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Tolerate PKCS#8 DSA format with negative private key.

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This commit is contained in:
Dr. Stephen Henson 2010-01-22 20:17:30 +00:00
parent ad8ee3d7d1
commit 1699389a46
5 changed files with 19 additions and 1 deletions
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3
CHANGES
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@ -4,6 +4,9 @@
Changes between 0.9.8m (?) and 1.0.0 [xx XXX xxxx]
*) Tolerate yet another broken PKCS#8 key format: private key value negative.
[Steve Henson]
*) Add new -subject_hash_old and -issuer_hash_old options to x509 utility to
output hashes compatible with older versions of OpenSSL.
[Willy Weisz <weisz@vcpc.univie.ac.at>]

4
apps/pkcs8.c
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@ -403,6 +403,10 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
BIO_printf(bio_err, "DSA public key include in PrivateKey\n");
break;
case PKCS8_NEG_PRIVKEY:
BIO_printf(bio_err, "DSA private key value is negative\n");
break;
default:
BIO_printf(bio_err, "Unknown broken type\n");
break;

8
crypto/dsa/dsa_ameth.c
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@ -237,8 +237,16 @@ static int dsa_priv_decode(EVP_PKEY *pkey, PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8)
}
else
{
const unsigned char *q = p;
if (!(privkey=d2i_ASN1_INTEGER(NULL, &p, pklen)))
goto decerr;
if (privkey->type == V_ASN1_NEG_INTEGER)
{
p8->broken = PKCS8_NEG_PRIVKEY;
ASN1_INTEGER_free(privkey);
if (!(privkey=d2i_ASN1_UINTEGER(NULL, &q, pklen)))
goto decerr;
}
if (ptype != V_ASN1_SEQUENCE)
goto decerr;
}

1
crypto/x509/x509.h
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@ -585,6 +585,7 @@ struct pkcs8_priv_key_info_st
#define PKCS8_NO_OCTET 1
#define PKCS8_EMBEDDED_PARAM 2
#define PKCS8_NS_DB 3
#define PKCS8_NEG_PRIVKEY 4
ASN1_INTEGER *version;
X509_ALGOR *pkeyalg;
ASN1_TYPE *pkey; /* Should be OCTET STRING but some are broken */

4
doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_options.pod
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@ -247,7 +247,9 @@ If an unpatched client attempts to connect to a patched OpenSSL server then
the attempt will succeed but renegotiation is not permitted. As required
by the standard a B<no_renegotiation> alert is sent back to the client if
the TLS v1.0 protocol is used. If SSLv3.0 is used then renegotiation results
in a fatal B<handshake_failed> alert.
in a fatal B<handshake_failed> alert. If the patched server attempts to
renegotiate (existing applications which renegotiate may well do this) then
a fatal B<handshake_failed> alert is sent.
If a patched OpenSSL client attempts to connect to an unpatched server
then the connection will fail because it is not possible to determine