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David Brumley <dbrumley@stanford.edu> noted and corrected a case in the

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verification step of CRT private key operations in the RSA code -
previously no montgomery form was checked or used for 'n', and so it would
be generated on the fly each time. As a result, private key operations are
now a percent or two faster.

Rather than adding this as another repetition of the nearly-identical
montgomery "check for first-use" initialisation code blocks, I've taken
this chance to create a helper function and macro-wrapper to replace them.

PR: 475
This commit is contained in:
Geoff Thorpe
2003-02-14 23:21:19 +00:00
parent ffa49dc3d9
commit 79221bc265
1 changed files with 45 additions and 100 deletions
Download Patch File Download Diff File Expand all files Collapse all files

141
crypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c
View File

@@ -100,6 +100,43 @@ const RSA_METHOD *RSA_PKCS1_SSLeay(void)
return(&rsa_pkcs1_eay_meth); return(&rsa_pkcs1_eay_meth);
} }
/* Static helper to reduce oodles of code duplication. As a slight
* optimisation, the "MONT_HELPER() macro must be used as front-end to this
* function, to prevent unnecessary function calls - there is an initial test
* that is performed by the macro-generated code. */
static int rsa_eay_mont_helper(BN_MONT_CTX **ptr, const BIGNUM *modulus, BN_CTX *ctx)
{
BN_MONT_CTX *bn_mont_ctx;
if((bn_mont_ctx = BN_MONT_CTX_new()) == NULL)
return 0;
if(!BN_MONT_CTX_set(bn_mont_ctx, modulus, ctx))
{
BN_MONT_CTX_free(bn_mont_ctx);
return 0;
}
if (*ptr == NULL) /* other thread may have finished first */
{
CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA);
if (*ptr == NULL) /* check again in the lock to stop races */
{
*ptr = bn_mont_ctx;
bn_mont_ctx = NULL;
}
CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA);
}
if (bn_mont_ctx)
BN_MONT_CTX_free(bn_mont_ctx);
return 1;
}
/* Usage example;
* MONT_HELPER(rsa, bn_ctx, p, rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PRIVATE, goto err);
*/
#define MONT_HELPER(rsa, ctx, m, pre_cond, err_instr) \
if((pre_cond) && ((rsa)->_method_mod_##m == NULL) && \
!rsa_eay_mont_helper(&((rsa)->_method_mod_##m), \
(rsa)->m, (ctx))) \
err_instr
static int RSA_eay_public_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, static int RSA_eay_public_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding) unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
{ {
@@ -149,29 +186,7 @@ static int RSA_eay_public_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
goto err; goto err;
} }
if ((rsa->_method_mod_n == NULL) && (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC)) MONT_HELPER(rsa, ctx, n, rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC, goto err);
{
BN_MONT_CTX* bn_mont_ctx;
if ((bn_mont_ctx=BN_MONT_CTX_new()) == NULL)
goto err;
if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set(bn_mont_ctx,rsa->n,ctx))
{
BN_MONT_CTX_free(bn_mont_ctx);
goto err;
}
if (rsa->_method_mod_n == NULL) /* other thread may have finished first */
{
CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA);
if (rsa->_method_mod_n == NULL)
{
rsa->_method_mod_n = bn_mont_ctx;
bn_mont_ctx = NULL;
}
CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA);
}
if (bn_mont_ctx)
BN_MONT_CTX_free(bn_mont_ctx);
}
if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(&ret,&f,rsa->e,rsa->n,ctx, if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(&ret,&f,rsa->e,rsa->n,ctx,
rsa->_method_mod_n)) goto err; rsa->_method_mod_n)) goto err;
@@ -418,30 +433,7 @@ static int RSA_eay_public_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
goto err; goto err;
} }
/* do the decrypt */ MONT_HELPER(rsa, ctx, n, rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC, goto err);
if ((rsa->_method_mod_n == NULL) && (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC))
{
BN_MONT_CTX* bn_mont_ctx;
if ((bn_mont_ctx=BN_MONT_CTX_new()) == NULL)
goto err;
if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set(bn_mont_ctx,rsa->n,ctx))
{
BN_MONT_CTX_free(bn_mont_ctx);
goto err;
}
if (rsa->_method_mod_n == NULL) /* other thread may have finished first */
{
CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA);
if (rsa->_method_mod_n == NULL)
{
rsa->_method_mod_n = bn_mont_ctx;
bn_mont_ctx = NULL;
}
CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA);
}
if (bn_mont_ctx)
BN_MONT_CTX_free(bn_mont_ctx);
}
if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(&ret,&f,rsa->e,rsa->n,ctx, if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(&ret,&f,rsa->e,rsa->n,ctx,
rsa->_method_mod_n)) goto err; rsa->_method_mod_n)) goto err;
@@ -487,56 +479,9 @@ static int RSA_eay_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r0, const BIGNUM *I, RSA *rsa)
BN_init(&vrfy); BN_init(&vrfy);
if ((ctx=BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) goto err; if ((ctx=BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) goto err;
if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PRIVATE) MONT_HELPER(rsa, ctx, p, rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PRIVATE, goto err);
{ MONT_HELPER(rsa, ctx, q, rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PRIVATE, goto err);
if (rsa->_method_mod_p == NULL) MONT_HELPER(rsa, ctx, n, rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PRIVATE, goto err);
{
BN_MONT_CTX* bn_mont_ctx;
if ((bn_mont_ctx=BN_MONT_CTX_new()) == NULL)
goto err;
if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set(bn_mont_ctx,rsa->p,ctx))
{
BN_MONT_CTX_free(bn_mont_ctx);
goto err;
}
if (rsa->_method_mod_p == NULL) /* other thread may have finished first */
{
CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA);
if (rsa->_method_mod_p == NULL)
{
rsa->_method_mod_p = bn_mont_ctx;
bn_mont_ctx = NULL;
}
CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA);
}
if (bn_mont_ctx)
BN_MONT_CTX_free(bn_mont_ctx);
}
if (rsa->_method_mod_q == NULL)
{
BN_MONT_CTX* bn_mont_ctx;
if ((bn_mont_ctx=BN_MONT_CTX_new()) == NULL)
goto err;
if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set(bn_mont_ctx,rsa->q,ctx))
{
BN_MONT_CTX_free(bn_mont_ctx);
goto err;
}
if (rsa->_method_mod_q == NULL) /* other thread may have finished first */
{
CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA);
if (rsa->_method_mod_q == NULL)
{
rsa->_method_mod_q = bn_mont_ctx;
bn_mont_ctx = NULL;
}
CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA);
}
if (bn_mont_ctx)
BN_MONT_CTX_free(bn_mont_ctx);
}
}
if (!BN_mod(&r1,I,rsa->q,ctx)) goto err; if (!BN_mod(&r1,I,rsa->q,ctx)) goto err;
if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(&m1,&r1,rsa->dmq1,rsa->q,ctx, if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(&m1,&r1,rsa->dmq1,rsa->q,ctx,
@@ -568,7 +513,7 @@ static int RSA_eay_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r0, const BIGNUM *I, RSA *rsa)
if (rsa->e && rsa->n) if (rsa->e && rsa->n)
{ {
if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(&vrfy,r0,rsa->e,rsa->n,ctx,NULL)) goto err; if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(&vrfy,r0,rsa->e,rsa->n,ctx,rsa->_method_mod_n)) goto err;
/* If 'I' was greater than (or equal to) rsa->n, the operation /* If 'I' was greater than (or equal to) rsa->n, the operation
* will be equivalent to using 'I mod n'. However, the result of * will be equivalent to using 'I mod n'. However, the result of
* the verify will *always* be less than 'n' so we don't check * the verify will *always* be less than 'n' so we don't check