- Scott Cantor posted the bug report #2829955
(http://curl.haxx.se/bug/view.cgi?id=2829955) mentioning the recent SSL cert verification flaw found and exploited by Moxie Marlinspike. The presentation he did at Black Hat is available here: https://www.blackhat.com/html/bh-usa-09/bh-usa-09-archives.html#Marlinspike Apparently at least one CA allowed a subjectAltName or CN that contain a zero byte, and thus clients that assumed they would never have zero bytes were exploited to OK a certificate that didn't actually match the site. Like if the name in the cert was "example.com\0theatualsite.com", libcurl would happily verify that cert for example.com. libcurl now better use the length of the extracted name, not assuming it is zero terminated.
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Changelog
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Daniel Stenberg (1 Aug 2009)
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- Scott Cantor posted the bug report #2829955
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(http://curl.haxx.se/bug/view.cgi?id=2829955) mentioning the recent SSL cert
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verification flaw found and exploited by Moxie Marlinspike. The presentation
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he did at Black Hat is available here:
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https://www.blackhat.com/html/bh-usa-09/bh-usa-09-archives.html#Marlinspike
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Apparently at least one CA allowed a subjectAltName or CN that contain a
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zero byte, and thus clients that assumed they would never have zero bytes
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were exploited to OK a certificate that didn't actually match the site. Like
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if the name in the cert was "example.com\0theatualsite.com", libcurl would
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happily verify that cert for example.com.
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libcurl now better use the length of the extracted name, not assuming it is
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zero terminated.
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- Tanguy Fautre pointed out that OpenSSL's function RAND_screen() (present
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only in some OpenSSL installs - like on Windows) isn't thread-safe and we
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agreed that moving it to the global_init() function is a decent way to deal
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