properly handle length-zero opaque PRF input values
(which are pointless, but still might occur)
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@@ -2369,7 +2369,10 @@ long ssl3_ctrl(SSL *s, int cmd, long larg, void *parg)
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}
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if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
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OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input);
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s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(parg, (size_t)larg);
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if ((size_t)larg == 0)
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s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
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else
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s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(parg, (size_t)larg);
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if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
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{
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s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len = (size_t)larg;
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