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Updates from 0.9.8-stable

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This commit is contained in:
Dr. Stephen Henson
2007-12-14 01:16:16 +00:00
parent 97c9cf71aa
commit 0633bca11c
98 changed files with 4547 additions and 1060 deletions
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96
ssl/d1_pkt.c
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@@ -120,6 +120,7 @@
#include <openssl/evp.h>
#include <openssl/buffer.h>
#include <openssl/pqueue.h>
#include <openssl/rand.h>
static int have_handshake_fragment(SSL *s, int type, unsigned char *buf,
int len, int peek);
@@ -486,9 +487,9 @@ int dtls1_get_record(SSL *s)
SSL3_RECORD *rr;
SSL_SESSION *sess;
unsigned char *p;
short version;
unsigned short version;
DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap;
unsigned int is_next_epoch;
unsigned int is_next_epoch;
rr= &(s->s3->rrec);
sess=s->session;
@@ -524,7 +525,7 @@ again:
ssl_minor= *(p++);
version=(ssl_major<<8)|ssl_minor;
/* sequence number is 64 bits, with top 2 bytes = epoch */
/* sequence number is 64 bits, with top 2 bytes = epoch */
n2s(p,rr->epoch);
memcpy(&(s->s3->read_sequence[2]), p, 6);
@@ -535,7 +536,7 @@ again:
/* Lets check version */
if (!s->first_packet)
{
if (version != s->version)
if (version != s->version && version != DTLS1_BAD_VER)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
/* Send back error using their
@@ -546,7 +547,8 @@ again:
}
}
if ((version & 0xff00) != (DTLS1_VERSION & 0xff00))
if ((version & 0xff00) != (DTLS1_VERSION & 0xff00) &&
(version & 0xff00) != (DTLS1_BAD_VER & 0xff00))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
goto err;
@@ -559,6 +561,7 @@ again:
goto f_err;
}
s->client_version = version;
/* now s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY */
}
@@ -973,47 +976,40 @@ start:
}
if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC)
{
struct ccs_header_st ccs_hdr;
{
struct ccs_header_st ccs_hdr;
dtls1_get_ccs_header(rr->data, &ccs_hdr);
if ( ccs_hdr.seq == s->d1->handshake_read_seq)
/* 'Change Cipher Spec' is just a single byte, so we know
* exactly what the record payload has to look like */
/* XDTLS: check that epoch is consistent */
if ( (s->client_version == DTLS1_BAD_VER && rr->length != 3) ||
(s->client_version != DTLS1_BAD_VER && rr->length != DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH) ||
(rr->off != 0) || (rr->data[0] != SSL3_MT_CCS))
{
/* 'Change Cipher Spec' is just a single byte, so we know
* exactly what the record payload has to look like */
/* XDTLS: check that epoch is consistent */
if ( (rr->length != DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH) ||
(rr->off != 0) || (rr->data[0] != SSL3_MT_CCS))
{
i=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC);
goto err;
}
rr->length=0;
if (s->msg_callback)
s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC,
rr->data, 1, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
s->s3->change_cipher_spec=1;
if (!ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(s))
goto err;
/* do this whenever CCS is processed */
dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s, SSL3_CC_READ);
/* handshake read seq is reset upon handshake completion */
i=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC);
goto err;
}
rr->length=0;
if (s->msg_callback)
s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC,
rr->data, 1, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
s->s3->change_cipher_spec=1;
if (!ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(s))
goto err;
/* do this whenever CCS is processed */
dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s, SSL3_CC_READ);
if (s->client_version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
s->d1->handshake_read_seq++;
goto start;
}
else
{
rr->length = 0;
goto start;
}
goto start;
}
/* Unexpected handshake message (Client Hello, or protocol violation) */
@@ -1341,8 +1337,12 @@ int do_dtls1_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf, unsigned int len,
*(p++)=type&0xff;
wr->type=type;
*(p++)=(s->version>>8);
*(p++)=s->version&0xff;
if (s->client_version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
*(p++) = DTLS1_BAD_VER>>8,
*(p++) = DTLS1_BAD_VER&0xff;
else
*(p++)=(s->version>>8),
*(p++)=s->version&0xff;
/* field where we are to write out packet epoch, seq num and len */
pseq=p;
@@ -1397,8 +1397,14 @@ int do_dtls1_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf, unsigned int len,
/* ssl3_enc can only have an error on read */
wr->length += bs; /* bs != 0 in case of CBC. The enc fn provides
* the randomness */
if (bs) /* bs != 0 in case of CBC */
{
RAND_pseudo_bytes(p,bs);
/* master IV and last CBC residue stand for
* the rest of randomness */
wr->length += bs;
}
s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s,1);
/* record length after mac and block padding */