Sanity check record length before skipping explicit IV in DTLS
to fix DoS attack. Thanks to Codenomicon for discovering this issue using Fuzz-o-Matic fuzzing as a service testing platform. (CVE-2012-2333)
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@ -4,6 +4,14 @@
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Changes between 0.9.8w and 0.9.8x [xx XXX xxxx]
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Changes between 0.9.8w and 0.9.8x [xx XXX xxxx]
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*) Sanity check record length before skipping explicit IV in DTLS
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to fix DoS attack.
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Thanks to Codenomicon for discovering this issue using Fuzz-o-Matic
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fuzzing as a service testing platform.
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(CVE-2012-2333)
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[Steve Henson]
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*) Initialise tkeylen properly when encrypting CMS messages.
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*) Initialise tkeylen properly when encrypting CMS messages.
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Thanks to Solar Designer of Openwall for reporting this issue.
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Thanks to Solar Designer of Openwall for reporting this issue.
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[Steve Henson]
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[Steve Henson]
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@ -249,7 +249,7 @@ int dtls1_enc(SSL *s, int send)
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}
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}
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/* TLS 1.0 does not bound the number of padding bytes by the block size.
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/* TLS 1.0 does not bound the number of padding bytes by the block size.
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* All of them must have value 'padding_length'. */
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* All of them must have value 'padding_length'. */
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if (i > (int)rec->length)
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if (i + bs > (int)rec->length)
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{
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{
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/* Incorrect padding. SSLerr() and ssl3_alert are done
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/* Incorrect padding. SSLerr() and ssl3_alert are done
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* by caller: we don't want to reveal whether this is
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* by caller: we don't want to reveal whether this is
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