make sure DSA signing exponentiations really are constant-time
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7
CHANGES
7
CHANGES
@ -803,6 +803,13 @@
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Changes between 0.9.7g and 0.9.7h [XX xxx XXXX]
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*) For DSA signing, unless DSA_FLAG_NO_EXP_CONSTTIME is set, perform
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the exponentiation using a fixed-length exponent. (Otherwise,
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the information leaked through timing could expose the secret key
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after many signatures; cf. Bleichenbacher's attack on DSA with
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biased k.)
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[Bodo Moeller]
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*) Make a new fixed-window mod_exp implementation the default for
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RSA, DSA, and DH private-key operations so that the sequence of
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squares and multiplies and the memory access pattern are
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@ -202,7 +202,7 @@ err:
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static int dsa_sign_setup(DSA *dsa, BN_CTX *ctx_in, BIGNUM **kinvp, BIGNUM **rp)
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{
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BN_CTX *ctx;
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BIGNUM k,*kinv=NULL,*r=NULL;
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BIGNUM k,kq,*K,*kinv=NULL,*r=NULL;
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int ret=0;
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if (!dsa->p || !dsa->q || !dsa->g)
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@ -212,6 +212,7 @@ static int dsa_sign_setup(DSA *dsa, BN_CTX *ctx_in, BIGNUM **kinvp, BIGNUM **rp)
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}
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BN_init(&k);
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BN_init(&kq);
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if (ctx_in == NULL)
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{
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@ -221,7 +222,6 @@ static int dsa_sign_setup(DSA *dsa, BN_CTX *ctx_in, BIGNUM **kinvp, BIGNUM **rp)
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ctx=ctx_in;
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if ((r=BN_new()) == NULL) goto err;
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kinv=NULL;
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/* Get random k */
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do
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@ -241,7 +241,30 @@ static int dsa_sign_setup(DSA *dsa, BN_CTX *ctx_in, BIGNUM **kinvp, BIGNUM **rp)
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}
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/* Compute r = (g^k mod p) mod q */
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DSA_BN_MOD_EXP(goto err, dsa, r, dsa->g, &k, dsa->p, ctx,
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if ((dsa->flags & DSA_FLAG_NO_EXP_CONSTTIME) == 0)
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{
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if (!BN_copy(&kq, &k)) goto err;
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/* We do not want timing information to leak the length of k,
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* so we compute g^k using an equivalent exponent of fixed length.
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*
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* (This is a kludge that we need because the BN_mod_exp_mont()
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* does not let us specify the desired timing behaviour.) */
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if (!BN_add(&kq, &kq, dsa->q)) goto err;
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if (BN_num_bits(&kq) <= BN_num_bits(dsa->q))
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{
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if (!BN_add(&kq, &kq, dsa->q)) goto err;
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}
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K = &kq;
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}
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else
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{
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K = &k;
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}
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DSA_BN_MOD_EXP(goto err, dsa, r, dsa->g, K, dsa->p, ctx,
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dsa->method_mont_p);
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if (!BN_mod(r,r,dsa->q,ctx)) goto err;
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@ -264,6 +287,7 @@ err:
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if (ctx_in == NULL) BN_CTX_free(ctx);
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if (kinv != NULL) BN_clear_free(kinv);
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BN_clear_free(&k);
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BN_clear_free(&kq);
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return(ret);
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}
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