make timing attack protection unconditional

This commit is contained in:
Dr. Stephen Henson 2011-09-01 14:23:31 +00:00
parent d2650c3a4a
commit 2fffc29bd1

View File

@ -144,7 +144,6 @@ static int ecdsa_sign_setup(EC_KEY *eckey, BN_CTX *ctx_in, BIGNUM **kinvp,
} }
while (BN_is_zero(k)); while (BN_is_zero(k));
#ifdef ECDSA_POINT_MUL_NO_CONSTTIME
/* We do not want timing information to leak the length of k, /* We do not want timing information to leak the length of k,
* so we compute G*k using an equivalent scalar of fixed * so we compute G*k using an equivalent scalar of fixed
* bit-length. */ * bit-length. */
@ -152,7 +151,6 @@ static int ecdsa_sign_setup(EC_KEY *eckey, BN_CTX *ctx_in, BIGNUM **kinvp,
if (!BN_add(k, k, order)) goto err; if (!BN_add(k, k, order)) goto err;
if (BN_num_bits(k) <= BN_num_bits(order)) if (BN_num_bits(k) <= BN_num_bits(order))
if (!BN_add(k, k, order)) goto err; if (!BN_add(k, k, order)) goto err;
#endif /* def(ECDSA_POINT_MUL_NO_CONSTTIME) */
/* compute r the x-coordinate of generator * k */ /* compute r the x-coordinate of generator * k */
if (!EC_POINT_mul(group, tmp_point, k, NULL, NULL, ctx)) if (!EC_POINT_mul(group, tmp_point, k, NULL, NULL, ctx))