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Patches from Vern Staats <staatsvr@asc.hpc.mil> to get Kerberos 5 in

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SSL according to RFC 2712.  His comment is:

This is a patch to openssl-SNAP-20010702 to support Kerberized SSL
authentication.  I'm expecting to have the full kssl-0.5 kit up on
sourceforge by the end of the week.  The full kit includes patches
for mod-ssl, apache, and a few text clients.  The sourceforge URL
is http://sourceforge.net/projects/kssl/ .

Thanks to a note from Simon Wilkinson I've replaced my KRB5 AP_REQ
message with a real KerberosWrapper struct.  I think this is fully
RFC 2712 compliant now, including support for the optional
authenticator field.  I also added openssl-style ASN.1 macros for
a few Kerberos structs; see crypto/krb5/ if you're interested.
This commit is contained in:
Richard Levitte
2001-07-09 21:46:58 +00:00
parent c148d70978
commit 2a1ef75435
14 changed files with 1641 additions and 173 deletions
Download Patch File Download Diff File Expand all files Collapse all files

113
ssl/s3_srvr.c
View File

@@ -66,6 +66,7 @@
#include <openssl/objects.h>
#include <openssl/evp.h>
#include <openssl/x509.h>
#include <openssl/krb5_asn.h>
#include "ssl_locl.h"
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
@@ -1452,13 +1453,46 @@ static int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
if (l & SSL_kKRB5)
{
krb5_error_code krb5rc;
KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx = s->kssl_ctx;
krb5_error_code krb5rc;
krb5_data enc_ticket;
krb5_data authenticator;
krb5_data enc_pms;
KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx = s->kssl_ctx;
EVP_CIPHER_CTX ciph_ctx;
EVP_CIPHER *enc = NULL;
unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
unsigned char pms[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
int padl, outl = sizeof(pms);
krb5_timestamp authtime = 0;
krb5_ticket_times ttimes;
if (!kssl_ctx) kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_new();
if ((krb5rc = kssl_sget_tkt(kssl_ctx,
s->init_buf->data, s->init_buf->length,
&kssl_err)) != 0)
n2s(p,i);
enc_ticket.length = i;
enc_ticket.data = p;
p+=enc_ticket.length;
n2s(p,i);
authenticator.length = i;
authenticator.data = p;
p+=authenticator.length;
n2s(p,i);
enc_pms.length = i;
enc_pms.data = p;
p+=enc_pms.length;
if (n != enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length +
enc_pms.length + 6)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
goto err;
}
if ((krb5rc = kssl_sget_tkt(kssl_ctx, &enc_ticket, &ttimes,
&kssl_err)) != 0)
{
#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
printf("kssl_sget_tkt rtn %d [%d]\n",
@@ -1471,34 +1505,71 @@ static int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
goto err;
}
/* Note: no authenticator is not considered an error,
** but will return authtime == 0.
*/
if ((krb5rc = kssl_check_authent(kssl_ctx, &authenticator,
&authtime, &kssl_err)) != 0)
{
#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
printf("kssl_check_authent rtn %d [%d]\n",
krb5rc, kssl_err.reason);
if (kssl_err.text)
printf("kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
kssl_err.reason);
goto err;
}
if ((krb5rc = kssl_validate_times(authtime, &ttimes)) != 0)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, krb5rc);
goto err;
}
#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
kssl_ctx_show(kssl_ctx);
#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
/* 19991013 VRS - 3DES is kind of bogus here,
** at least until Kerberos supports 3DES. The only
** real secret is the 8-byte Kerberos session key;
** the other key material (client_random, server_random)
** could be sniffed. Nonces may help against replays though.
**
** Alternate code for Kerberos Purists:
**
** memcpy(s->session->master_key, kssl_ctx->key, kssl_ctx->length);
** s->session->master_key_length = kssl_ctx->length;
*/
enc = kssl_map_enc(kssl_ctx->enctype);
memset(iv, 0, EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH); /* per RFC 1510 */
EVP_DecryptInit(&ciph_ctx,enc,kssl_ctx->key,iv);
EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ciph_ctx, pms,&outl,
enc_pms.data, enc_pms.length);
if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
goto err;
}
EVP_DecryptFinal(&ciph_ctx,&(pms[outl]),&padl);
outl += padl;
if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
goto err;
}
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ciph_ctx);
s->session->master_key_length=
s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
s->session->master_key, kssl_ctx->key, kssl_ctx->length);
/* Was doing kssl_ctx_free() here, but it caused problems for apache.
** kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_free(kssl_ctx);
** if (s->kssl_ctx) s->kssl_ctx = NULL;
s->session->master_key, pms, outl);
/* Was doing kssl_ctx_free() here,
** but it caused problems for apache.
** kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_free(kssl_ctx);
** if (s->kssl_ctx) s->kssl_ctx = NULL;
*/
}
else
#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
{
al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE);
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE);
goto f_err;
}