Fix SRP ciphersuite DoS vulnerability.
If a client attempted to use an SRP ciphersuite and it had not been set up correctly it would crash with a null pointer read. A malicious server could exploit this in a DoS attack. Thanks to Joonas Kuorilehto and Riku Hietamäki from Codenomicon for reporting this issue. CVE-2014-5139 Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
This commit is contained in:

committed by
Matt Caswell

parent
86788e1ee6
commit
83764a989d
@@ -954,6 +954,15 @@ int ssl3_get_server_hello(SSL *s)
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SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED);
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SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED);
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goto f_err;
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goto f_err;
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}
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}
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#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
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if (((c->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) || (c->algorithm_auth & SSL_aSRP)) &&
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!(s->srp_ctx.srp_Mask & SSL_kSRP))
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{
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al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
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SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED);
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goto f_err;
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}
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#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_SRP */
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p+=ssl_put_cipher_by_char(s,NULL,NULL);
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p+=ssl_put_cipher_by_char(s,NULL,NULL);
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sk=ssl_get_ciphers_by_id(s);
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sk=ssl_get_ciphers_by_id(s);
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@@ -1406,6 +1406,11 @@ int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL *s,STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk,unsigned char *p,
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s->psk_client_callback == NULL)
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s->psk_client_callback == NULL)
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continue;
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continue;
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#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
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#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
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#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
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if (((c->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) || (c->algorithm_auth & SSL_aSRP)) &&
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!(s->srp_ctx.srp_Mask & SSL_kSRP))
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continue;
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#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_SRP */
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j = put_cb ? put_cb(c,p) : ssl_put_cipher_by_char(s,c,p);
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j = put_cb ? put_cb(c,p) : ssl_put_cipher_by_char(s,c,p);
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p+=j;
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p+=j;
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}
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}
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