More Kerberos SSL changes from Jeffrey Altman <jaltman@columbia.edu>
His comments are: First, it corrects a problem introduced in the last patch where the kssl_map_enc() would intentionally return NULL for valid ENCTYPE values. This was done to prevent verification of the kerberos 5 authenticator from being performed when Derived Key ciphers were in use. Unfortunately, the authenticator verification routine was not the only place that function was used. And it caused core dumps. Second, it attempt to add to SSL_SESSION the Kerberos 5 Client Principal Name.
This commit is contained in:
16
ssl/kssl.c
16
ssl/kssl.c
@@ -760,19 +760,14 @@ kssl_map_enc(krb5_enctype enctype)
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{
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switch (enctype)
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{
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#if ! defined(KRB5_MIT_OLD11)
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/* cannot handle derived keys */
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case ENCTYPE_DES3_CBC_SHA1: /* EVP_des_ede3_cbc(); */
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case ENCTYPE_DES_HMAC_SHA1: /* EVP_des_cbc(); */
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return (EVP_CIPHER *) NULL;
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break;
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#endif
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case ENCTYPE_DES_CBC_CRC:
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case ENCTYPE_DES_CBC_MD4:
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case ENCTYPE_DES_CBC_MD5:
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case ENCTYPE_DES_CBC_RAW:
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return (EVP_CIPHER *) EVP_des_cbc();
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break;
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case ENCTYPE_DES3_CBC_SHA1: /* EVP_des_ede3_cbc(); */
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case ENCTYPE_DES3_CBC_SHA:
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case ENCTYPE_DES3_CBC_RAW:
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return (EVP_CIPHER *) EVP_des_ede3_cbc();
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@@ -1979,6 +1974,15 @@ krb5_error_code kssl_check_authent(
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}
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enctype = dec_authent->etype->data[0]; /* should = kssl_ctx->enctype */
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#if !defined(KRB5_MIT_OLD11)
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switch ( enctype ) {
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case ENCTYPE_DES3_CBC_SHA1: /* EVP_des_ede3_cbc(); */
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case ENCTYPE_DES3_CBC_SHA:
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case ENCTYPE_DES3_CBC_RAW:
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krb5rc = 0; /* Skip, can't handle derived keys */
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goto err;
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}
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#endif
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enc = kssl_map_enc(enctype);
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memset(iv, 0, EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH); /* per RFC 1510 */
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