Reject names that are longer than 255 characters, to avoid problems with strict or buggy DNS server implementations. (Patch from the Google tree)
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@ -108,6 +108,23 @@ int ares_mkquery(const char *name, int dnsclass, int type, unsigned short id,
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if (*name && *(p - 1) != '.')
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len++;
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/* Immediately reject names that are longer than the maximum of 255
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* bytes that's specified in RFC 1035 ("To simplify implementations,
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* the total length of a domain name (i.e., label octets and label
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* length octets) is restricted to 255 octets or less."). We aren't
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* doing this just to be a stickler about RFCs. For names that are
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* too long, 'dnscache' closes its TCP connection to us immediately
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* (when using TCP) and ignores the request when using UDP, and
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* BIND's named returns ServFail (TCP or UDP). Sending a request
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* that we know will cause 'dnscache' to close the TCP connection is
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* painful, since that makes any other outstanding requests on that
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* connection fail. And sending a UDP request that we know
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* 'dnscache' will ignore is bad because resources will be tied up
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* until we time-out the request.
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*/
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if (len > MAXCDNAME)
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return ARES_EBADNAME;
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*buflen = len + HFIXEDSZ + QFIXEDSZ;
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*buf = malloc(*buflen);
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if (!*buf)
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