openssl/fips/fingerprint.sha1

HMAC-SHA1(fips.c)= f764539b7d09141738d86c9e0442de990ab8ae3f
HMAC-SHA1(fips_err_wrapper.c)= d3e2be316062510312269e98f964cb87e7577898
HMAC-SHA1(fips.h)= fbedad5dbd8986ddd521ea576bf2a20e6881540a
HMAC-SHA1(fips_err.h)= 4a73f2a88e206f1f88edfd9b26609a0eed818491
Cygwin specific FIPS fix-ups. 2004-12-09 18:13:46 +00:00			`HMAC-SHA1(fips.c)= f764539b7d09141738d86c9e0442de990ab8ae3f`
Pull FIPS back into stable. 2004-05-11 12:46:24 +00:00			`HMAC-SHA1(fips_err_wrapper.c)= d3e2be316062510312269e98f964cb87e7577898`
To protect FIPS-related global variables, add locking mechanisms around them. NOTE: because two new locks are added, this adds potential binary incompatibility with earlier versions in the 0.9.7 series. However, those locks will only ever be touched when FIPS_mode_set() is called and after, thanks to a variable that's only changed from 0 to 1 once (when FIPS_mode_set() is called). So basically, as long as FIPS mode hasn't been engaged explicitely by the calling application, the new locks are treated as if they didn't exist at all, thus not becoming a problem. Applications that are built or rebuilt to use FIPS functionality will need to be recompiled in any case, thus not being a problem either. 2004-07-30 14:38:02 +00:00			`HMAC-SHA1(fips.h)= fbedad5dbd8986ddd521ea576bf2a20e6881540a`
The version that was actually submitted for FIPS testing. 2004-06-19 13:15:35 +00:00			`HMAC-SHA1(fips_err.h)= 4a73f2a88e206f1f88edfd9b26609a0eed818491`