Fix for DTLS DoS issue introduced by fix for CVE-2011-4109.
Thanks to Antonio Martin, Enterprise Secure Access Research and Development, Cisco Systems, Inc. for discovering this bug and preparing a fix. (CVE-2012-0050)
This commit is contained in:
17
ssl/d1_pkt.c
17
ssl/d1_pkt.c
@@ -336,6 +336,7 @@ dtls1_process_record(SSL *s)
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unsigned int mac_size;
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unsigned char md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
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int decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac = 0;
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unsigned char *mac = NULL;
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rr= &(s->s3->rrec);
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@@ -403,19 +404,15 @@ if ( (sess == NULL) ||
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#endif
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}
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/* check the MAC for rr->input (it's in mac_size bytes at the tail) */
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if (rr->length < mac_size)
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if (rr->length >= mac_size)
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{
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#if 0 /* OK only for stream ciphers */
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al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
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SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD,SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
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goto f_err;
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#else
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decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac = 1;
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#endif
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rr->length -= mac_size;
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mac = &rr->data[rr->length];
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}
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rr->length-=mac_size;
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else
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rr->length = 0;
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s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s,md,0);
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if (memcmp(md,&(rr->data[rr->length]),mac_size) != 0)
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if (mac == NULL || memcmp(md, mac, mac_size) != 0)
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{
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decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac = 1;
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}
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