Clean up CHANGES
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 31832e8ff1
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Conflicts:
CHANGES
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@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
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OpenSSL CHANGES
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_______________
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Changes between 1.0.1j and 1.0.2 [xx XXX xxxx]
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Changes between 1.0.1k and 1.0.2 [xx XXX xxxx]
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*) SRTP Memory Leak.
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@ -43,22 +43,6 @@
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(CVE-2014-3566)
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[Adam Langley, Bodo Moeller]
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*) Tighten handling of the ChangeCipherSpec (CCS) message: reject
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early CCS messages during renegotiation. (Note that because
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renegotiation is encrypted, this early CCS was not exploitable.)
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[Emilia Käsper]
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*) Tighten client-side session ticket handling during renegotiation:
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ensure that the client only accepts a session ticket if the server sends
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the extension anew in the ServerHello. Previously, a TLS client would
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reuse the old extension state and thus accept a session ticket if one was
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announced in the initial ServerHello.
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Similarly, ensure that the client requires a session ticket if one
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was advertised in the ServerHello. Previously, a TLS client would
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ignore a missing NewSessionTicket message.
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[Emilia Käsper]
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*) Accelerated NIST P-256 elliptic curve implementation for x86_64
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(other platforms pending).
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[Shay Gueron & Vlad Krasnov (Intel Corp), Andy Polyakov]
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