92 lines
		
	
	
		
			4.0 KiB
		
	
	
	
		
			Plaintext
		
	
	
	
	
	
			
		
		
	
	
			92 lines
		
	
	
		
			4.0 KiB
		
	
	
	
		
			Plaintext
		
	
	
	
	
	
                                  _   _ ____  _
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                             / __| | | | |_) | |
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                            | (__| |_| |  _ <| |___
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                             \___|\___/|_| \_\_____|
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CURL SECURITY FOR DEVELOPERS
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This document is intended to provide guidance to curl developers on how
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security vulnerabilities should be handled.
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PUBLISHING INFORMATION
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All known and public curl or libcurl related vulnerabilities are listed at
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http://curl.haxx.se/docs/security.html
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Security vulnerabilities should not be entered in the project's public bug
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tracker unless the necessary configuration is in place to limit access to the
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issue to only the reporter and the project's security team.
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VULNERABILITY HANDLING
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The typical process for handling a new security vulnerability is as follows.
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No information should be made public about a vulnerability until it is
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formally announced at the end of this process. That means, for example that a
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bug tracker entry must NOT be created to track the issue since that will make
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the issue public and it should not be discussed on any of the project's public
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mailing lists. Also messages associated with any commits should not make
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any reference to the security nature of the commit if done prior to the public
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announcement.
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- The person discovering the issue, the reporter, reports the vulnerability
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  privately to curl-security@haxx.se. That's an email alias that reaches a
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  handful of selected and trusted people.
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- Messages that do not relate to the reporting or managing of an undisclosed
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  security vulnerability in curl or libcurl are ignored and no further action
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  is required.
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- A person in the security team sends an e-mail to the original reporter to
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  acknowledge the report.
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- The security team investigates the report and either rejects it or accepts
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  it.
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- If the report is rejected, the team writes to the reporter to explain why.
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- If the report is accepted, the team writes to the reporter to let him/her
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  know it is accepted and that they are working on a fix.
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- The security team discusses the problem, works out a fix, considers the
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  impact of the problem and suggests a release schedule. This discussion
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  should involve the reporter as much as possible.
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- The release of the information should be "as soon as possible" and is most
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  often synced with an upcoming release that contains the fix. If the
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  reporter, or anyone else, thinks the next planned release is too far away
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  then a separate earlier release for security reasons should be considered.
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- Write a security advisory draft about the problem that explains what the
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  problem is, its impact, which versions it affects, solutions or
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  workarounds, when the release is out and make sure to credit all
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  contributors properly.
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- Request a CVE number from distros@openwall.org[1] when also informing and
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  preparing them for the upcoming public security vulnerability announcement -
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  attach the advisory draft for information. Note that 'distros' won't accept
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  an embargo longer than 19 days.
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- Update the "security advisory" with the CVE number.
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- The security team commits the fix in a private branch. The commit message
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  should ideally contain the CVE number. This fix is usually also distributed
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  to the 'distros' mailing list to allow them to use the fix prior to the
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  public announcement.
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- At the day of the next release, the private branch is merged into the master
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  branch and pushed. Once pushed, the information is accessible to the public
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  and the actual release should follow suit immediately afterwards.
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- The project team creates a release that includes the fix.
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- The project team announces the release and the vulnerability to the world in
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  the same manner we always announce releases. It gets sent to the
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  curl-announce, curl-library and curl-users mailing lists.
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- The security web page on the web site should get the new vulnerability
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  mentioned.
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[1] = http://oss-security.openwall.org/wiki/mailing-lists/distros
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