_length <= sizeof s->sid_ctx);
|
||||
memcpy(&s->sid_ctx, &ctx->sid_ctx, sizeof(s->sid_ctx));
|
||||
@@ -339,10 +320,6 @@ SSL *SSL_new(SSL_CTX *ctx)
|
||||
if (!s->param)
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(s->param, ctx->param);
|
||||
#if 0
|
||||
s->purpose = ctx->purpose;
|
||||
s->trust = ctx->trust;
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
s->quiet_shutdown = ctx->quiet_shutdown;
|
||||
s->max_send_fragment = ctx->max_send_fragment;
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1915,26 +1892,14 @@ SSL_CTX *SSL_CTX_new(const SSL_METHOD *meth)
|
||||
|
||||
ret->references = 1;
|
||||
ret->quiet_shutdown = 0;
|
||||
|
||||
/* ret->cipher=NULL;*/
|
||||
/*-
|
||||
ret->s2->challenge=NULL;
|
||||
ret->master_key=NULL;
|
||||
ret->s2->conn_id=NULL; */
|
||||
|
||||
ret->info_callback = NULL;
|
||||
|
||||
ret->app_verify_callback = 0;
|
||||
ret->app_verify_arg = NULL;
|
||||
|
||||
ret->max_cert_list = SSL_MAX_CERT_LIST_DEFAULT;
|
||||
ret->read_ahead = 0;
|
||||
ret->msg_callback = 0;
|
||||
ret->msg_callback_arg = NULL;
|
||||
ret->verify_mode = SSL_VERIFY_NONE;
|
||||
#if 0
|
||||
ret->verify_depth = -1; /* Don't impose a limit (but x509_lu.c does) */
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
ret->sid_ctx_length = 0;
|
||||
ret->default_verify_callback = NULL;
|
||||
if ((ret->cert = ssl_cert_new()) == NULL)
|
||||
@@ -2097,13 +2062,7 @@ void SSL_CTX_free(SSL_CTX *a)
|
||||
sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(a->client_CA, X509_NAME_free);
|
||||
if (a->extra_certs != NULL)
|
||||
sk_X509_pop_free(a->extra_certs, X509_free);
|
||||
#if 0 /* This should never be done, since it
|
||||
* removes a global database */
|
||||
if (a->comp_methods != NULL)
|
||||
sk_SSL_COMP_pop_free(a->comp_methods, SSL_COMP_free);
|
||||
#else
|
||||
a->comp_methods = NULL;
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
|
||||
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
|
||||
if (a->srtp_profiles)
|
||||
@@ -2265,15 +2224,6 @@ void ssl_set_cert_masks(CERT *c, const SSL_CIPHER *cipher)
|
||||
if (rsa_enc_export || (rsa_tmp_export && (rsa_sign || rsa_enc)))
|
||||
emask_k |= SSL_kRSA;
|
||||
|
||||
#if 0
|
||||
/* The match needs to be both kDHE and aRSA or aDSA, so don't worry */
|
||||
if ((dh_tmp || dh_rsa || dh_dsa) && (rsa_enc || rsa_sign || dsa_sign))
|
||||
mask_k |= SSL_kDHE;
|
||||
if ((dh_tmp_export || dh_rsa_export || dh_dsa_export) &&
|
||||
(rsa_enc || rsa_sign || dsa_sign))
|
||||
emask_k |= SSL_kDHE;
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
|
||||
if (dh_tmp_export)
|
||||
emask_k |= SSL_kDHE;
|
||||
|
||||
|
Reference in New Issue
Block a user