One time CAN->CVE change
This commit is contained in:
parent
860841794d
commit
802c014656
30
CHANGES
30
CHANGES
@ -10,7 +10,7 @@
|
|||||||
(part of SSL_OP_ALL). This option used to disable the
|
(part of SSL_OP_ALL). This option used to disable the
|
||||||
countermeasure against man-in-the-middle protocol-version
|
countermeasure against man-in-the-middle protocol-version
|
||||||
rollback in the SSL 2.0 server implementation, which is a bad
|
rollback in the SSL 2.0 server implementation, which is a bad
|
||||||
idea. (CAN-2005-2969)
|
idea. (CVE-2005-2969)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
[Bodo Moeller; problem pointed out by Yutaka Oiwa (Research Center
|
[Bodo Moeller; problem pointed out by Yutaka Oiwa (Research Center
|
||||||
for Information Security, National Institute of Advanced Industrial
|
for Information Security, National Institute of Advanced Industrial
|
||||||
@ -1040,11 +1040,11 @@
|
|||||||
Changes between 0.9.7c and 0.9.7d [17 Mar 2004]
|
Changes between 0.9.7c and 0.9.7d [17 Mar 2004]
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
*) Fix null-pointer assignment in do_change_cipher_spec() revealed
|
*) Fix null-pointer assignment in do_change_cipher_spec() revealed
|
||||||
by using the Codenomicon TLS Test Tool (CAN-2004-0079)
|
by using the Codenomicon TLS Test Tool (CVE-2004-0079)
|
||||||
[Joe Orton, Steve Henson]
|
[Joe Orton, Steve Henson]
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
*) Fix flaw in SSL/TLS handshaking when using Kerberos ciphersuites
|
*) Fix flaw in SSL/TLS handshaking when using Kerberos ciphersuites
|
||||||
(CAN-2004-0112)
|
(CVE-2004-0112)
|
||||||
[Joe Orton, Steve Henson]
|
[Joe Orton, Steve Henson]
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
*) Make it possible to have multiple active certificates with the same
|
*) Make it possible to have multiple active certificates with the same
|
||||||
@ -1087,9 +1087,9 @@
|
|||||||
*) Fix various bugs revealed by running the NISCC test suite:
|
*) Fix various bugs revealed by running the NISCC test suite:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
Stop out of bounds reads in the ASN1 code when presented with
|
Stop out of bounds reads in the ASN1 code when presented with
|
||||||
invalid tags (CAN-2003-0543 and CAN-2003-0544).
|
invalid tags (CVE-2003-0543 and CVE-2003-0544).
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
Free up ASN1_TYPE correctly if ANY type is invalid (CAN-2003-0545).
|
Free up ASN1_TYPE correctly if ANY type is invalid (CVE-2003-0545).
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
If verify callback ignores invalid public key errors don't try to check
|
If verify callback ignores invalid public key errors don't try to check
|
||||||
certificate signature with the NULL public key.
|
certificate signature with the NULL public key.
|
||||||
@ -1174,7 +1174,7 @@
|
|||||||
via timing by performing a MAC computation even if incorrrect
|
via timing by performing a MAC computation even if incorrrect
|
||||||
block cipher padding has been found. This is a countermeasure
|
block cipher padding has been found. This is a countermeasure
|
||||||
against active attacks where the attacker has to distinguish
|
against active attacks where the attacker has to distinguish
|
||||||
between bad padding and a MAC verification error. (CAN-2003-0078)
|
between bad padding and a MAC verification error. (CVE-2003-0078)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
[Bodo Moeller; problem pointed out by Brice Canvel (EPFL),
|
[Bodo Moeller; problem pointed out by Brice Canvel (EPFL),
|
||||||
Alain Hiltgen (UBS), Serge Vaudenay (EPFL), and
|
Alain Hiltgen (UBS), Serge Vaudenay (EPFL), and
|
||||||
@ -1391,7 +1391,7 @@
|
|||||||
|
|
||||||
Remote buffer overflow in SSL3 protocol - an attacker could
|
Remote buffer overflow in SSL3 protocol - an attacker could
|
||||||
supply an oversized master key in Kerberos-enabled versions.
|
supply an oversized master key in Kerberos-enabled versions.
|
||||||
(CAN-2002-0657)
|
(CVE-2002-0657)
|
||||||
[Ben Laurie (CHATS)]
|
[Ben Laurie (CHATS)]
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
*) Change the SSL kerb5 codes to match RFC 2712.
|
*) Change the SSL kerb5 codes to match RFC 2712.
|
||||||
@ -3075,7 +3075,7 @@ des-cbc 3624.96k 5258.21k 5530.91k 5624.30k 5628.26k
|
|||||||
Changes between 0.9.6l and 0.9.6m [17 Mar 2004]
|
Changes between 0.9.6l and 0.9.6m [17 Mar 2004]
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
*) Fix null-pointer assignment in do_change_cipher_spec() revealed
|
*) Fix null-pointer assignment in do_change_cipher_spec() revealed
|
||||||
by using the Codenomicon TLS Test Tool (CAN-2004-0079)
|
by using the Codenomicon TLS Test Tool (CVE-2004-0079)
|
||||||
[Joe Orton, Steve Henson]
|
[Joe Orton, Steve Henson]
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
Changes between 0.9.6k and 0.9.6l [04 Nov 2003]
|
Changes between 0.9.6k and 0.9.6l [04 Nov 2003]
|
||||||
@ -3083,7 +3083,7 @@ des-cbc 3624.96k 5258.21k 5530.91k 5624.30k 5628.26k
|
|||||||
*) Fix additional bug revealed by the NISCC test suite:
|
*) Fix additional bug revealed by the NISCC test suite:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
Stop bug triggering large recursion when presented with
|
Stop bug triggering large recursion when presented with
|
||||||
certain ASN.1 tags (CAN-2003-0851)
|
certain ASN.1 tags (CVE-2003-0851)
|
||||||
[Steve Henson]
|
[Steve Henson]
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
Changes between 0.9.6j and 0.9.6k [30 Sep 2003]
|
Changes between 0.9.6j and 0.9.6k [30 Sep 2003]
|
||||||
@ -3091,7 +3091,7 @@ des-cbc 3624.96k 5258.21k 5530.91k 5624.30k 5628.26k
|
|||||||
*) Fix various bugs revealed by running the NISCC test suite:
|
*) Fix various bugs revealed by running the NISCC test suite:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
Stop out of bounds reads in the ASN1 code when presented with
|
Stop out of bounds reads in the ASN1 code when presented with
|
||||||
invalid tags (CAN-2003-0543 and CAN-2003-0544).
|
invalid tags (CVE-2003-0543 and CVE-2003-0544).
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
If verify callback ignores invalid public key errors don't try to check
|
If verify callback ignores invalid public key errors don't try to check
|
||||||
certificate signature with the NULL public key.
|
certificate signature with the NULL public key.
|
||||||
@ -3143,7 +3143,7 @@ des-cbc 3624.96k 5258.21k 5530.91k 5624.30k 5628.26k
|
|||||||
via timing by performing a MAC computation even if incorrrect
|
via timing by performing a MAC computation even if incorrrect
|
||||||
block cipher padding has been found. This is a countermeasure
|
block cipher padding has been found. This is a countermeasure
|
||||||
against active attacks where the attacker has to distinguish
|
against active attacks where the attacker has to distinguish
|
||||||
between bad padding and a MAC verification error. (CAN-2003-0078)
|
between bad padding and a MAC verification error. (CVE-2003-0078)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
[Bodo Moeller; problem pointed out by Brice Canvel (EPFL),
|
[Bodo Moeller; problem pointed out by Brice Canvel (EPFL),
|
||||||
Alain Hiltgen (UBS), Serge Vaudenay (EPFL), and
|
Alain Hiltgen (UBS), Serge Vaudenay (EPFL), and
|
||||||
@ -3276,7 +3276,7 @@ des-cbc 3624.96k 5258.21k 5530.91k 5624.30k 5628.26k
|
|||||||
*) Add various sanity checks to asn1_get_length() to reject
|
*) Add various sanity checks to asn1_get_length() to reject
|
||||||
the ASN1 length bytes if they exceed sizeof(long), will appear
|
the ASN1 length bytes if they exceed sizeof(long), will appear
|
||||||
negative or the content length exceeds the length of the
|
negative or the content length exceeds the length of the
|
||||||
supplied buffer. (CAN-2002-0659)
|
supplied buffer. (CVE-2002-0659)
|
||||||
[Steve Henson, Adi Stav <stav@mercury.co.il>, James Yonan <jim@ntlp.com>]
|
[Steve Henson, Adi Stav <stav@mercury.co.il>, James Yonan <jim@ntlp.com>]
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
*) Assertions for various potential buffer overflows, not known to
|
*) Assertions for various potential buffer overflows, not known to
|
||||||
@ -3284,15 +3284,15 @@ des-cbc 3624.96k 5258.21k 5530.91k 5624.30k 5628.26k
|
|||||||
[Ben Laurie (CHATS)]
|
[Ben Laurie (CHATS)]
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
*) Various temporary buffers to hold ASCII versions of integers were
|
*) Various temporary buffers to hold ASCII versions of integers were
|
||||||
too small for 64 bit platforms. (CAN-2002-0655)
|
too small for 64 bit platforms. (CVE-2002-0655)
|
||||||
[Matthew Byng-Maddick <mbm@aldigital.co.uk> and Ben Laurie (CHATS)>
|
[Matthew Byng-Maddick <mbm@aldigital.co.uk> and Ben Laurie (CHATS)>
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
*) Remote buffer overflow in SSL3 protocol - an attacker could
|
*) Remote buffer overflow in SSL3 protocol - an attacker could
|
||||||
supply an oversized session ID to a client. (CAN-2002-0656)
|
supply an oversized session ID to a client. (CVE-2002-0656)
|
||||||
[Ben Laurie (CHATS)]
|
[Ben Laurie (CHATS)]
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
*) Remote buffer overflow in SSL2 protocol - an attacker could
|
*) Remote buffer overflow in SSL2 protocol - an attacker could
|
||||||
supply an oversized client master key. (CAN-2002-0656)
|
supply an oversized client master key. (CVE-2002-0656)
|
||||||
[Ben Laurie (CHATS)]
|
[Ben Laurie (CHATS)]
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
Changes between 0.9.6c and 0.9.6d [9 May 2002]
|
Changes between 0.9.6c and 0.9.6d [9 May 2002]
|
||||||
|
Loading…
x
Reference in New Issue
Block a user