libreSSL/configure.ac

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AC_INIT([libressl], m4_esyscmd([tr -d '\n' < VERSION]))
AC_SUBST([LIBCRYPTO_VERSION], m4_esyscmd([tr -d '\n' < crypto/VERSION]))
AC_SUBST([LIBSSL_VERSION], m4_esyscmd([tr -d '\n' < ssl/VERSION]))
AC_SUBST([LIBTLS_VERSION], m4_esyscmd([tr -d '\n' < tls/VERSION]))
AC_CANONICAL_HOST
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AM_INIT_AUTOMAKE([subdir-objects])
AC_CONFIG_MACRO_DIR([m4])
m4_ifdef([AM_SILENT_RULES], [AM_SILENT_RULES([yes])])
# This must be called before AC_PROG_CC
USER_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS"
AC_PROG_CC
AC_PROG_CC_STDC
AM_PROG_CC_C_O
AC_PROG_LIBTOOL
LT_INIT
CFLAGS="$CFLAGS -Wall -std=gnu99"
case $host_os in
*aix*)
HOST_OS=aix
if [ $CC != "gcc" ]; then
CFLAGS="$USER_CFLAGS"
fi
AC_SUBST([PLATFORM_LDADD], ['-lperfstat -lpthread'])
;;
*cygwin*)
HOST_OS=cygwin
;;
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*darwin*)
HOST_OS=darwin
HOST_ABI=macosx
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;;
*freebsd*)
HOST_OS=freebsd
HOST_ABI=elf
AC_SUBST([PROG_LDADD], ['-lthr'])
;;
*hpux*)
HOST_OS=hpux;
if [ $CC = "gcc" ]; then
CFLAGS="$CFLAGS -mlp64"
else
CFLAGS="-g -O2 +DD64 $USER_CFLAGS"
fi
CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -D_XOPEN_SOURCE=600 -D__STRICT_ALIGNMENT"
AC_SUBST([PLATFORM_LDADD], ['-lpthread'])
;;
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*linux*)
HOST_OS=linux
HOST_ABI=elf
CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -D_DEFAULT_SOURCE -D_BSD_SOURCE -D_POSIX_SOURCE -D_GNU_SOURCE"
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;;
*netbsd*)
HOST_OS=netbsd
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CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -D_OPENBSD_SOURCE"
;;
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*openbsd*)
HOST_ABI=elf
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AC_DEFINE([HAVE_ATTRIBUTE__BOUNDED__], [1], [OpenBSD gcc has bounded])
;;
*mingw*)
HOST_OS=win
CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -D_GNU_SOURCE -D_POSIX -D_POSIX_SOURCE -D__USE_MINGW_ANSI_STDIO"
CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -D_REENTRANT -D_POSIX_THREAD_SAFE_FUNCTIONS"
CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -DWIN32_LEAN_AND_MEAN -D_WIN32_WINNT=0x0600"
CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -DOPENSSL_NO_SPEED -DNO_SYSLOG"
CFLAGS="$CFLAGS -static-libgcc"
LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS -static-libgcc"
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AC_SUBST([PLATFORM_LDADD], ['-lws2_32'])
;;
*solaris*)
HOST_OS=solaris
HOST_ABI=elf
CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -D__EXTENSIONS__ -D_XOPEN_SOURCE=600 -DBSD_COMP"
AC_SUBST([PLATFORM_LDADD], ['-lnsl -lsocket'])
;;
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*) ;;
esac
AM_CONDITIONAL([HOST_AIX], [test x$HOST_OS = xaix])
AM_CONDITIONAL([HOST_CYGWIN], [test x$HOST_OS = xcygwin])
AM_CONDITIONAL([HOST_DARWIN], [test x$HOST_OS = xdarwin])
AM_CONDITIONAL([HOST_FREEBSD], [test x$HOST_OS = xfreebsd])
AM_CONDITIONAL([HOST_HPUX], [test x$HOST_OS = xhpux])
AM_CONDITIONAL([HOST_LINUX], [test x$HOST_OS = xlinux])
AM_CONDITIONAL([HOST_NETBSD], [test x$HOST_OS = xnetbsd])
AM_CONDITIONAL([HOST_SOLARIS], [test x$HOST_OS = xsolaris])
AM_CONDITIONAL([HOST_WIN], [test x$HOST_OS = xwin])
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AC_CHECK_FUNC([clock_gettime],,
[AC_SEARCH_LIBS([clock_gettime],[rt posix4])])
AC_CHECK_FUNC([dl_iterate_phdr],,
[AC_SEARCH_LIBS([dl_iterate_phdr],[dl])])
AC_MSG_CHECKING([if compiling with clang])
AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([], [[
#ifndef __clang__
not clang
#endif
]])],
[CLANG=yes],
[CLANG=no]
)
AC_MSG_RESULT([$CLANG])
AS_IF([test "x$CLANG" = "xyes"], [CLANG_FLAGS=-Qunused-arguments])
CFLAGS="$CFLAGS $CLANG_FLAGS"
LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS $CLANG_FLAGS"
# We want to check for compiler flag support. Prior to clang v5.1, there was no
# way to make clang's "argument unused" warning fatal. So we invoke the
# compiler through a wrapper script that greps for this message.
configure.ac: use executable hardening where available Where available, enable stack smashing protection, fortify source, no-strict-overflow, and read only relocations. Many Linux distributions automatically enable most of these options. They are no brainers. The difference introduced here is in asking for a few more aggressive options. An option to disable the more aggressive options is provided (--disable-hardening). When set, configure will fall back to the default CFLAGS on the system - in many cases that will still be hardened. There is no point in going further than that. Options enabled are: -fstack-protector-strong is a relatively new GCC-4.9 feature that is supposed to give a better balance between performance and protection. -all is considered too aggressive, but was used in Chromium and other security critical systems until -strong became available. Follow their lead and use -strong when possible. clang 6.0 supports -all but not -strong. _FORTIFY_SOURCE replaces certain unsafe C str* and mem* functions with more robust equivalents when the compiler can determine the length of the buffers involved. -fno-strict-overflow instructs GCC to not make optimizations based on the assumption that signed arithmetic will wrap around on overflow (e.g. (short)0x7FFF + 1 == 0). This prevents the optimizer from doing some unexpected things. Further improvements should trap signed overflows and reduce the use of signed to refer to naturally unsigned quantities. I did not set -fPIE (position independent executables). The critical function of Open/LibreSSL is as a library, not an executable. Tested on Ubuntu Linux 14.04.1 LTS, OS X 10.10.1 with "make check". Signed-off-by: Jim Barlow <jim@purplerock.ca>
2014-12-23 14:24:24 +01:00
saved_CC="$CC"
saved_LD="$LD"
flag_wrap="$srcdir/scripts/wrap-compiler-for-flag-check"
CC="$flag_wrap $CC"
LD="$flag_wrap $LD"
AC_ARG_ENABLE([hardening],
[AS_HELP_STRING([--disable-hardening],
[Disable options to frustrate memory corruption exploits])],
[], [enable_hardening=yes])
AC_ARG_ENABLE([windows-ssp],
[AS_HELP_STRING([--enable-windows-ssp],
[Enable building the stack smashing protection on
Windows. This currently distributing libssp-0.dll.])])
AC_DEFUN([CHECK_CFLAG], [
AC_LANG_ASSERT(C)
AC_MSG_CHECKING([if $saved_CC supports "$1"])
old_cflags="$CFLAGS"
CFLAGS="$1 -Wall -Werror"
AC_TRY_LINK([
#include <stdio.h>
],
[printf("Hello")],
AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
CFLAGS=$old_cflags
HARDEN_CFLAGS="$HARDEN_CFLAGS $1",
AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
CFLAGS=$old_cflags
[$2])
])
AC_DEFUN([CHECK_LDFLAG], [
AC_LANG_ASSERT(C)
AC_MSG_CHECKING([if $saved_LD supports "$1"])
old_ldflags="$LDFLAGS"
LDFLAGS="$1 -Wall -Werror"
AC_TRY_LINK([
#include <stdio.h>
],
[printf("Hello")],
AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
LDFLAGS=$old_ldflags
HARDEN_LDFLAGS="$HARDEN_LDFLAGS $1",
AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
LDFLAGS=$old_ldflags
[$2])
])
AS_IF([test "x$enable_hardening" = "xyes"], [
configure.ac: use executable hardening where available Where available, enable stack smashing protection, fortify source, no-strict-overflow, and read only relocations. Many Linux distributions automatically enable most of these options. They are no brainers. The difference introduced here is in asking for a few more aggressive options. An option to disable the more aggressive options is provided (--disable-hardening). When set, configure will fall back to the default CFLAGS on the system - in many cases that will still be hardened. There is no point in going further than that. Options enabled are: -fstack-protector-strong is a relatively new GCC-4.9 feature that is supposed to give a better balance between performance and protection. -all is considered too aggressive, but was used in Chromium and other security critical systems until -strong became available. Follow their lead and use -strong when possible. clang 6.0 supports -all but not -strong. _FORTIFY_SOURCE replaces certain unsafe C str* and mem* functions with more robust equivalents when the compiler can determine the length of the buffers involved. -fno-strict-overflow instructs GCC to not make optimizations based on the assumption that signed arithmetic will wrap around on overflow (e.g. (short)0x7FFF + 1 == 0). This prevents the optimizer from doing some unexpected things. Further improvements should trap signed overflows and reduce the use of signed to refer to naturally unsigned quantities. I did not set -fPIE (position independent executables). The critical function of Open/LibreSSL is as a library, not an executable. Tested on Ubuntu Linux 14.04.1 LTS, OS X 10.10.1 with "make check". Signed-off-by: Jim Barlow <jim@purplerock.ca>
2014-12-23 14:24:24 +01:00
# Tell GCC to NOT optimize based on signed arithmetic overflow
CHECK_CFLAG([[-fno-strict-overflow]])
configure.ac: use executable hardening where available Where available, enable stack smashing protection, fortify source, no-strict-overflow, and read only relocations. Many Linux distributions automatically enable most of these options. They are no brainers. The difference introduced here is in asking for a few more aggressive options. An option to disable the more aggressive options is provided (--disable-hardening). When set, configure will fall back to the default CFLAGS on the system - in many cases that will still be hardened. There is no point in going further than that. Options enabled are: -fstack-protector-strong is a relatively new GCC-4.9 feature that is supposed to give a better balance between performance and protection. -all is considered too aggressive, but was used in Chromium and other security critical systems until -strong became available. Follow their lead and use -strong when possible. clang 6.0 supports -all but not -strong. _FORTIFY_SOURCE replaces certain unsafe C str* and mem* functions with more robust equivalents when the compiler can determine the length of the buffers involved. -fno-strict-overflow instructs GCC to not make optimizations based on the assumption that signed arithmetic will wrap around on overflow (e.g. (short)0x7FFF + 1 == 0). This prevents the optimizer from doing some unexpected things. Further improvements should trap signed overflows and reduce the use of signed to refer to naturally unsigned quantities. I did not set -fPIE (position independent executables). The critical function of Open/LibreSSL is as a library, not an executable. Tested on Ubuntu Linux 14.04.1 LTS, OS X 10.10.1 with "make check". Signed-off-by: Jim Barlow <jim@purplerock.ca>
2014-12-23 14:24:24 +01:00
# _FORTIFY_SOURCE replaces builtin functions with safer versions.
CHECK_CFLAG([[-D_FORTIFY_SOURCE=2]])
configure.ac: use executable hardening where available Where available, enable stack smashing protection, fortify source, no-strict-overflow, and read only relocations. Many Linux distributions automatically enable most of these options. They are no brainers. The difference introduced here is in asking for a few more aggressive options. An option to disable the more aggressive options is provided (--disable-hardening). When set, configure will fall back to the default CFLAGS on the system - in many cases that will still be hardened. There is no point in going further than that. Options enabled are: -fstack-protector-strong is a relatively new GCC-4.9 feature that is supposed to give a better balance between performance and protection. -all is considered too aggressive, but was used in Chromium and other security critical systems until -strong became available. Follow their lead and use -strong when possible. clang 6.0 supports -all but not -strong. _FORTIFY_SOURCE replaces certain unsafe C str* and mem* functions with more robust equivalents when the compiler can determine the length of the buffers involved. -fno-strict-overflow instructs GCC to not make optimizations based on the assumption that signed arithmetic will wrap around on overflow (e.g. (short)0x7FFF + 1 == 0). This prevents the optimizer from doing some unexpected things. Further improvements should trap signed overflows and reduce the use of signed to refer to naturally unsigned quantities. I did not set -fPIE (position independent executables). The critical function of Open/LibreSSL is as a library, not an executable. Tested on Ubuntu Linux 14.04.1 LTS, OS X 10.10.1 with "make check". Signed-off-by: Jim Barlow <jim@purplerock.ca>
2014-12-23 14:24:24 +01:00
# Enable read only relocations
CHECK_LDFLAG([[-Wl,-z,relro]])
CHECK_LDFLAG([[-Wl,-z,now]])
configure.ac: use executable hardening where available Where available, enable stack smashing protection, fortify source, no-strict-overflow, and read only relocations. Many Linux distributions automatically enable most of these options. They are no brainers. The difference introduced here is in asking for a few more aggressive options. An option to disable the more aggressive options is provided (--disable-hardening). When set, configure will fall back to the default CFLAGS on the system - in many cases that will still be hardened. There is no point in going further than that. Options enabled are: -fstack-protector-strong is a relatively new GCC-4.9 feature that is supposed to give a better balance between performance and protection. -all is considered too aggressive, but was used in Chromium and other security critical systems until -strong became available. Follow their lead and use -strong when possible. clang 6.0 supports -all but not -strong. _FORTIFY_SOURCE replaces certain unsafe C str* and mem* functions with more robust equivalents when the compiler can determine the length of the buffers involved. -fno-strict-overflow instructs GCC to not make optimizations based on the assumption that signed arithmetic will wrap around on overflow (e.g. (short)0x7FFF + 1 == 0). This prevents the optimizer from doing some unexpected things. Further improvements should trap signed overflows and reduce the use of signed to refer to naturally unsigned quantities. I did not set -fPIE (position independent executables). The critical function of Open/LibreSSL is as a library, not an executable. Tested on Ubuntu Linux 14.04.1 LTS, OS X 10.10.1 with "make check". Signed-off-by: Jim Barlow <jim@purplerock.ca>
2014-12-23 14:24:24 +01:00
# Windows security flags
AS_IF([test "x$HOST_OS" = "xwin"], [
CHECK_LDFLAG([[-Wl,--nxcompat]])
CHECK_LDFLAG([[-Wl,--dynamicbase]])
CHECK_LDFLAG([[-Wl,--high-entropy-va]])
])
# Use stack-protector-strong if available; if not, fallback to
# stack-protector-all which is considered to be overkill
AS_IF([test "x$enable_windows_ssp" = "xyes" -o "x$HOST_OS" != "xwin"], [
CHECK_CFLAG([[-fstack-protector-strong]],
CHECK_CFLAG([[-fstack-protector-all]],
AC_MSG_WARN([compiler does not appear to support stack protection])
)
)
AS_IF([test "x$HOST_OS" = "xwin"], [
AC_SEARCH_LIBS([__stack_chk_guard],[ssp])
])
])
])
configure.ac: use executable hardening where available Where available, enable stack smashing protection, fortify source, no-strict-overflow, and read only relocations. Many Linux distributions automatically enable most of these options. They are no brainers. The difference introduced here is in asking for a few more aggressive options. An option to disable the more aggressive options is provided (--disable-hardening). When set, configure will fall back to the default CFLAGS on the system - in many cases that will still be hardened. There is no point in going further than that. Options enabled are: -fstack-protector-strong is a relatively new GCC-4.9 feature that is supposed to give a better balance between performance and protection. -all is considered too aggressive, but was used in Chromium and other security critical systems until -strong became available. Follow their lead and use -strong when possible. clang 6.0 supports -all but not -strong. _FORTIFY_SOURCE replaces certain unsafe C str* and mem* functions with more robust equivalents when the compiler can determine the length of the buffers involved. -fno-strict-overflow instructs GCC to not make optimizations based on the assumption that signed arithmetic will wrap around on overflow (e.g. (short)0x7FFF + 1 == 0). This prevents the optimizer from doing some unexpected things. Further improvements should trap signed overflows and reduce the use of signed to refer to naturally unsigned quantities. I did not set -fPIE (position independent executables). The critical function of Open/LibreSSL is as a library, not an executable. Tested on Ubuntu Linux 14.04.1 LTS, OS X 10.10.1 with "make check". Signed-off-by: Jim Barlow <jim@purplerock.ca>
2014-12-23 14:24:24 +01:00
# Restore CC, LD
CC="$saved_CC"
LD="$saved_LD"
CFLAGS="$CFLAGS $HARDEN_CFLAGS"
LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS $HARDEN_LDFLAGS"
# Removing the dependency on -Wno-pointer-sign should be a goal
save_cflags="$CFLAGS"
CFLAGS=-Wno-pointer-sign
AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether CC supports -Wno-pointer-sign])
AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([])],
[AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])]
[AM_CFLAGS=-Wno-pointer-sign],
[AC_MSG_RESULT([no])]
)
CFLAGS="$save_cflags $AM_CFLAGS"
save_cflags="$CFLAGS"
CFLAGS=
AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether AS supports .note.GNU-stack])
AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
__asm__(".section .note.GNU-stack,\"\",@progbits");]])],
[AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])]
[AM_CFLAGS=-DHAVE_GNU_STACK],
[AC_MSG_RESULT([no])]
)
CFLAGS="$save_cflags $AM_CFLAGS"
AM_PROG_AS
AC_CHECK_FUNCS([arc4random_buf asprintf explicit_bzero funopen getauxval])
AC_CHECK_FUNCS([getentropy memmem poll reallocarray])
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AC_CHECK_FUNCS([strlcat strlcpy strndup strnlen strsep strtonum])
AC_CHECK_FUNCS([symlink])
AC_CHECK_FUNCS([timingsafe_bcmp timingsafe_memcmp])
# Share test results with automake
AM_CONDITIONAL([HAVE_ARC4RANDOM_BUF], [test "x$ac_cv_func_arc4random_buf" = xyes])
AM_CONDITIONAL([HAVE_ASPRINTF], [test "x$ac_cv_func_asprintf" = xyes])
AM_CONDITIONAL([HAVE_EXPLICIT_BZERO], [test "x$ac_cv_func_explicit_bzero" = xyes])
AM_CONDITIONAL([HAVE_GETENTROPY], [test "x$ac_cv_func_getentropy" = xyes])
AM_CONDITIONAL([HAVE_MEMMEM], [test "x$ac_cv_func_memmem" = xyes])
add minimal poll(2) implementation for Windows This provides sufficient functionality to run openssl(1) from a Windows console. This is based on the original select-based version from from songdongsheng@live.cn. Changes: * use nfds_t directly for iterating the fds. * add WSAGetLastError -> errno mappings * handle POLLHUP and the OOB data cases for revents * handle sparse arrays of fds correctly * KNF style updates * teach poll how to handle file handles as well as sockets This handles the socket/non-socket issue by alternating a loop between WaitForMultipleObjects for non-sockets and and select for sockets. One would think this would be terrible for performance, but as of this writing, poll consumes about 6% of the time doing a bulk transfer between a Linux box and 'openssl.exe s_server'. I tried to implement this all in terms of WaitForMultipleObjects with a select 'poll' at the end to get extra specific socket status. However, the cost of setting up an event handle for each socket, setting the WSAEventSelect attributes, and cleaning them up reliably was pretty high. Since the event handle associated with a socket is also global, creating a new one cancels the previous one or can be disabled externally. In addition, the 'FD_WRITE' status of a socket event handle does not behave in an expected fashion, being triggered by an edge on a write event rather than being level triggered. Another fun horror story is how stdin in windows might be a console, it might be a pipe, it might be something else. If these all worked in the same way, it would be great. But, since a console-stdin can also signal on a mouse or window event, it means we can easily get stuck in a blocking read (you can't make stdin non-blocking) if the non-character events are not filtered out. So, poll does that too. See here for various additional horror stories: http://www.postgresql.org/message-id/4351.1336927207@sss.pgh.pa.us
2014-11-20 07:24:20 +01:00
AM_CONDITIONAL([HAVE_POLL], [test "x$ac_cv_func_poll" = xyes])
AM_CONDITIONAL([HAVE_REALLOCARRAY], [test "x$ac_cv_func_reallocarray" = xyes])
AM_CONDITIONAL([HAVE_STRLCAT], [test "x$ac_cv_func_strlcat" = xyes])
AM_CONDITIONAL([HAVE_STRLCPY], [test "x$ac_cv_func_strlcpy" = xyes])
AM_CONDITIONAL([HAVE_STRNDUP], [test "x$ac_cv_func_strndup" = xyes])
AM_CONDITIONAL([HAVE_STRNLEN], [test "x$ac_cv_func_strnlen" = xyes])
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AM_CONDITIONAL([HAVE_STRSEP], [test "x$ac_cv_func_strsep" = xyes])
AM_CONDITIONAL([HAVE_STRTONUM], [test "x$ac_cv_func_strtonum" = xyes])
AM_CONDITIONAL([HAVE_TIMINGSAFE_BCMP], [test "x$ac_cv_func_timingsafe_bcmp" = xyes])
AM_CONDITIONAL([HAVE_TIMINGSAFE_MEMCMP], [test "x$ac_cv_func_timingsafe_memcmp" = xyes])
AM_CONDITIONAL([BUILD_CERTHASH], [test "x$ac_cv_func_symlink" = xyes])
# overrides for arc4random_buf implementations with known issues
AM_CONDITIONAL([HAVE_ARC4RANDOM_BUF],
[test "x$HOST_OS" != xdarwin \
-a "x$HOST_OS" != xfreebsd \
-a "x$HOST_OS" != xnetbsd \
-a "x$ac_cv_func_arc4random_buf" = xyes])
AC_CACHE_CHECK([whether va_copy exists], ac_cv_have_va_copy, [
AC_LINK_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
#include <stdarg.h>
va_list x,y;
]], [[ va_copy(x,y); ]])],
[ ac_cv_have_va_copy="yes" ],
[ ac_cv_have_va_copy="no"
])
])
if test "x$ac_cv_have_va_copy" = "xyes" ; then
AC_DEFINE([HAVE_VA_COPY], [1], [Define if va_copy exists])
fi
AC_CACHE_CHECK([whether __va_copy exists], ac_cv_have___va_copy, [
AC_LINK_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
#include <stdarg.h>
va_list x,y;
]], [[ __va_copy(x,y); ]])],
[ ac_cv_have___va_copy="yes" ], [ ac_cv_have___va_copy="no"
])
])
if test "x$ac_cv_have___va_copy" = "xyes" ; then
AC_DEFINE([HAVE___VA_COPY], [1], [Define if __va_copy exists])
fi
AC_CHECK_HEADERS([sys/sysctl.h err.h])
AC_ARG_WITH([openssldir],
AS_HELP_STRING([--with-openssldir],
[Set the default openssl directory]),
AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED(OPENSSLDIR, "$withval")
)
AC_ARG_WITH([enginesdir],
AS_HELP_STRING([--with-enginesdir],
[Set the default engines directory (use with openssldir)]),
AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED(ENGINESDIR, "$withval")
)
AC_ARG_ENABLE([asm],
AS_HELP_STRING([--disable-asm], [Disable assembly]))
AM_CONDITIONAL([OPENSSL_NO_ASM], [test "x$enable_asm" = "xno"])
AC_ARG_ENABLE([extratests],
AS_HELP_STRING([--enable-extratests], [Enable extra tests that may be unreliable on some platforms]))
AM_CONDITIONAL([ENABLE_EXTRATESTS], [test "x$enable_extratests" = xyes])
old_cflags=$CFLAGS
CFLAGS="$CFLAGS -I$srcdir/include"
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AC_MSG_CHECKING([if BSWAP4 builds without __STRICT_ALIGNMENT])
AC_TRY_COMPILE([#include "$srcdir/crypto/modes/modes_lcl.h"],
[int a = 0; BSWAP4(a);],
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AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
BSWAP4=yes,
AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
BSWAP4=no)
CFLAGS="$old_cflags"
case $host_cpu in
*sparc*)
CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -D__STRICT_ALIGNMENT"
;;
*arm*)
AS_IF([test "x$BSWAP4" = "xyes"],,
CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -D__STRICT_ALIGNMENT")
;;
esac
AM_CONDITIONAL([HOST_ASM_ELF_X86_64],
[test "x$HOST_ABI" = "xelf" -a "$host_cpu" = "x86_64" -a "x$enable_asm" != "xno"])
AM_CONDITIONAL([HOST_ASM_MACOSX_X86_64],
[test "x$HOST_ABI" = "xmacosx" -a "$host_cpu" = "x86_64" -a "x$enable_asm" != "xno"])
AC_CONFIG_FILES([
Makefile
include/Makefile
include/openssl/Makefile
crypto/Makefile
ssl/Makefile
tls/Makefile
tests/Makefile
apps/Makefile
man/Makefile
libcrypto.pc
libssl.pc
libtls.pc
openssl.pc
])
AC_OUTPUT