Re-align some comments after running the reformat script.
This should be a one off operation (subsequent invokation of the script should not move them) Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
This commit is contained in:
114
ssl/t1_lib.c
114
ssl/t1_lib.c
@@ -1170,14 +1170,14 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf,
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unsigned long size_str;
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long lenmax;
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/*-
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* check for enough space.
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* 4 for the servername type and entension length
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* 2 for servernamelist length
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* 1 for the hostname type
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* 2 for hostname length
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* + hostname length
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*/
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/*-
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* check for enough space.
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* 4 for the servername type and entension length
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* 2 for servernamelist length
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* 1 for the hostname type
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* 2 for hostname length
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* + hostname length
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*/
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if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 9) < 0
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|| (size_str =
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@@ -1208,12 +1208,12 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf,
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return NULL;
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}
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/*-
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* check for enough space.
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* 4 for the srp type type and entension length
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* 1 for the srp user identity
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* + srp user identity length
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*/
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/*-
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* check for enough space.
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* 4 for the srp type type and entension length
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* 1 for the srp user identity
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* + srp user identity length
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*/
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if ((limit - ret - 5 - login_len) < 0)
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return NULL;
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@@ -1405,11 +1405,11 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf,
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return NULL;
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s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat, ret);
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s2n(1, ret);
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/*-
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* Set mode:
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* 1: peer may send requests
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* 2: peer not allowed to send requests
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*/
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/*-
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* Set mode:
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* 1: peer may send requests
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* 2: peer not allowed to send requests
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*/
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if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
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*(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
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else
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@@ -1666,11 +1666,11 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf,
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return NULL;
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s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat, ret);
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s2n(1, ret);
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/*-
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* Set mode:
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* 1: peer may send requests
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* 2: peer not allowed to send requests
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*/
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/*-
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* Set mode:
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* 1: peer may send requests
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* 2: peer not allowed to send requests
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*/
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if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
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*(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
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else
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@@ -2324,23 +2324,23 @@ static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p,
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else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
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s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0 &&
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s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL) {
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/*-
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* We shouldn't accept this extension on a
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* renegotiation.
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*
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* s->new_session will be set on renegotiation, but we
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* probably shouldn't rely that it couldn't be set on
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* the initial renegotation too in certain cases (when
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* there's some other reason to disallow resuming an
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* earlier session -- the current code won't be doing
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* anything like that, but this might change).
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*
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* A valid sign that there's been a previous handshake
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* in this connection is if s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len >
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* 0. (We are talking about a check that will happen
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* in the Hello protocol round, well before a new
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* Finished message could have been computed.)
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*/
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/*-
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* We shouldn't accept this extension on a
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* renegotiation.
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*
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* s->new_session will be set on renegotiation, but we
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* probably shouldn't rely that it couldn't be set on
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* the initial renegotation too in certain cases (when
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* there's some other reason to disallow resuming an
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* earlier session -- the current code won't be doing
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* anything like that, but this might change).
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*
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* A valid sign that there's been a previous handshake
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* in this connection is if s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len >
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* 0. (We are talking about a check that will happen
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* in the Hello protocol round, well before a new
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* Finished message could have been computed.)
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*/
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s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
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}
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# endif
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@@ -2635,12 +2635,12 @@ static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p,
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*al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
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return 0;
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}
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/*-
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* The extension data consists of:
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* uint16 list_length
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* uint8 proto_length;
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* uint8 proto[proto_length];
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*/
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/*-
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* The extension data consists of:
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* uint16 list_length
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* uint8 proto_length;
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* uint8 proto[proto_length];
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*/
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len = data[0];
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len <<= 8;
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len |= data[1];
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@@ -3944,16 +3944,16 @@ int tls1_heartbeat(SSL *s)
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*/
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OPENSSL_assert(payload + padding <= 16381);
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/*-
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* Create HeartBeat message, we just use a sequence number
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* as payload to distuingish different messages and add
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* some random stuff.
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* - Message Type, 1 byte
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* - Payload Length, 2 bytes (unsigned int)
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* - Payload, the sequence number (2 bytes uint)
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* - Payload, random bytes (16 bytes uint)
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* - Padding
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*/
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/*-
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* Create HeartBeat message, we just use a sequence number
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* as payload to distuingish different messages and add
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* some random stuff.
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* - Message Type, 1 byte
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* - Payload Length, 2 bytes (unsigned int)
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* - Payload, the sequence number (2 bytes uint)
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* - Payload, random bytes (16 bytes uint)
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* - Padding
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*/
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buf = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
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if (buf == NULL) {
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SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
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