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stricter session ID context matching

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This commit is contained in:
Bodo Möller
2007-03-21 14:33:01 +00:00
parent d9e262443c
commit 6fd3f3260d
2 changed files with 47 additions and 21 deletions
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24
CHANGES
View File

@@ -4,6 +4,17 @@
Changes between 0.9.8e and 0.9.8f [xx XXX xxxx]
*) In the SSL/TLS server implementation, be strict about session ID
context matching (which matters if an application uses a single
external cache for different purposes). Previously,
out-of-context reuse was forbidden only if SSL_VERIFY_PEER was
set. This did ensure strict client verification, but meant that,
with applications using a single external cache for quite
different requirements, clients could circumvent ciphersuite
restrictions for a given session ID context by starting a session
in a different context.
[Bodo Moeller]
*) Include "!eNULL" in SSL_DEFAULT_CIPHER_LIST to make sure that
a ciphersuite string such as "DEFAULT:RSA" cannot enable
authentication-only ciphersuites.
@@ -1049,6 +1060,19 @@
differing sizes.
[Richard Levitte]
Changes between 0.9.7m and 0.9.7n [xx XXX xxxx]
*) In the SSL/TLS server implementation, be strict about session ID
context matching (which matters if an application uses a single
external cache for different purposes). Previously,
out-of-context reuse was forbidden only if SSL_VERIFY_PEER was
set. This did ensure strict client verification, but meant that,
with applications using a single external cache for quite
different requirements, clients could circumvent ciphersuite
restrictions for a given session ID context by starting a session
in a different context.
[Bodo Moeller]
Changes between 0.9.7l and 0.9.7m [23 Feb 2007]
*) Cleanse PEM buffers before freeing them since they may contain

44
ssl/ssl_sess.c
View File

@@ -334,33 +334,35 @@ int ssl_get_prev_session(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len)
/* Now ret is non-NULL, and we own one of its reference counts. */
if((s->verify_mode&SSL_VERIFY_PEER)
&& (!s->sid_ctx_length || ret->sid_ctx_length != s->sid_ctx_length
|| memcmp(ret->sid_ctx,s->sid_ctx,ret->sid_ctx_length)))
{
if (ret->sid_ctx_length != s->sid_ctx_length
|| memcmp(ret->sid_ctx,s->sid_ctx,ret->sid_ctx_length))
{
/* We've found the session named by the client, but we don't
* want to use it in this context. */
if (s->sid_ctx_length == 0)
{
/* application should have used SSL[_CTX]_set_session_id_context
* -- we could tolerate this and just pretend we never heard
* of this session, but then applications could effectively
* disable the session cache by accident without anyone noticing */
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_GET_PREV_SESSION,SSL_R_SESSION_ID_CONTEXT_UNINITIALIZED);
fatal = 1;
goto err;
}
else
{
#if 0 /* The client cannot always know when a session is not appropriate,
* so we shouldn't generate an error message. */
* so we shouldn't generate an error message. */
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_GET_PREV_SESSION,SSL_R_ATTEMPT_TO_REUSE_SESSION_IN_DIFFERENT_CONTEXT);
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_GET_PREV_SESSION,SSL_R_ATTEMPT_TO_REUSE_SESSION_IN_DIFFERENT_CONTEXT);
#endif
goto err; /* treat like cache miss */
}
goto err; /* treat like cache miss */
}
if((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) && s->sid_ctx_length == 0)
{
/* We can't be sure if this session is being used out of
* context, which is especially important for SSL_VERIFY_PEER.
* The application should have used SSL[_CTX]_set_session_id_context.
*
* For this error case, we generate an error instead of treating
* the event like a cache miss (otherwise it would be easy for
* applications to effectively disable the session cache by
* accident without anyone noticing).
*/
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_GET_PREV_SESSION,SSL_R_SESSION_ID_CONTEXT_UNINITIALIZED);
fatal = 1;
goto err;
}
if (ret->cipher == NULL)