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Fix stateless session resumption so it can coexist with SNI

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This commit is contained in:
Dr. Stephen Henson 2009-10-30 13:28:07 +00:00
parent e6e11f4ec3
commit 2a8834cf89
4 changed files with 33 additions and 16 deletions
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8
CHANGES
View File

@ -4,6 +4,14 @@
Changes between 0.9.8k and 0.9.8l [xx XXX xxxx]
*) Fixes to stateless session resumption handling. Use initial_ctx when
issuing and attempting to decrypt tickets in case it has changed during
servername handling. Use a non-zero length session ID when attempting
stateless session resumption: this makes it possible to determine if
a resumption has occurred immediately after receiving server hello
(several places in OpenSSL subtly assume this) instead of later in
the handshake.
[Steve Henson]
*) The functions ENGINE_ctrl(), OPENSSL_isservice(),
CMS_get1_RecipientRequest() and RAND_bytes() can return <=0 on error

11
ssl/s3_srvr.c
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@ -2716,6 +2716,7 @@ int ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(SSL *s)
unsigned int hlen;
EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx;
HMAC_CTX hctx;
SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
unsigned char key_name[16];
@ -2754,9 +2755,9 @@ int ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(SSL *s)
* it does all the work otherwise use generated values
* from parent ctx.
*/
if (s->ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb)
if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb)
{
if (s->ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, key_name, iv, &ctx,
if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, key_name, iv, &ctx,
&hctx, 1) < 0)
{
OPENSSL_free(senc);
@ -2767,10 +2768,10 @@ int ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(SSL *s)
{
RAND_pseudo_bytes(iv, 16);
EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
s->ctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, iv);
HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, s->ctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, iv);
HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
tlsext_tick_md(), NULL);
memcpy(key_name, s->ctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16);
memcpy(key_name, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16);
}
l2n(s->session->tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint, p);
/* Skip ticket length for now */

19
ssl/ssl_asn1.c
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@ -501,19 +501,26 @@ SSL_SESSION *d2i_SSL_SESSION(SSL_SESSION **a, const unsigned char **pp,
ret->tlsext_ticklen = os.length;
os.data = NULL;
os.length = 0;
#if 0
/* There are two ways to detect a resumed ticket sesion.
* One is to set a random session ID and then the server
* must return a match in ServerHello. This allows the normal
* client session ID matching to work.
* client session ID matching to work and we know much
* earlier that the ticket has been accepted.
*
* The other way is to set zero length session ID when the
* ticket is presented and rely on the handshake to determine
* session resumption.
*/
if (ret->session_id_length == 0)
{
ret->session_id_length=SSL3_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH;
RAND_pseudo_bytes(ret->session_id,
ret->session_id_length);
}
EVP_Digest(ret->tlsext_tick, ret->tlsext_ticklen,
ret->session_id, &ret->session_id_length,
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
EVP_sha256(), NULL);
#else
EVP_sha1(), NULL);
#endif
}
}
else
ret->tlsext_tick=NULL;

11
ssl/t1_lib.c
View File

@ -811,16 +811,17 @@ static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick, int eticklen,
unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
HMAC_CTX hctx;
EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx;
SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
/* Need at least keyname + iv + some encrypted data */
if (eticklen < 48)
goto tickerr;
/* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
if (s->ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb)
if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb)
{
unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick;
int rv = s->ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, nctick, nctick + 16,
int rv = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, nctick, nctick + 16,
&ctx, &hctx, 0);
if (rv < 0)
return -1;
@ -832,12 +833,12 @@ static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick, int eticklen,
else
{
/* Check key name matches */
if (memcmp(etick, s->ctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16))
if (memcmp(etick, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16))
goto tickerr;
HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, s->ctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
tlsext_tick_md(), NULL);
EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
s->ctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, etick + 16);
tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, etick + 16);
}
/* Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and
* integrity checks on ticket.