make timing attack protection unconditional
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@ -144,7 +144,6 @@ static int ecdsa_sign_setup(EC_KEY *eckey, BN_CTX *ctx_in, BIGNUM **kinvp,
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}
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while (BN_is_zero(k));
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#ifdef ECDSA_POINT_MUL_NO_CONSTTIME
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/* We do not want timing information to leak the length of k,
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* so we compute G*k using an equivalent scalar of fixed
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* bit-length. */
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@ -152,7 +151,6 @@ static int ecdsa_sign_setup(EC_KEY *eckey, BN_CTX *ctx_in, BIGNUM **kinvp,
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if (!BN_add(k, k, order)) goto err;
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if (BN_num_bits(k) <= BN_num_bits(order))
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if (!BN_add(k, k, order)) goto err;
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#endif /* def(ECDSA_POINT_MUL_NO_CONSTTIME) */
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/* compute r the x-coordinate of generator * k */
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if (!EC_POINT_mul(group, tmp_point, k, NULL, NULL, ctx))
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