libzmq/src/curve_server.cpp
Luca Boccassi da31917f4f Relicense from LGPL3 + exceptions to Mozilla Public License version 2.0
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The relicense grants are collected under RELICENSE/ and will be moved
to the above repository in a later commit.

Fixes https://github.com/zeromq/libzmq/issues/2376
2023-06-05 20:31:47 +01:00

480 lines
17 KiB
C++

/* SPDX-License-Identifier: MPL-2.0 */
#include "precompiled.hpp"
#include "macros.hpp"
#ifdef ZMQ_HAVE_CURVE
#include "msg.hpp"
#include "session_base.hpp"
#include "err.hpp"
#include "curve_server.hpp"
#include "wire.hpp"
#include "secure_allocator.hpp"
zmq::curve_server_t::curve_server_t (session_base_t *session_,
const std::string &peer_address_,
const options_t &options_,
const bool downgrade_sub_) :
mechanism_base_t (session_, options_),
zap_client_common_handshake_t (
session_, peer_address_, options_, sending_ready),
curve_mechanism_base_t (session_,
options_,
"CurveZMQMESSAGES",
"CurveZMQMESSAGEC",
downgrade_sub_)
{
int rc;
// Fetch our secret key from socket options
memcpy (_secret_key, options_.curve_secret_key, crypto_box_SECRETKEYBYTES);
// Generate short-term key pair
memset (_cn_secret, 0, crypto_box_SECRETKEYBYTES);
memset (_cn_public, 0, crypto_box_PUBLICKEYBYTES);
rc = crypto_box_keypair (_cn_public, _cn_secret);
zmq_assert (rc == 0);
}
zmq::curve_server_t::~curve_server_t ()
{
}
int zmq::curve_server_t::next_handshake_command (msg_t *msg_)
{
int rc = 0;
switch (state) {
case sending_welcome:
rc = produce_welcome (msg_);
if (rc == 0)
state = waiting_for_initiate;
break;
case sending_ready:
rc = produce_ready (msg_);
if (rc == 0)
state = ready;
break;
case sending_error:
rc = produce_error (msg_);
if (rc == 0)
state = error_sent;
break;
default:
errno = EAGAIN;
rc = -1;
break;
}
return rc;
}
int zmq::curve_server_t::process_handshake_command (msg_t *msg_)
{
int rc = 0;
switch (state) {
case waiting_for_hello:
rc = process_hello (msg_);
break;
case waiting_for_initiate:
rc = process_initiate (msg_);
break;
default:
// TODO I think this is not a case reachable with a misbehaving
// client. It is not an "invalid handshake command", but would be
// trying to process a handshake command in an invalid state,
// which is purely under control of this peer.
// Therefore, it should be changed to zmq_assert (false);
// CURVE I: invalid handshake command
session->get_socket ()->event_handshake_failed_protocol (
session->get_endpoint (), ZMQ_PROTOCOL_ERROR_ZMTP_UNSPECIFIED);
errno = EPROTO;
rc = -1;
break;
}
if (rc == 0) {
rc = msg_->close ();
errno_assert (rc == 0);
rc = msg_->init ();
errno_assert (rc == 0);
}
return rc;
}
int zmq::curve_server_t::encode (msg_t *msg_)
{
zmq_assert (state == ready);
return curve_mechanism_base_t::encode (msg_);
}
int zmq::curve_server_t::decode (msg_t *msg_)
{
zmq_assert (state == ready);
return curve_mechanism_base_t::decode (msg_);
}
int zmq::curve_server_t::process_hello (msg_t *msg_)
{
int rc = check_basic_command_structure (msg_);
if (rc == -1)
return -1;
const size_t size = msg_->size ();
const uint8_t *const hello = static_cast<uint8_t *> (msg_->data ());
if (size < 6 || memcmp (hello, "\x05HELLO", 6)) {
session->get_socket ()->event_handshake_failed_protocol (
session->get_endpoint (), ZMQ_PROTOCOL_ERROR_ZMTP_UNEXPECTED_COMMAND);
errno = EPROTO;
return -1;
}
if (size != 200) {
session->get_socket ()->event_handshake_failed_protocol (
session->get_endpoint (),
ZMQ_PROTOCOL_ERROR_ZMTP_MALFORMED_COMMAND_HELLO);
errno = EPROTO;
return -1;
}
const uint8_t major = hello[6];
const uint8_t minor = hello[7];
if (major != 1 || minor != 0) {
// CURVE I: client HELLO has unknown version number
session->get_socket ()->event_handshake_failed_protocol (
session->get_endpoint (),
ZMQ_PROTOCOL_ERROR_ZMTP_MALFORMED_COMMAND_HELLO);
errno = EPROTO;
return -1;
}
// Save client's short-term public key (C')
memcpy (_cn_client, hello + 80, 32);
uint8_t hello_nonce[crypto_box_NONCEBYTES];
std::vector<uint8_t, secure_allocator_t<uint8_t> > hello_plaintext (
crypto_box_ZEROBYTES + 64);
uint8_t hello_box[crypto_box_BOXZEROBYTES + 80];
memcpy (hello_nonce, "CurveZMQHELLO---", 16);
memcpy (hello_nonce + 16, hello + 112, 8);
set_peer_nonce (get_uint64 (hello + 112));
memset (hello_box, 0, crypto_box_BOXZEROBYTES);
memcpy (hello_box + crypto_box_BOXZEROBYTES, hello + 120, 80);
// Open Box [64 * %x0](C'->S)
rc = crypto_box_open (&hello_plaintext[0], hello_box, sizeof hello_box,
hello_nonce, _cn_client, _secret_key);
if (rc != 0) {
// CURVE I: cannot open client HELLO -- wrong server key?
session->get_socket ()->event_handshake_failed_protocol (
session->get_endpoint (), ZMQ_PROTOCOL_ERROR_ZMTP_CRYPTOGRAPHIC);
errno = EPROTO;
return -1;
}
state = sending_welcome;
return rc;
}
int zmq::curve_server_t::produce_welcome (msg_t *msg_)
{
uint8_t cookie_nonce[crypto_secretbox_NONCEBYTES];
std::vector<uint8_t, secure_allocator_t<uint8_t> > cookie_plaintext (
crypto_secretbox_ZEROBYTES + 64);
uint8_t cookie_ciphertext[crypto_secretbox_BOXZEROBYTES + 80];
// Create full nonce for encryption
// 8-byte prefix plus 16-byte random nonce
memset (cookie_nonce, 0, crypto_secretbox_NONCEBYTES);
memcpy (cookie_nonce, "COOKIE--", 8);
randombytes (cookie_nonce + 8, 16);
// Generate cookie = Box [C' + s'](t)
std::fill (cookie_plaintext.begin (),
cookie_plaintext.begin () + crypto_secretbox_ZEROBYTES, 0);
memcpy (&cookie_plaintext[crypto_secretbox_ZEROBYTES], _cn_client, 32);
memcpy (&cookie_plaintext[crypto_secretbox_ZEROBYTES + 32], _cn_secret, 32);
// Generate fresh cookie key
memset (_cookie_key, 0, crypto_secretbox_KEYBYTES);
randombytes (_cookie_key, crypto_secretbox_KEYBYTES);
// Encrypt using symmetric cookie key
int rc =
crypto_secretbox (cookie_ciphertext, &cookie_plaintext[0],
cookie_plaintext.size (), cookie_nonce, _cookie_key);
zmq_assert (rc == 0);
uint8_t welcome_nonce[crypto_box_NONCEBYTES];
std::vector<uint8_t, secure_allocator_t<uint8_t> > welcome_plaintext (
crypto_box_ZEROBYTES + 128);
uint8_t welcome_ciphertext[crypto_box_BOXZEROBYTES + 144];
// Create full nonce for encryption
// 8-byte prefix plus 16-byte random nonce
memset (welcome_nonce, 0, crypto_box_NONCEBYTES);
memcpy (welcome_nonce, "WELCOME-", 8);
randombytes (welcome_nonce + 8, crypto_box_NONCEBYTES - 8);
// Create 144-byte Box [S' + cookie](S->C')
std::fill (welcome_plaintext.begin (),
welcome_plaintext.begin () + crypto_box_ZEROBYTES, 0);
memcpy (&welcome_plaintext[crypto_box_ZEROBYTES], _cn_public, 32);
memcpy (&welcome_plaintext[crypto_box_ZEROBYTES + 32], cookie_nonce + 8,
16);
memcpy (&welcome_plaintext[crypto_box_ZEROBYTES + 48],
cookie_ciphertext + crypto_secretbox_BOXZEROBYTES, 80);
rc = crypto_box (welcome_ciphertext, &welcome_plaintext[0],
welcome_plaintext.size (), welcome_nonce, _cn_client,
_secret_key);
// TODO I think we should change this back to zmq_assert (rc == 0);
// as it was before https://github.com/zeromq/libzmq/pull/1832
// The reason given there was that secret_key might be 0ed.
// But if it were, we would never get this far, since we could
// not have opened the client's hello box with a 0ed key.
if (rc == -1)
return -1;
rc = msg_->init_size (168);
errno_assert (rc == 0);
uint8_t *const welcome = static_cast<uint8_t *> (msg_->data ());
memcpy (welcome, "\x07WELCOME", 8);
memcpy (welcome + 8, welcome_nonce + 8, 16);
memcpy (welcome + 24, welcome_ciphertext + crypto_box_BOXZEROBYTES, 144);
return 0;
}
int zmq::curve_server_t::process_initiate (msg_t *msg_)
{
int rc = check_basic_command_structure (msg_);
if (rc == -1)
return -1;
const size_t size = msg_->size ();
const uint8_t *initiate = static_cast<uint8_t *> (msg_->data ());
if (size < 9 || memcmp (initiate, "\x08INITIATE", 9)) {
session->get_socket ()->event_handshake_failed_protocol (
session->get_endpoint (), ZMQ_PROTOCOL_ERROR_ZMTP_UNEXPECTED_COMMAND);
errno = EPROTO;
return -1;
}
if (size < 257) {
session->get_socket ()->event_handshake_failed_protocol (
session->get_endpoint (),
ZMQ_PROTOCOL_ERROR_ZMTP_MALFORMED_COMMAND_INITIATE);
errno = EPROTO;
return -1;
}
uint8_t cookie_nonce[crypto_secretbox_NONCEBYTES];
uint8_t cookie_plaintext[crypto_secretbox_ZEROBYTES + 64];
uint8_t cookie_box[crypto_secretbox_BOXZEROBYTES + 80];
// Open Box [C' + s'](t)
memset (cookie_box, 0, crypto_secretbox_BOXZEROBYTES);
memcpy (cookie_box + crypto_secretbox_BOXZEROBYTES, initiate + 25, 80);
memcpy (cookie_nonce, "COOKIE--", 8);
memcpy (cookie_nonce + 8, initiate + 9, 16);
rc = crypto_secretbox_open (cookie_plaintext, cookie_box, sizeof cookie_box,
cookie_nonce, _cookie_key);
if (rc != 0) {
// CURVE I: cannot open client INITIATE cookie
session->get_socket ()->event_handshake_failed_protocol (
session->get_endpoint (), ZMQ_PROTOCOL_ERROR_ZMTP_CRYPTOGRAPHIC);
errno = EPROTO;
return -1;
}
// Check cookie plain text is as expected [C' + s']
if (memcmp (cookie_plaintext + crypto_secretbox_ZEROBYTES, _cn_client, 32)
|| memcmp (cookie_plaintext + crypto_secretbox_ZEROBYTES + 32,
_cn_secret, 32)) {
// TODO this case is very hard to test, as it would require a modified
// client that knows the server's secret temporary cookie key
// CURVE I: client INITIATE cookie is not valid
session->get_socket ()->event_handshake_failed_protocol (
session->get_endpoint (), ZMQ_PROTOCOL_ERROR_ZMTP_CRYPTOGRAPHIC);
errno = EPROTO;
return -1;
}
const size_t clen = (size - 113) + crypto_box_BOXZEROBYTES;
uint8_t initiate_nonce[crypto_box_NONCEBYTES];
std::vector<uint8_t, secure_allocator_t<uint8_t> > initiate_plaintext (
crypto_box_ZEROBYTES + clen);
std::vector<uint8_t> initiate_box (crypto_box_BOXZEROBYTES + clen);
// Open Box [C + vouch + metadata](C'->S')
std::fill (initiate_box.begin (),
initiate_box.begin () + crypto_box_BOXZEROBYTES, 0);
memcpy (&initiate_box[crypto_box_BOXZEROBYTES], initiate + 113,
clen - crypto_box_BOXZEROBYTES);
memcpy (initiate_nonce, "CurveZMQINITIATE", 16);
memcpy (initiate_nonce + 16, initiate + 105, 8);
set_peer_nonce (get_uint64 (initiate + 105));
const uint8_t *client_key = &initiate_plaintext[crypto_box_ZEROBYTES];
rc = crypto_box_open (&initiate_plaintext[0], &initiate_box[0], clen,
initiate_nonce, _cn_client, _cn_secret);
if (rc != 0) {
// CURVE I: cannot open client INITIATE
session->get_socket ()->event_handshake_failed_protocol (
session->get_endpoint (), ZMQ_PROTOCOL_ERROR_ZMTP_CRYPTOGRAPHIC);
errno = EPROTO;
return -1;
}
uint8_t vouch_nonce[crypto_box_NONCEBYTES];
std::vector<uint8_t, secure_allocator_t<uint8_t> > vouch_plaintext (
crypto_box_ZEROBYTES + 64);
uint8_t vouch_box[crypto_box_BOXZEROBYTES + 80];
// Open Box Box [C',S](C->S') and check contents
memset (vouch_box, 0, crypto_box_BOXZEROBYTES);
memcpy (vouch_box + crypto_box_BOXZEROBYTES,
&initiate_plaintext[crypto_box_ZEROBYTES + 48], 80);
memset (vouch_nonce, 0, crypto_box_NONCEBYTES);
memcpy (vouch_nonce, "VOUCH---", 8);
memcpy (vouch_nonce + 8, &initiate_plaintext[crypto_box_ZEROBYTES + 32],
16);
rc = crypto_box_open (&vouch_plaintext[0], vouch_box, sizeof vouch_box,
vouch_nonce, client_key, _cn_secret);
if (rc != 0) {
// CURVE I: cannot open client INITIATE vouch
session->get_socket ()->event_handshake_failed_protocol (
session->get_endpoint (), ZMQ_PROTOCOL_ERROR_ZMTP_CRYPTOGRAPHIC);
errno = EPROTO;
return -1;
}
// What we decrypted must be the client's short-term public key
if (memcmp (&vouch_plaintext[crypto_box_ZEROBYTES], _cn_client, 32)) {
// TODO this case is very hard to test, as it would require a modified
// client that knows the server's secret short-term key
// CURVE I: invalid handshake from client (public key)
session->get_socket ()->event_handshake_failed_protocol (
session->get_endpoint (), ZMQ_PROTOCOL_ERROR_ZMTP_KEY_EXCHANGE);
errno = EPROTO;
return -1;
}
// Precompute connection secret from client key
rc = crypto_box_beforenm (get_writable_precom_buffer (), _cn_client,
_cn_secret);
zmq_assert (rc == 0);
// Given this is a backward-incompatible change, it's behind a socket
// option disabled by default.
if (zap_required () || !options.zap_enforce_domain) {
// Use ZAP protocol (RFC 27) to authenticate the user.
rc = session->zap_connect ();
if (rc == 0) {
send_zap_request (client_key);
state = waiting_for_zap_reply;
// TODO actually, it is quite unlikely that we can read the ZAP
// reply already, but removing this has some strange side-effect
// (probably because the pipe's in_active flag is true until a read
// is attempted)
if (-1 == receive_and_process_zap_reply ())
return -1;
} else if (!options.zap_enforce_domain) {
// This supports the Stonehouse pattern (encryption without
// authentication) in legacy mode (domain set but no handler).
state = sending_ready;
} else {
session->get_socket ()->event_handshake_failed_no_detail (
session->get_endpoint (), EFAULT);
return -1;
}
} else {
// This supports the Stonehouse pattern (encryption without authentication).
state = sending_ready;
}
return parse_metadata (&initiate_plaintext[crypto_box_ZEROBYTES + 128],
clen - crypto_box_ZEROBYTES - 128);
}
int zmq::curve_server_t::produce_ready (msg_t *msg_)
{
const size_t metadata_length = basic_properties_len ();
uint8_t ready_nonce[crypto_box_NONCEBYTES];
std::vector<uint8_t, secure_allocator_t<uint8_t> > ready_plaintext (
crypto_box_ZEROBYTES + metadata_length);
// Create Box [metadata](S'->C')
std::fill (ready_plaintext.begin (),
ready_plaintext.begin () + crypto_box_ZEROBYTES, 0);
uint8_t *ptr = &ready_plaintext[crypto_box_ZEROBYTES];
ptr += add_basic_properties (ptr, metadata_length);
const size_t mlen = ptr - &ready_plaintext[0];
memcpy (ready_nonce, "CurveZMQREADY---", 16);
put_uint64 (ready_nonce + 16, get_and_inc_nonce ());
std::vector<uint8_t> ready_box (crypto_box_BOXZEROBYTES + 16
+ metadata_length);
int rc = crypto_box_afternm (&ready_box[0], &ready_plaintext[0], mlen,
ready_nonce, get_precom_buffer ());
zmq_assert (rc == 0);
rc = msg_->init_size (14 + mlen - crypto_box_BOXZEROBYTES);
errno_assert (rc == 0);
uint8_t *ready = static_cast<uint8_t *> (msg_->data ());
memcpy (ready, "\x05READY", 6);
// Short nonce, prefixed by "CurveZMQREADY---"
memcpy (ready + 6, ready_nonce + 16, 8);
// Box [metadata](S'->C')
memcpy (ready + 14, &ready_box[crypto_box_BOXZEROBYTES],
mlen - crypto_box_BOXZEROBYTES);
return 0;
}
int zmq::curve_server_t::produce_error (msg_t *msg_) const
{
const size_t expected_status_code_length = 3;
zmq_assert (status_code.length () == 3);
const int rc = msg_->init_size (6 + 1 + expected_status_code_length);
zmq_assert (rc == 0);
char *msg_data = static_cast<char *> (msg_->data ());
memcpy (msg_data, "\5ERROR", 6);
msg_data[6] = expected_status_code_length;
memcpy (msg_data + 7, status_code.c_str (), expected_status_code_length);
return 0;
}
void zmq::curve_server_t::send_zap_request (const uint8_t *key_)
{
zap_client_t::send_zap_request ("CURVE", 5, key_,
crypto_box_PUBLICKEYBYTES);
}
#endif