Set the ZMQ_HEARTBEAT_TIMEOUT to default to the value of
ZMQ_HEARTBEAT_IVL if it's not explicitly set.
Change the units of ZMQ_HEARTBEAT_TTL to milliseconds in the API
and round down to the nearest decisecond so that all the options
are using the same units.
Make the maximum heartbeat TTL match the spec (6553 seconds)
Of course people still "can" distributed the sources under the
LGPLv3. However we provide COPYING.LESSER with additional grants.
Solution: specify these grants in the header of each source file.
ZMQ_INVERT_MATCHING reverses the PUB/SUB prefix matching. The subscription
list becomes a rejection list. The PUB socket sends messages to all
connected (X)SUB sockets that do not have any matching subscription.
Whenever the option is used on a PUB/XPUB socket, any connecting SUB
sockets must also set it or they will reject everything the publisher
sends them. XSUB sockets are unaffected because they do not filter out
incoming messages.
Symptom is that ZMQ_STREAM sockets in 4.1.0 and 4.1.1 generate zero
sized messages on each new connection, unlike 4.0.x which did not do
this.
Person who made this commit also changed test cases so that contract
breakage did not show. Same person was later banned for persistently
poor form in CZMQ contributions.
Solution: enable connect notifications on ZMQ_STREAM sockets using a
new ZMQ_STREAM_NOTIFY setting. By default, socket does not deliver
notifications, and behaves as in 4.0.x.
Fixes#1316
Solution: set defaults back to infinity, and add new context
option, ZMQ_BLOCKY that the user can set to false to get a
less surprising behavior on context termination. Eg.
zmq_ctx_set (ctx, ZMQ_BLOCKY, false);
Solution: change setsockopts on printable keys to expect 41, nor 40
bytes. Code still accepts 40 bytes for compatibility, and copies the
key to a well-terminated string before using it.
Fixes#1148
This is still raw and experimental.
To connect through a SOCKS proxy, set ZMQ_SOCKS_PROXY socket option on
socket before issuing a connect call, e.g.:
zmq_setsockopt (s, ZMQ_SOCKS_PROXY,
"127.0.0.1:22222", strlen ("127.0.0.1:22222"));
zmq_connect (s, "tcp://127.0.0.1:5555");
Known limitations:
- only SOCKS version 5 supported
- authentication not supported
- new option is still undocumented
Solution: use same approach as for libsodium/CURVE, i.e. return EINVAL
if the library isn't present when libzmq builds, and the application
still tries to use these options in zmq_getsockopt/setsockopt.
The example is applications passing invalid arguments to a socket option
and then failing to check the return code. The results can be very hard
to diagnose. Here are some threads that show the pain this causes:
* https://github.com/zeromq/zyre/issues/179
* http://lists.zeromq.org/pipermail/zeromq-dev/2014-June/026388.html
One common argument is that a library should never assert, and should
pass errors back to the calling application. The counter argument is
that when an application is broken enough to pass garbage to libzmq,
it cannot be trusted to handle the resulting errors properly. Empirical
evidence from CZMQ, where we systematically assert on bad arguments, is
that this militant approach makes applications more, not less, robust.
I don't see any valid use cases for returning errors on bad arguments,
with one exception: zmq_setsockopt can be used to probe whether libzmq
was e.g. built with CURVE security. I'd argue that it's nasty to use a
side effect like this. If apps need to probe how libzmq was built, this
should be done explicitly, and for ALL build options, not just CURVE.
There are/were no libzmq test cases that check the return code for an
invalid option.
For now I've enabled militant assertions using --with-militant at
configure time. However I'd like to make this the default setting.
Applications that use ZMQ_IDENTITY can be trapped by the artificial
restriction on not using a binary zero as first byte. It's specially
nasty on random generated identities, e.g. UUIDs, as the chance of a
binary zero is low, so it will pass 255 out of 256 times.
Solution: remove the restriction.
- This seems redundant; is there a use case for NOT providing
the IPC credentials to the ZAP authenticator?
- More, why is IPC authentication done via libzmq instead of ZAP?
Is it because we're missing the transport type on the ZAP request?
Another take on LIBZMQ-568 to allow filtering IPC connections, this time
using ZAP. This change is backward compatible. If the
ZMQ_ZAP_IPC_CREDS option is set, the user, group, and process IDs of the
peer process are appended to the address (separated by colons) of a ZAP
request; otherwise, nothing changes. See LIBZMQ-568 and zmq_setsockopt
documentation for more information.
* Removed redundant Z85 code and include files from project
* Simplified use of headers in test cases (now they all just use testutil.hpp)
* Export zmq_z85_encode() and zmq_z85_decode() in API
* Added man pages for these two functions
On ZMQ_CURVE_xxxKEY fetches, would return 41 bytes into caller's 40-byte
buffer. Now these fetches only return 41 bytes if the caller explicitly
provides a 41-byte buffer (i.e. the option size is 41).
* This is passed to the ZAP handler in the 'domain' field
* If not set, or empty, then NULL security does not call the ZAP handler
* This resolves the phantom ZAP request syndrome seen with sockets where
security was never intended (e.g. in test cases)
* This means if you install a ZAP handler, it will not get any requests
for new connections until you take some explicit action, which can be
setting a username/password for PLAIN, a key for CURVE, or the domain
for NULL.
These were exposed to users, but have subsequently been removed as
sockopts. They are currently only being used by ZAP, so I've moved it to
a simpl function call (actually it's only used in one case even in that,
so there may be a further simplification possible there).
