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One time CAN->CVE change

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This commit is contained in:
Mark J. Cox 2005-10-19 10:51:36 +00:00
parent 860841794d
commit 802c014656
1 changed files with 15 additions and 15 deletions
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@ -10,7 +10,7 @@
(part of SSL_OP_ALL). This option used to disable the
countermeasure against man-in-the-middle protocol-version
rollback in the SSL 2.0 server implementation, which is a bad
idea. (CAN-2005-2969)
idea. (CVE-2005-2969)
[Bodo Moeller; problem pointed out by Yutaka Oiwa (Research Center
for Information Security, National Institute of Advanced Industrial
@ -1040,11 +1040,11 @@
Changes between 0.9.7c and 0.9.7d [17 Mar 2004]
*) Fix null-pointer assignment in do_change_cipher_spec() revealed
by using the Codenomicon TLS Test Tool (CAN-2004-0079)
by using the Codenomicon TLS Test Tool (CVE-2004-0079)
[Joe Orton, Steve Henson]
*) Fix flaw in SSL/TLS handshaking when using Kerberos ciphersuites
(CAN-2004-0112)
(CVE-2004-0112)
[Joe Orton, Steve Henson]
*) Make it possible to have multiple active certificates with the same
@ -1087,9 +1087,9 @@
*) Fix various bugs revealed by running the NISCC test suite:
Stop out of bounds reads in the ASN1 code when presented with
invalid tags (CAN-2003-0543 and CAN-2003-0544).
invalid tags (CVE-2003-0543 and CVE-2003-0544).
Free up ASN1_TYPE correctly if ANY type is invalid (CAN-2003-0545).
Free up ASN1_TYPE correctly if ANY type is invalid (CVE-2003-0545).
If verify callback ignores invalid public key errors don't try to check
certificate signature with the NULL public key.
@ -1174,7 +1174,7 @@
via timing by performing a MAC computation even if incorrrect
block cipher padding has been found. This is a countermeasure
against active attacks where the attacker has to distinguish
between bad padding and a MAC verification error. (CAN-2003-0078)
between bad padding and a MAC verification error. (CVE-2003-0078)
[Bodo Moeller; problem pointed out by Brice Canvel (EPFL),
Alain Hiltgen (UBS), Serge Vaudenay (EPFL), and
@ -1391,7 +1391,7 @@
Remote buffer overflow in SSL3 protocol - an attacker could
supply an oversized master key in Kerberos-enabled versions.
(CAN-2002-0657)
(CVE-2002-0657)
[Ben Laurie (CHATS)]
*) Change the SSL kerb5 codes to match RFC 2712.
@ -3075,7 +3075,7 @@ des-cbc 3624.96k 5258.21k 5530.91k 5624.30k 5628.26k
Changes between 0.9.6l and 0.9.6m [17 Mar 2004]
*) Fix null-pointer assignment in do_change_cipher_spec() revealed
by using the Codenomicon TLS Test Tool (CAN-2004-0079)
by using the Codenomicon TLS Test Tool (CVE-2004-0079)
[Joe Orton, Steve Henson]
Changes between 0.9.6k and 0.9.6l [04 Nov 2003]
@ -3083,7 +3083,7 @@ des-cbc 3624.96k 5258.21k 5530.91k 5624.30k 5628.26k
*) Fix additional bug revealed by the NISCC test suite:
Stop bug triggering large recursion when presented with
certain ASN.1 tags (CAN-2003-0851)
certain ASN.1 tags (CVE-2003-0851)
[Steve Henson]
Changes between 0.9.6j and 0.9.6k [30 Sep 2003]
@ -3091,7 +3091,7 @@ des-cbc 3624.96k 5258.21k 5530.91k 5624.30k 5628.26k
*) Fix various bugs revealed by running the NISCC test suite:
Stop out of bounds reads in the ASN1 code when presented with
invalid tags (CAN-2003-0543 and CAN-2003-0544).
invalid tags (CVE-2003-0543 and CVE-2003-0544).
If verify callback ignores invalid public key errors don't try to check
certificate signature with the NULL public key.
@ -3143,7 +3143,7 @@ des-cbc 3624.96k 5258.21k 5530.91k 5624.30k 5628.26k
via timing by performing a MAC computation even if incorrrect
block cipher padding has been found. This is a countermeasure
against active attacks where the attacker has to distinguish
between bad padding and a MAC verification error. (CAN-2003-0078)
between bad padding and a MAC verification error. (CVE-2003-0078)
[Bodo Moeller; problem pointed out by Brice Canvel (EPFL),
Alain Hiltgen (UBS), Serge Vaudenay (EPFL), and
@ -3276,7 +3276,7 @@ des-cbc 3624.96k 5258.21k 5530.91k 5624.30k 5628.26k
*) Add various sanity checks to asn1_get_length() to reject
the ASN1 length bytes if they exceed sizeof(long), will appear
negative or the content length exceeds the length of the
supplied buffer. (CAN-2002-0659)
supplied buffer. (CVE-2002-0659)
[Steve Henson, Adi Stav <stav@mercury.co.il>, James Yonan <jim@ntlp.com>]
*) Assertions for various potential buffer overflows, not known to
@ -3284,15 +3284,15 @@ des-cbc 3624.96k 5258.21k 5530.91k 5624.30k 5628.26k
[Ben Laurie (CHATS)]
*) Various temporary buffers to hold ASCII versions of integers were
too small for 64 bit platforms. (CAN-2002-0655)
too small for 64 bit platforms. (CVE-2002-0655)
[Matthew Byng-Maddick <mbm@aldigital.co.uk> and Ben Laurie (CHATS)>
*) Remote buffer overflow in SSL3 protocol - an attacker could
supply an oversized session ID to a client. (CAN-2002-0656)
supply an oversized session ID to a client. (CVE-2002-0656)
[Ben Laurie (CHATS)]
*) Remote buffer overflow in SSL2 protocol - an attacker could
supply an oversized client master key. (CAN-2002-0656)
supply an oversized client master key. (CVE-2002-0656)
[Ben Laurie (CHATS)]
Changes between 0.9.6c and 0.9.6d [9 May 2002]