ossl_seed: fix the last resort PRNG seeding
Instead of just abusing the pseudo-randomizer from Curl_FormBoundary(), this now uses Curl_ossl_random() to get entropy.
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d09d08dc1f
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25
lib/ssluse.c
25
lib/ssluse.c
@ -236,27 +236,14 @@ static int ossl_seed(struct SessionHandle *data)
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/* If we get here, it means we need to seed the PRNG using a "silly"
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approach! */
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{
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do {
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int len;
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char *area;
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unsigned char randb[64];
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Curl_ossl_random(data, randb, sizeof(randb));
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/* Changed call to RAND_seed to use the underlying RAND_add implementation
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* directly. Do this in a loop, with the amount of additional entropy
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* being dependent upon the algorithm used by Curl_FormBoundary(): N bytes
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* of a 7-bit ascii set. -- Richard Gorton, March 11 2003.
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*/
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do {
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area = Curl_FormBoundary();
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if(!area)
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return 3; /* out of memory */
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len = curlx_uztosi(strlen(area));
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RAND_add(area, len, (len >> 1));
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free(area); /* now remove the random junk */
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} while(!RAND_status());
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}
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len = sizeof(randb);
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RAND_add(randb, len, (len >> 1));
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} while(!RAND_status());
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/* generates a default path for the random seed file */
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buf[0]=0; /* blank it first */
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