Fix statless session resumption so it can coexist with SNI
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9
CHANGES
9
CHANGES
@ -4,6 +4,15 @@
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Changes between 0.9.8k and 1.0 [xx XXX xxxx]
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*) Fixes to stateless session resumption handling. Use initial_ctx when
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issuing and attempting to decrypt tickets in case it has changed during
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servername handling. Use a non-zero length session ID when attempting
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stateless session resumption: this makes it possible to determine if
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a resumption has occurred immediately after receiving server hello
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(several places in OpenSSL subtly assume this) instead of later in
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the handshake.
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[Steve Henson]
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*) Update OCSP request code to permit adding custom headers to the request:
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some responders need this.
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[Steve Henson]
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@ -2973,6 +2973,7 @@ int ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(SSL *s)
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unsigned int hlen;
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EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx;
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HMAC_CTX hctx;
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SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
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unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
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unsigned char key_name[16];
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@ -3011,9 +3012,9 @@ int ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(SSL *s)
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* it does all the work otherwise use generated values
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* from parent ctx.
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*/
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if (s->ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb)
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if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb)
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{
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if (s->ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, key_name, iv, &ctx,
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if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, key_name, iv, &ctx,
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&hctx, 1) < 0)
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{
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OPENSSL_free(senc);
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@ -3024,10 +3025,10 @@ int ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(SSL *s)
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{
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RAND_pseudo_bytes(iv, 16);
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EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
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s->ctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, iv);
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HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, s->ctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
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tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, iv);
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HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
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tlsext_tick_md(), NULL);
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memcpy(key_name, s->ctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16);
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memcpy(key_name, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16);
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}
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l2n(s->session->tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint, p);
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/* Skip ticket length for now */
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@ -579,19 +579,26 @@ SSL_SESSION *d2i_SSL_SESSION(SSL_SESSION **a, const unsigned char **pp,
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ret->tlsext_ticklen = os.length;
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os.data = NULL;
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os.length = 0;
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#if 0
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/* There are two ways to detect a resumed ticket sesion.
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* One is to set a random session ID and then the server
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* must return a match in ServerHello. This allows the normal
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* client session ID matching to work.
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* client session ID matching to work and we know much
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* earlier that the ticket has been accepted.
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*
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* The other way is to set zero length session ID when the
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* ticket is presented and rely on the handshake to determine
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* session resumption.
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*/
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if (ret->session_id_length == 0)
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{
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ret->session_id_length=SSL3_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH;
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RAND_pseudo_bytes(ret->session_id,
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ret->session_id_length);
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}
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EVP_Digest(ret->tlsext_tick, ret->tlsext_ticklen,
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ret->session_id, &ret->session_id_length,
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#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
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EVP_sha256(), NULL);
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#else
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EVP_sha1(), NULL);
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#endif
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}
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}
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else
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ret->tlsext_tick=NULL;
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11
ssl/t1_lib.c
11
ssl/t1_lib.c
@ -1516,16 +1516,17 @@ static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick, int eticklen,
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unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
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HMAC_CTX hctx;
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EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx;
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SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
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/* Need at least keyname + iv + some encrypted data */
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if (eticklen < 48)
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goto tickerr;
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/* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
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HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
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EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
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if (s->ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb)
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if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb)
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{
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unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick;
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int rv = s->ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, nctick, nctick + 16,
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int rv = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, nctick, nctick + 16,
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&ctx, &hctx, 0);
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if (rv < 0)
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return -1;
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@ -1537,12 +1538,12 @@ static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick, int eticklen,
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else
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{
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/* Check key name matches */
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if (memcmp(etick, s->ctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16))
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if (memcmp(etick, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16))
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goto tickerr;
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HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, s->ctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
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HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
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tlsext_tick_md(), NULL);
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EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
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s->ctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, etick + 16);
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tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, etick + 16);
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}
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/* Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and
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* integrity checks on ticket.
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