Should reject signatures that we can't properly verify
and couldn't generate (as pointed out by Ernst G Giessmann)
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@@ -384,6 +384,21 @@ static int ecdsa_do_verify(const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len,
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ECDSAerr(ECDSA_F_ECDSA_DO_VERIFY, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
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ECDSAerr(ECDSA_F_ECDSA_DO_VERIFY, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
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goto err;
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goto err;
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}
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}
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if (8 * dgst_len > BN_num_bits(order))
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{
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/* XXX
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*
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* Should provide for optional hash truncation:
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* Keep the BN_num_bits(order) leftmost bits of dgst
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* (see March 2006 FIPS 186-3 draft, which has a few
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* confusing errors in this part though)
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*/
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ECDSAerr(ECDSA_F_ECDSA_DO_VERIFY,
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ECDSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_KEY_SIZE);
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ret = 0;
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goto err;
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}
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if (BN_is_zero(sig->r) || BN_is_negative(sig->r) ||
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if (BN_is_zero(sig->r) || BN_is_negative(sig->r) ||
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BN_ucmp(sig->r, order) >= 0 || BN_is_zero(sig->s) ||
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BN_ucmp(sig->r, order) >= 0 || BN_is_zero(sig->s) ||
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