Additional comment changes for reformat of 0.9.8
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
This commit is contained in:
@@ -906,7 +906,8 @@ int dtls1_send_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
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goto err;
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}
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/* 20010406 VRS - Earlier versions used KRB5 AP_REQ
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/*-
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* 20010406 VRS - Earlier versions used KRB5 AP_REQ
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** in place of RFC 2712 KerberosWrapper, as in:
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**
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** Send ticket (copy to *p, set n = length)
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@@ -952,12 +953,13 @@ int dtls1_send_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
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if (RAND_bytes(tmp_buf,sizeof tmp_buf) <= 0)
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goto err;
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/* 20010420 VRS. Tried it this way; failed.
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** EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx,enc, NULL,NULL);
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** EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_key_length(&ciph_ctx,
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** kssl_ctx->length);
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** EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx,NULL, key,iv);
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*/
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/*-
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* 20010420 VRS. Tried it this way; failed.
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* EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx,enc, NULL,NULL);
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* EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_key_length(&ciph_ctx,
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* kssl_ctx->length);
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* EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx,NULL, key,iv);
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*/
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memset(iv, 0, sizeof iv); /* per RFC 1510 */
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EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx,enc, NULL,
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@@ -1060,7 +1062,7 @@ int dtls1_send_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
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d = dtls1_set_message_header(s, d,
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SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, n, 0, n);
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/*
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/*-
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*(d++)=SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE;
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l2n3(n,d);
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l2n(s->d1->handshake_write_seq,d);
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@@ -126,14 +126,16 @@
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#include <openssl/des.h>
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#endif
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/* dtls1_enc encrypts/decrypts the record in |s->wrec| / |s->rrec|, respectively.
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/*-
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* dtls1_enc encrypts/decrypts the record in |s->wrec| / |s->rrec|, respectively.
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*
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* Returns:
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* 0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publically invalid (i.e. too
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* short etc).
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* 1: if the record's padding is valid / the encryption was successful.
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* -1: if the record's padding/AEAD-authenticator is invalid or, if sending,
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* an internal error occured. */
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* an internal error occured.
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*/
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int dtls1_enc(SSL *s, int send)
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{
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SSL3_RECORD *rec;
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12
ssl/d1_pkt.c
12
ssl/d1_pkt.c
@@ -364,10 +364,12 @@ dtls1_process_record(SSL *s)
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rr->data=rr->input;
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enc_err = s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s,0);
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/* enc_err is:
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/*-
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* enc_err is:
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* 0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publically invalid.
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* 1: if the padding is valid
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* -1: if the padding is invalid */
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* -1: if the padding is invalid
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*/
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if (enc_err == 0)
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{
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/* For DTLS we simply ignore bad packets. */
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@@ -919,9 +921,11 @@ start:
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}
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}
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/* s->d1->handshake_fragment_len == 12 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE;
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/*-
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* s->d1->handshake_fragment_len == 12 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE;
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* s->d1->alert_fragment_len == 7 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT.
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* (Possibly rr is 'empty' now, i.e. rr->length may be 0.) */
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* (Possibly rr is 'empty' now, i.e. rr->length may be 0.)
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*/
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/* If we are a client, check for an incoming 'Hello Request': */
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if ((!s->server) &&
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@@ -1300,7 +1300,8 @@ kssl_TKT2tkt( /* IN */ krb5_context krb5context,
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}
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/* Given krb5 service name in KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx (typically "kssl"),
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/*-
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* Given krb5 service name in KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx (typically "kssl"),
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* and krb5 AP_REQ message & message length,
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* Return Kerberos session key and client principle
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* to SSL Server in KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx.
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@@ -90,7 +90,8 @@ typedef unsigned char krb5_octet;
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#endif
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/* Uncomment this to debug kssl problems or
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/*-
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* Uncomment this to debug kssl problems or
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* to trace usage of the Kerberos session key
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*
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* #define KSSL_DEBUG
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15
ssl/s2_pkt.c
15
ssl/s2_pkt.c
@@ -561,16 +561,20 @@ static int do_ssl_write(SSL *s, const unsigned char *buf, unsigned int len)
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}
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else if ((bs <= 1) && (!s->s2->escape))
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{
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/* j <= SSL2_MAX_RECORD_LENGTH_3_BYTE_HEADER, thus
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* j < SSL2_MAX_RECORD_LENGTH_2_BYTE_HEADER */
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/*-
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* j <= SSL2_MAX_RECORD_LENGTH_3_BYTE_HEADER, thus
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* j < SSL2_MAX_RECORD_LENGTH_2_BYTE_HEADER
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*/
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s->s2->three_byte_header=0;
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p=0;
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}
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else /* we may have to use a 3 byte header */
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{
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/* If s->s2->escape is not set, then
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/*-
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* If s->s2->escape is not set, then
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* j <= SSL2_MAX_RECORD_LENGTH_3_BYTE_HEADER, and thus
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* j < SSL2_MAX_RECORD_LENGTH_2_BYTE_HEADER. */
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* j < SSL2_MAX_RECORD_LENGTH_2_BYTE_HEADER.
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*/
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p=(j%bs);
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p=(p == 0)?0:(bs-p);
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if (s->s2->escape)
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@@ -584,7 +588,8 @@ static int do_ssl_write(SSL *s, const unsigned char *buf, unsigned int len)
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}
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}
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/* Now
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/*-
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* Now
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* j <= SSL2_MAX_RECORD_LENGTH_2_BYTE_HEADER
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* holds, and if s->s2->three_byte_header is set, then even
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* j <= SSL2_MAX_RECORD_LENGTH_3_BYTE_HEADER.
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@@ -433,7 +433,8 @@ void ssl3_cleanup_key_block(SSL *s)
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s->s3->tmp.key_block_length=0;
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}
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/* ssl3_enc encrypts/decrypts the record in |s->wrec| / |s->rrec|, respectively.
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/*-
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* ssl3_enc encrypts/decrypts the record in |s->wrec| / |s->rrec|, respectively.
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*
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* Returns:
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* 0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publically invalid (i.e. too
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@@ -619,7 +620,8 @@ int ssl3_mac(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *md, int send)
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* data we are hashing because that gives an attacker a
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* timing-oracle. */
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/* npad is, at most, 48 bytes and that's with MD5:
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/*-
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* npad is, at most, 48 bytes and that's with MD5:
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* 16 + 48 + 8 (sequence bytes) + 1 + 2 = 75.
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*
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* With SHA-1 (the largest hash speced for SSLv3) the hash size
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@@ -198,7 +198,8 @@ extern "C" {
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#endif
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/* SSLeay version number for ASN.1 encoding of the session information */
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/* Version 0 - initial version
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/*-
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* Version 0 - initial version
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* Version 1 - added the optional peer certificate
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*/
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#define SSL_SESSION_ASN1_VERSION 0x0001
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@@ -1134,10 +1135,12 @@ extern "C" {
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#define SSL_ST_READ_BODY 0xF1
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#define SSL_ST_READ_DONE 0xF2
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/* Obtain latest Finished message
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/*-
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* Obtain latest Finished message
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* -- that we sent (SSL_get_finished)
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* -- that we expected from peer (SSL_get_peer_finished).
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* Returns length (0 == no Finished so far), copies up to 'count' bytes. */
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* Returns length (0 == no Finished so far), copies up to 'count' bytes.
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*/
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size_t SSL_get_finished(const SSL *s, void *buf, size_t count);
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size_t SSL_get_peer_finished(const SSL *s, void *buf, size_t count);
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@@ -885,7 +885,8 @@ static int ssl_cipher_process_rulestr(const char *rule_str,
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if (!found)
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break; /* ignore this entry */
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/* New algorithms:
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/*-
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* New algorithms:
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* 1 - any old restrictions apply outside new mask
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* 2 - any new restrictions apply outside old mask
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* 3 - enforce old & new where masks intersect
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@@ -396,7 +396,7 @@
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* SSL_aDSS <- DSA_SIGN
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*/
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/*
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/*-
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#define CERT_INVALID 0
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#define CERT_PUBLIC_KEY 1
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#define CERT_PRIVATE_KEY 2
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