curl/lib/polarssl.c

707 lines
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/***************************************************************************
* _ _ ____ _
* Project ___| | | | _ \| |
* / __| | | | |_) | |
* | (__| |_| | _ <| |___
* \___|\___/|_| \_\_____|
*
2013-02-19 13:11:55 +01:00
* Copyright (C) 2010 - 2011, Hoi-Ho Chan, <hoiho.chan@gmail.com>
* Copyright (C) 2012 - 2013, Daniel Stenberg, <daniel@haxx.se>, et al.
*
* This software is licensed as described in the file COPYING, which
* you should have received as part of this distribution. The terms
* are also available at http://curl.haxx.se/docs/copyright.html.
*
* You may opt to use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute and/or sell
* copies of the Software, and permit persons to whom the Software is
* furnished to do so, under the terms of the COPYING file.
*
* This software is distributed on an "AS IS" basis, WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY
* KIND, either express or implied.
*
***************************************************************************/
/*
* Source file for all PolarSSL-specific code for the TLS/SSL layer. No code
* but sslgen.c should ever call or use these functions.
*
*/
build: fix circular header inclusion with other packages This commit renames lib/setup.h to lib/curl_setup.h and renames lib/setup_once.h to lib/curl_setup_once.h. Removes the need and usage of a header inclusion guard foreign to libcurl. [1] Removes the need and presence of an alarming notice we carried in old setup_once.h [2] ---------------------------------------- 1 - lib/setup_once.h used __SETUP_ONCE_H macro as header inclusion guard up to commit ec691ca3 which changed this to HEADER_CURL_SETUP_ONCE_H, this single inclusion guard is enough to ensure that inclusion of lib/setup_once.h done from lib/setup.h is only done once. Additionally lib/setup.h has always used __SETUP_ONCE_H macro to protect inclusion of setup_once.h even after commit ec691ca3, this was to avoid a circular header inclusion triggered when building a c-ares enabled version with c-ares sources available which also has a setup_once.h header. Commit ec691ca3 exposes the real nature of __SETUP_ONCE_H usage in lib/setup.h, it is a header inclusion guard foreign to libcurl belonging to c-ares's setup_once.h The renaming this commit does, fixes the circular header inclusion, and as such removes the need and usage of a header inclusion guard foreign to libcurl. Macro __SETUP_ONCE_H no longer used in libcurl. 2 - Due to the circular interdependency of old lib/setup_once.h and the c-ares setup_once.h header, old file lib/setup_once.h has carried back from 2006 up to now days an alarming and prominent notice about the need of keeping libcurl's and c-ares's setup_once.h in sync. Given that this commit fixes the circular interdependency, the need and presence of mentioned notice is removed. All mentioned interdependencies come back from now old days when the c-ares project lived inside a curl subdirectory. This commit removes last traces of such fact.
2013-01-06 19:06:49 +01:00
#include "curl_setup.h"
#ifdef USE_POLARSSL
#include <polarssl/net.h>
#include <polarssl/ssl.h>
#include <polarssl/certs.h>
#include <polarssl/x509.h>
#include <polarssl/version.h>
#if POLARSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x01000000
#include <polarssl/error.h>
#endif /* POLARSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x01000000 */
#if POLARSSL_VERSION_NUMBER>0x01010000
#include <polarssl/entropy.h>
#include <polarssl/ctr_drbg.h>
#else
#include <polarssl/havege.h>
#endif /* POLARSSL_VERSION_NUMBER>0x01010000 */
#if POLARSSL_VERSION_NUMBER<0x01000000
/*
Earlier versions of polarssl had no WANT_READ or WANT_WRITE, only TRY_AGAIN
*/
#define POLARSSL_ERR_NET_WANT_READ POLARSSL_ERR_NET_TRY_AGAIN
#define POLARSSL_ERR_NET_WANT_WRITE POLARSSL_ERR_NET_TRY_AGAIN
#endif
#include "urldata.h"
#include "sendf.h"
#include "inet_pton.h"
#include "polarssl.h"
#include "sslgen.h"
#include "parsedate.h"
#include "connect.h" /* for the connect timeout */
#include "select.h"
#include "rawstr.h"
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#include "polarssl_threadlock.h"
#define _MPRINTF_REPLACE /* use our functions only */
#include <curl/mprintf.h>
#include "curl_memory.h"
/* The last #include file should be: */
#include "memdebug.h"
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/* apply threading? */
#if defined(USE_THREADS_POSIX) || defined(USE_THREADS_WIN32)
#define THREADING_SUPPORT
#endif
#if defined(THREADING_SUPPORT) && POLARSSL_VERSION_NUMBER>0x01010000
static entropy_context entropy;
static int entropy_init_initialized = 0;
/* start of entropy_init_mutex() */
static void entropy_init_mutex(entropy_context *ctx)
{
/* lock 0 = entropy_init_mutex() */
polarsslthreadlock_lock_function(0);
if(entropy_init_initialized == 0) {
entropy_init(ctx);
entropy_init_initialized = 1;
}
polarsslthreadlock_unlock_function(0);
}
/* end of entropy_init_mutex() */
/* start of entropy_func_mutex() */
static int entropy_func_mutex(void *data, unsigned char *output, size_t len)
{
int ret;
/* lock 1 = entropy_func_mutex() */
polarsslthreadlock_lock_function(1);
ret = entropy_func(data, output, len);
polarsslthreadlock_unlock_function(1);
return ret;
}
/* end of entropy_func_mutex() */
#endif /* THREADING_SUPPORT && POLARSSL_VERSION_NUMBER>0x01010000 */
/* Define this to enable lots of debugging for PolarSSL */
#undef POLARSSL_DEBUG
#ifdef POLARSSL_DEBUG
static void polarssl_debug(void *context, int level, char *line)
{
struct SessionHandle *data = NULL;
if(!context)
return;
data = (struct SessionHandle *)context;
infof(data, "%s\n", line);
}
#else
#endif
static Curl_recv polarssl_recv;
static Curl_send polarssl_send;
static CURLcode
polarssl_connect_step1(struct connectdata *conn,
int sockindex)
{
struct SessionHandle *data = conn->data;
struct ssl_connect_data* connssl = &conn->ssl[sockindex];
bool sni = TRUE; /* default is SNI enabled */
int ret = -1;
#ifdef ENABLE_IPV6
struct in6_addr addr;
#else
struct in_addr addr;
#endif
void *old_session = NULL;
size_t old_session_size = 0;
char errorbuf[128];
memset(errorbuf, 0, sizeof(errorbuf));
/* PolarSSL only supports SSLv3 and TLSv1 */
if(data->set.ssl.version == CURL_SSLVERSION_SSLv2) {
failf(data, "PolarSSL does not support SSLv2");
return CURLE_SSL_CONNECT_ERROR;
}
else if(data->set.ssl.version == CURL_SSLVERSION_SSLv3)
sni = FALSE; /* SSLv3 has no SNI */
#if POLARSSL_VERSION_NUMBER<0x01010000
havege_init(&connssl->hs);
#else
#ifdef THREADING_SUPPORT
entropy_init_mutex(&entropy);
if((ret = ctr_drbg_init(&connssl->ctr_drbg, entropy_func_mutex, &entropy,
connssl->ssn.id, connssl->ssn.length)) != 0) {
#ifdef POLARSSL_ERROR_C
error_strerror(ret, errorbuf, sizeof(errorbuf));
#endif /* POLARSSL_ERROR_C */
failf(data, "Failed - PolarSSL: ctr_drbg_init returned (-0x%04X) %s\n",
-ret, errorbuf);
}
#else
entropy_init(&connssl->entropy);
if((ret = ctr_drbg_init(&connssl->ctr_drbg, entropy_func, &connssl->entropy,
connssl->ssn.id, connssl->ssn.length)) != 0) {
#ifdef POLARSSL_ERROR_C
error_strerror(ret, errorbuf, sizeof(errorbuf));
#endif /* POLARSSL_ERROR_C */
failf(data, "Failed - PolarSSL: ctr_drbg_init returned (-0x%04X) %s\n",
-ret, errorbuf);
}
#endif /* THREADING_SUPPORT */
#endif /* POLARSSL_VERSION_NUMBER<0x01010000 */
/* Load the trusted CA */
memset(&connssl->cacert, 0, sizeof(x509_cert));
if(data->set.str[STRING_SSL_CAFILE]) {
ret = x509parse_crtfile(&connssl->cacert,
data->set.str[STRING_SSL_CAFILE]);
if(ret<0) {
#ifdef POLARSSL_ERROR_C
error_strerror(ret, errorbuf, sizeof(errorbuf));
#endif /* POLARSSL_ERROR_C */
failf(data, "Error reading ca cert file %s - PolarSSL: (-0x%04X) %s",
data->set.str[STRING_SSL_CAFILE], -ret, errorbuf);
if(data->set.ssl.verifypeer)
return CURLE_SSL_CACERT_BADFILE;
}
}
/* Load the client certificate */
memset(&connssl->clicert, 0, sizeof(x509_cert));
if(data->set.str[STRING_CERT]) {
ret = x509parse_crtfile(&connssl->clicert,
data->set.str[STRING_CERT]);
if(ret) {
#ifdef POLARSSL_ERROR_C
error_strerror(ret, errorbuf, sizeof(errorbuf));
#endif /* POLARSSL_ERROR_C */
failf(data, "Error reading client cert file %s - PolarSSL: (-0x%04X) %s",
data->set.str[STRING_CERT], -ret, errorbuf);
return CURLE_SSL_CERTPROBLEM;
}
}
/* Load the client private key */
if(data->set.str[STRING_KEY]) {
ret = x509parse_keyfile(&connssl->rsa,
data->set.str[STRING_KEY],
data->set.str[STRING_KEY_PASSWD]);
if(ret) {
#ifdef POLARSSL_ERROR_C
error_strerror(ret, errorbuf, sizeof(errorbuf));
#endif /* POLARSSL_ERROR_C */
failf(data, "Error reading private key %s - PolarSSL: (-0x%04X) %s",
data->set.str[STRING_KEY], -ret, errorbuf);
return CURLE_SSL_CERTPROBLEM;
}
}
/* Load the CRL */
memset(&connssl->crl, 0, sizeof(x509_crl));
if(data->set.str[STRING_SSL_CRLFILE]) {
ret = x509parse_crlfile(&connssl->crl,
data->set.str[STRING_SSL_CRLFILE]);
if(ret) {
#ifdef POLARSSL_ERROR_C
error_strerror(ret, errorbuf, sizeof(errorbuf));
#endif /* POLARSSL_ERROR_C */
failf(data, "Error reading CRL file %s - PolarSSL: (-0x%04X) %s",
data->set.str[STRING_SSL_CRLFILE], -ret, errorbuf);
return CURLE_SSL_CRL_BADFILE;
}
}
infof(data, "PolarSSL: Connecting to %s:%d\n",
conn->host.name, conn->remote_port);
if(ssl_init(&connssl->ssl)) {
failf(data, "PolarSSL: ssl_init failed");
return CURLE_SSL_CONNECT_ERROR;
}
ssl_set_endpoint(&connssl->ssl, SSL_IS_CLIENT);
ssl_set_authmode(&connssl->ssl, SSL_VERIFY_OPTIONAL);
#if POLARSSL_VERSION_NUMBER<0x01010000
ssl_set_rng(&connssl->ssl, havege_rand,
&connssl->hs);
#else
ssl_set_rng(&connssl->ssl, ctr_drbg_random,
&connssl->ctr_drbg);
#endif /* POLARSSL_VERSION_NUMBER<0x01010000 */
ssl_set_bio(&connssl->ssl,
net_recv, &conn->sock[sockindex],
net_send, &conn->sock[sockindex]);
#if POLARSSL_VERSION_NUMBER<0x01000000
ssl_set_ciphers(&connssl->ssl, ssl_default_ciphers);
#else
ssl_set_ciphersuites(&connssl->ssl, ssl_default_ciphersuites);
#endif
if(!Curl_ssl_getsessionid(conn, &old_session, &old_session_size)) {
memcpy(&connssl->ssn, old_session, old_session_size);
infof(data, "PolarSSL re-using session\n");
}
SSL: Several SSL-backend related fixes axTLS: This will make the axTLS backend perform the RFC2818 checks, honoring the VERIFYHOST setting similar to the OpenSSL backend. Generic for OpenSSL and axTLS: Move the hostcheck and cert_hostcheck functions from the lib/ssluse.c files to make them genericly available for both the OpenSSL, axTLS and other SSL backends. They are now in the new lib/hostcheck.c file. CyaSSL: CyaSSL now also has the RFC2818 checks enabled by default. There is a limitation that the verifyhost can not be enabled exclusively on the Subject CN field comparison. This SSL backend will thus behave like the NSS and the GnuTLS (meaning: RFC2818 ok, or bust). In other words: setting verifyhost to 0 or 1 will disable the Subject Alt Names checks too. Schannel: Updated the schannel information messages: Split the IP address usage message from the verifyhost setting and changed the message about disabling SNI (Server Name Indication, used in HTTP virtual hosting) into a message stating that the Subject Alternative Names checks are being disabled when verifyhost is set to 0 or 1. As a side effect of switching off the RFC2818 related servername checks with SCH_CRED_NO_SERVERNAME_CHECK (http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/aa923430.aspx) the SNI feature is being disabled. This effect is not documented in MSDN, but Wireshark output clearly shows the effect (details on the libcurl maillist). PolarSSL: Fix the prototype change in PolarSSL of ssl_set_session() and the move of the peer_cert from the ssl_context to the ssl_session. Found this change in the PolarSSL SVN between r1316 and r1317 where the POLARSSL_VERSION_NUMBER was at 0x01010100. But to accommodate the Ubuntu PolarSSL version 1.1.4 the check is to discriminate between lower then PolarSSL version 1.2.0 and 1.2.0 and higher. Note: The PolarSSL SVN trunk jumped from version 1.1.1 to 1.2.0. Generic: All the SSL backends are fixed and checked to work with the ssl.verifyhost as a boolean, which is an internal API change.
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/* PolarSSL SVN revision r1316 to r1317, matching <1.2.0 is to cover Ubuntu's
1.1.4 version and the like */
#if POLARSSL_VERSION_NUMBER<0x01020000
ssl_set_session(&connssl->ssl, 1, 600,
&connssl->ssn);
SSL: Several SSL-backend related fixes axTLS: This will make the axTLS backend perform the RFC2818 checks, honoring the VERIFYHOST setting similar to the OpenSSL backend. Generic for OpenSSL and axTLS: Move the hostcheck and cert_hostcheck functions from the lib/ssluse.c files to make them genericly available for both the OpenSSL, axTLS and other SSL backends. They are now in the new lib/hostcheck.c file. CyaSSL: CyaSSL now also has the RFC2818 checks enabled by default. There is a limitation that the verifyhost can not be enabled exclusively on the Subject CN field comparison. This SSL backend will thus behave like the NSS and the GnuTLS (meaning: RFC2818 ok, or bust). In other words: setting verifyhost to 0 or 1 will disable the Subject Alt Names checks too. Schannel: Updated the schannel information messages: Split the IP address usage message from the verifyhost setting and changed the message about disabling SNI (Server Name Indication, used in HTTP virtual hosting) into a message stating that the Subject Alternative Names checks are being disabled when verifyhost is set to 0 or 1. As a side effect of switching off the RFC2818 related servername checks with SCH_CRED_NO_SERVERNAME_CHECK (http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/aa923430.aspx) the SNI feature is being disabled. This effect is not documented in MSDN, but Wireshark output clearly shows the effect (details on the libcurl maillist). PolarSSL: Fix the prototype change in PolarSSL of ssl_set_session() and the move of the peer_cert from the ssl_context to the ssl_session. Found this change in the PolarSSL SVN between r1316 and r1317 where the POLARSSL_VERSION_NUMBER was at 0x01010100. But to accommodate the Ubuntu PolarSSL version 1.1.4 the check is to discriminate between lower then PolarSSL version 1.2.0 and 1.2.0 and higher. Note: The PolarSSL SVN trunk jumped from version 1.1.1 to 1.2.0. Generic: All the SSL backends are fixed and checked to work with the ssl.verifyhost as a boolean, which is an internal API change.
2012-11-03 02:06:51 +01:00
#else
ssl_set_session(&connssl->ssl,
&connssl->ssn);
#endif
ssl_set_ca_chain(&connssl->ssl,
&connssl->cacert,
&connssl->crl,
conn->host.name);
ssl_set_own_cert(&connssl->ssl,
&connssl->clicert, &connssl->rsa);
if(!Curl_inet_pton(AF_INET, conn->host.name, &addr) &&
#ifdef ENABLE_IPV6
!Curl_inet_pton(AF_INET6, conn->host.name, &addr) &&
#endif
sni && ssl_set_hostname(&connssl->ssl, conn->host.name)) {
infof(data, "WARNING: failed to configure "
"server name indication (SNI) TLS extension\n");
}
#ifdef POLARSSL_DEBUG
ssl_set_dbg(&connssl->ssl, polarssl_debug, data);
#endif
connssl->connecting_state = ssl_connect_2;
return CURLE_OK;
}
static CURLcode
polarssl_connect_step2(struct connectdata *conn,
int sockindex)
{
int ret;
struct SessionHandle *data = conn->data;
struct ssl_connect_data* connssl = &conn->ssl[sockindex];
char buffer[1024];
char errorbuf[128];
memset(errorbuf, 0, sizeof(errorbuf));
conn->recv[sockindex] = polarssl_recv;
conn->send[sockindex] = polarssl_send;
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for(;;) {
if(!(ret = ssl_handshake(&connssl->ssl)))
break;
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else if(ret != POLARSSL_ERR_NET_WANT_READ &&
ret != POLARSSL_ERR_NET_WANT_WRITE) {
#ifdef POLARSSL_ERROR_C
error_strerror(ret, errorbuf, sizeof(errorbuf));
#endif /* POLARSSL_ERROR_C */
failf(data, "ssl_handshake returned - PolarSSL: (-0x%04X) %s",
-ret, errorbuf);
return CURLE_SSL_CONNECT_ERROR;
}
else {
if(ret == POLARSSL_ERR_NET_WANT_READ) {
connssl->connecting_state = ssl_connect_2_reading;
return CURLE_OK;
}
if(ret == POLARSSL_ERR_NET_WANT_WRITE) {
connssl->connecting_state = ssl_connect_2_writing;
return CURLE_OK;
}
failf(data, "SSL_connect failed with error %d.", ret);
return CURLE_SSL_CONNECT_ERROR;
}
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}
infof(data, "PolarSSL: Handshake complete, cipher is %s\n",
#if POLARSSL_VERSION_NUMBER<0x01000000
ssl_get_cipher(&conn->ssl[sockindex].ssl)
#elif POLARSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x01010000
ssl_get_ciphersuite(&conn->ssl[sockindex].ssl)
#else
ssl_get_ciphersuite_name(&conn->ssl[sockindex].ssl)
#endif
);
ret = ssl_get_verify_result(&conn->ssl[sockindex].ssl);
if(ret && data->set.ssl.verifypeer) {
if(ret & BADCERT_EXPIRED)
failf(data, "Cert verify failed: BADCERT_EXPIRED");
if(ret & BADCERT_REVOKED) {
failf(data, "Cert verify failed: BADCERT_REVOKED");
return CURLE_SSL_CACERT;
}
if(ret & BADCERT_CN_MISMATCH)
failf(data, "Cert verify failed: BADCERT_CN_MISMATCH");
if(ret & BADCERT_NOT_TRUSTED)
failf(data, "Cert verify failed: BADCERT_NOT_TRUSTED");
return CURLE_PEER_FAILED_VERIFICATION;
}
SSL: Several SSL-backend related fixes axTLS: This will make the axTLS backend perform the RFC2818 checks, honoring the VERIFYHOST setting similar to the OpenSSL backend. Generic for OpenSSL and axTLS: Move the hostcheck and cert_hostcheck functions from the lib/ssluse.c files to make them genericly available for both the OpenSSL, axTLS and other SSL backends. They are now in the new lib/hostcheck.c file. CyaSSL: CyaSSL now also has the RFC2818 checks enabled by default. There is a limitation that the verifyhost can not be enabled exclusively on the Subject CN field comparison. This SSL backend will thus behave like the NSS and the GnuTLS (meaning: RFC2818 ok, or bust). In other words: setting verifyhost to 0 or 1 will disable the Subject Alt Names checks too. Schannel: Updated the schannel information messages: Split the IP address usage message from the verifyhost setting and changed the message about disabling SNI (Server Name Indication, used in HTTP virtual hosting) into a message stating that the Subject Alternative Names checks are being disabled when verifyhost is set to 0 or 1. As a side effect of switching off the RFC2818 related servername checks with SCH_CRED_NO_SERVERNAME_CHECK (http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/aa923430.aspx) the SNI feature is being disabled. This effect is not documented in MSDN, but Wireshark output clearly shows the effect (details on the libcurl maillist). PolarSSL: Fix the prototype change in PolarSSL of ssl_set_session() and the move of the peer_cert from the ssl_context to the ssl_session. Found this change in the PolarSSL SVN between r1316 and r1317 where the POLARSSL_VERSION_NUMBER was at 0x01010100. But to accommodate the Ubuntu PolarSSL version 1.1.4 the check is to discriminate between lower then PolarSSL version 1.2.0 and 1.2.0 and higher. Note: The PolarSSL SVN trunk jumped from version 1.1.1 to 1.2.0. Generic: All the SSL backends are fixed and checked to work with the ssl.verifyhost as a boolean, which is an internal API change.
2012-11-03 02:06:51 +01:00
/* PolarSSL SVN revision r1316 to r1317, matching <1.2.0 is to cover Ubuntu's
1.1.4 version and the like */
#if POLARSSL_VERSION_NUMBER<0x01020000
if(conn->ssl[sockindex].ssl.peer_cert) {
SSL: Several SSL-backend related fixes axTLS: This will make the axTLS backend perform the RFC2818 checks, honoring the VERIFYHOST setting similar to the OpenSSL backend. Generic for OpenSSL and axTLS: Move the hostcheck and cert_hostcheck functions from the lib/ssluse.c files to make them genericly available for both the OpenSSL, axTLS and other SSL backends. They are now in the new lib/hostcheck.c file. CyaSSL: CyaSSL now also has the RFC2818 checks enabled by default. There is a limitation that the verifyhost can not be enabled exclusively on the Subject CN field comparison. This SSL backend will thus behave like the NSS and the GnuTLS (meaning: RFC2818 ok, or bust). In other words: setting verifyhost to 0 or 1 will disable the Subject Alt Names checks too. Schannel: Updated the schannel information messages: Split the IP address usage message from the verifyhost setting and changed the message about disabling SNI (Server Name Indication, used in HTTP virtual hosting) into a message stating that the Subject Alternative Names checks are being disabled when verifyhost is set to 0 or 1. As a side effect of switching off the RFC2818 related servername checks with SCH_CRED_NO_SERVERNAME_CHECK (http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/aa923430.aspx) the SNI feature is being disabled. This effect is not documented in MSDN, but Wireshark output clearly shows the effect (details on the libcurl maillist). PolarSSL: Fix the prototype change in PolarSSL of ssl_set_session() and the move of the peer_cert from the ssl_context to the ssl_session. Found this change in the PolarSSL SVN between r1316 and r1317 where the POLARSSL_VERSION_NUMBER was at 0x01010100. But to accommodate the Ubuntu PolarSSL version 1.1.4 the check is to discriminate between lower then PolarSSL version 1.2.0 and 1.2.0 and higher. Note: The PolarSSL SVN trunk jumped from version 1.1.1 to 1.2.0. Generic: All the SSL backends are fixed and checked to work with the ssl.verifyhost as a boolean, which is an internal API change.
2012-11-03 02:06:51 +01:00
#else
if(ssl_get_peer_cert(&(connssl->ssl))) {
#endif
/* If the session was resumed, there will be no peer certs */
memset(buffer, 0, sizeof(buffer));
SSL: Several SSL-backend related fixes axTLS: This will make the axTLS backend perform the RFC2818 checks, honoring the VERIFYHOST setting similar to the OpenSSL backend. Generic for OpenSSL and axTLS: Move the hostcheck and cert_hostcheck functions from the lib/ssluse.c files to make them genericly available for both the OpenSSL, axTLS and other SSL backends. They are now in the new lib/hostcheck.c file. CyaSSL: CyaSSL now also has the RFC2818 checks enabled by default. There is a limitation that the verifyhost can not be enabled exclusively on the Subject CN field comparison. This SSL backend will thus behave like the NSS and the GnuTLS (meaning: RFC2818 ok, or bust). In other words: setting verifyhost to 0 or 1 will disable the Subject Alt Names checks too. Schannel: Updated the schannel information messages: Split the IP address usage message from the verifyhost setting and changed the message about disabling SNI (Server Name Indication, used in HTTP virtual hosting) into a message stating that the Subject Alternative Names checks are being disabled when verifyhost is set to 0 or 1. As a side effect of switching off the RFC2818 related servername checks with SCH_CRED_NO_SERVERNAME_CHECK (http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/aa923430.aspx) the SNI feature is being disabled. This effect is not documented in MSDN, but Wireshark output clearly shows the effect (details on the libcurl maillist). PolarSSL: Fix the prototype change in PolarSSL of ssl_set_session() and the move of the peer_cert from the ssl_context to the ssl_session. Found this change in the PolarSSL SVN between r1316 and r1317 where the POLARSSL_VERSION_NUMBER was at 0x01010100. But to accommodate the Ubuntu PolarSSL version 1.1.4 the check is to discriminate between lower then PolarSSL version 1.2.0 and 1.2.0 and higher. Note: The PolarSSL SVN trunk jumped from version 1.1.1 to 1.2.0. Generic: All the SSL backends are fixed and checked to work with the ssl.verifyhost as a boolean, which is an internal API change.
2012-11-03 02:06:51 +01:00
/* PolarSSL SVN revision r1316 to r1317, matching <1.2.0 is to cover Ubuntu's
1.1.4 version and the like */
#if POLARSSL_VERSION_NUMBER<0x01020000
if(x509parse_cert_info(buffer, sizeof(buffer), (char *)"* ",
conn->ssl[sockindex].ssl.peer_cert) != -1)
SSL: Several SSL-backend related fixes axTLS: This will make the axTLS backend perform the RFC2818 checks, honoring the VERIFYHOST setting similar to the OpenSSL backend. Generic for OpenSSL and axTLS: Move the hostcheck and cert_hostcheck functions from the lib/ssluse.c files to make them genericly available for both the OpenSSL, axTLS and other SSL backends. They are now in the new lib/hostcheck.c file. CyaSSL: CyaSSL now also has the RFC2818 checks enabled by default. There is a limitation that the verifyhost can not be enabled exclusively on the Subject CN field comparison. This SSL backend will thus behave like the NSS and the GnuTLS (meaning: RFC2818 ok, or bust). In other words: setting verifyhost to 0 or 1 will disable the Subject Alt Names checks too. Schannel: Updated the schannel information messages: Split the IP address usage message from the verifyhost setting and changed the message about disabling SNI (Server Name Indication, used in HTTP virtual hosting) into a message stating that the Subject Alternative Names checks are being disabled when verifyhost is set to 0 or 1. As a side effect of switching off the RFC2818 related servername checks with SCH_CRED_NO_SERVERNAME_CHECK (http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/aa923430.aspx) the SNI feature is being disabled. This effect is not documented in MSDN, but Wireshark output clearly shows the effect (details on the libcurl maillist). PolarSSL: Fix the prototype change in PolarSSL of ssl_set_session() and the move of the peer_cert from the ssl_context to the ssl_session. Found this change in the PolarSSL SVN between r1316 and r1317 where the POLARSSL_VERSION_NUMBER was at 0x01010100. But to accommodate the Ubuntu PolarSSL version 1.1.4 the check is to discriminate between lower then PolarSSL version 1.2.0 and 1.2.0 and higher. Note: The PolarSSL SVN trunk jumped from version 1.1.1 to 1.2.0. Generic: All the SSL backends are fixed and checked to work with the ssl.verifyhost as a boolean, which is an internal API change.
2012-11-03 02:06:51 +01:00
#else
if(x509parse_cert_info(buffer, sizeof(buffer), (char *)"* ",
ssl_get_peer_cert(&(connssl->ssl))) != -1)
#endif
infof(data, "Dumping cert info:\n%s\n", buffer);
}
connssl->connecting_state = ssl_connect_3;
infof(data, "SSL connected\n");
return CURLE_OK;
}
static CURLcode
polarssl_connect_step3(struct connectdata *conn,
int sockindex)
{
CURLcode retcode = CURLE_OK;
struct ssl_connect_data *connssl = &conn->ssl[sockindex];
struct SessionHandle *data = conn->data;
void *old_ssl_sessionid = NULL;
ssl_session *our_ssl_sessionid = &conn->ssl[sockindex].ssn ;
int incache;
DEBUGASSERT(ssl_connect_3 == connssl->connecting_state);
/* Save the current session data for possible re-use */
incache = !(Curl_ssl_getsessionid(conn, &old_ssl_sessionid, NULL));
if(incache) {
if(old_ssl_sessionid != our_ssl_sessionid) {
infof(data, "old SSL session ID is stale, removing\n");
Curl_ssl_delsessionid(conn, old_ssl_sessionid);
incache = FALSE;
}
}
if(!incache) {
void *new_session = malloc(sizeof(ssl_session));
if(new_session) {
memcpy(new_session, our_ssl_sessionid,
sizeof(ssl_session));
retcode = Curl_ssl_addsessionid(conn, new_session,
sizeof(ssl_session));
}
else {
retcode = CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
}
if(retcode) {
failf(data, "failed to store ssl session");
return retcode;
}
}
connssl->connecting_state = ssl_connect_done;
return CURLE_OK;
}
static ssize_t polarssl_send(struct connectdata *conn,
int sockindex,
const void *mem,
size_t len,
CURLcode *curlcode)
{
int ret = -1;
ret = ssl_write(&conn->ssl[sockindex].ssl,
(unsigned char *)mem, len);
if(ret < 0) {
*curlcode = (ret == POLARSSL_ERR_NET_WANT_WRITE) ?
CURLE_AGAIN : CURLE_SEND_ERROR;
ret = -1;
}
return ret;
}
void Curl_polarssl_close_all(struct SessionHandle *data)
{
(void)data;
}
void Curl_polarssl_close(struct connectdata *conn, int sockindex)
{
rsa_free(&conn->ssl[sockindex].rsa);
x509_free(&conn->ssl[sockindex].clicert);
x509_free(&conn->ssl[sockindex].cacert);
x509_crl_free(&conn->ssl[sockindex].crl);
ssl_free(&conn->ssl[sockindex].ssl);
}
static ssize_t polarssl_recv(struct connectdata *conn,
int num,
char *buf,
size_t buffersize,
CURLcode *curlcode)
{
int ret = -1;
ssize_t len = -1;
memset(buf, 0, buffersize);
ret = ssl_read(&conn->ssl[num].ssl, (unsigned char *)buf, buffersize);
if(ret <= 0) {
if(ret == POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_PEER_CLOSE_NOTIFY)
return 0;
*curlcode = (ret == POLARSSL_ERR_NET_WANT_READ) ?
CURLE_AGAIN : CURLE_RECV_ERROR;
return -1;
}
len = ret;
return len;
}
void Curl_polarssl_session_free(void *ptr)
{
free(ptr);
}
size_t Curl_polarssl_version(char *buffer, size_t size)
{
unsigned int version = version_get_number();
return snprintf(buffer, size, "PolarSSL/%d.%d.%d", version>>24,
(version>>16)&0xff, (version>>8)&0xff);
}
static CURLcode
polarssl_connect_common(struct connectdata *conn,
int sockindex,
bool nonblocking,
bool *done)
{
CURLcode retcode;
struct SessionHandle *data = conn->data;
struct ssl_connect_data *connssl = &conn->ssl[sockindex];
curl_socket_t sockfd = conn->sock[sockindex];
long timeout_ms;
int what;
/* check if the connection has already been established */
if(ssl_connection_complete == connssl->state) {
*done = TRUE;
return CURLE_OK;
}
if(ssl_connect_1==connssl->connecting_state) {
/* Find out how much more time we're allowed */
timeout_ms = Curl_timeleft(data, NULL, TRUE);
if(timeout_ms < 0) {
/* no need to continue if time already is up */
failf(data, "SSL connection timeout");
return CURLE_OPERATION_TIMEDOUT;
}
retcode = polarssl_connect_step1(conn, sockindex);
if(retcode)
return retcode;
}
while(ssl_connect_2 == connssl->connecting_state ||
ssl_connect_2_reading == connssl->connecting_state ||
ssl_connect_2_writing == connssl->connecting_state) {
/* check allowed time left */
timeout_ms = Curl_timeleft(data, NULL, TRUE);
if(timeout_ms < 0) {
/* no need to continue if time already is up */
failf(data, "SSL connection timeout");
return CURLE_OPERATION_TIMEDOUT;
}
/* if ssl is expecting something, check if it's available. */
if(connssl->connecting_state == ssl_connect_2_reading
|| connssl->connecting_state == ssl_connect_2_writing) {
curl_socket_t writefd = ssl_connect_2_writing==
connssl->connecting_state?sockfd:CURL_SOCKET_BAD;
curl_socket_t readfd = ssl_connect_2_reading==
connssl->connecting_state?sockfd:CURL_SOCKET_BAD;
what = Curl_socket_ready(readfd, writefd, nonblocking?0:timeout_ms);
if(what < 0) {
/* fatal error */
failf(data, "select/poll on SSL socket, errno: %d", SOCKERRNO);
return CURLE_SSL_CONNECT_ERROR;
}
else if(0 == what) {
if(nonblocking) {
*done = FALSE;
return CURLE_OK;
}
else {
/* timeout */
failf(data, "SSL connection timeout");
return CURLE_OPERATION_TIMEDOUT;
}
}
/* socket is readable or writable */
}
/* Run transaction, and return to the caller if it failed or if
* this connection is part of a multi handle and this loop would
* execute again. This permits the owner of a multi handle to
* abort a connection attempt before step2 has completed while
* ensuring that a client using select() or epoll() will always
* have a valid fdset to wait on.
*/
retcode = polarssl_connect_step2(conn, sockindex);
if(retcode || (nonblocking &&
(ssl_connect_2 == connssl->connecting_state ||
ssl_connect_2_reading == connssl->connecting_state ||
ssl_connect_2_writing == connssl->connecting_state)))
return retcode;
} /* repeat step2 until all transactions are done. */
if(ssl_connect_3==connssl->connecting_state) {
retcode = polarssl_connect_step3(conn, sockindex);
if(retcode)
return retcode;
}
if(ssl_connect_done==connssl->connecting_state) {
connssl->state = ssl_connection_complete;
conn->recv[sockindex] = polarssl_recv;
conn->send[sockindex] = polarssl_send;
*done = TRUE;
}
else
*done = FALSE;
/* Reset our connect state machine */
connssl->connecting_state = ssl_connect_1;
return CURLE_OK;
}
CURLcode
Curl_polarssl_connect_nonblocking(struct connectdata *conn,
int sockindex,
bool *done)
{
return polarssl_connect_common(conn, sockindex, TRUE, done);
}
CURLcode
Curl_polarssl_connect(struct connectdata *conn,
int sockindex)
{
CURLcode retcode;
bool done = FALSE;
retcode = polarssl_connect_common(conn, sockindex, FALSE, &done);
if(retcode)
return retcode;
DEBUGASSERT(done);
return CURLE_OK;
}
/*
* return 0 error initializing SSL
* return 1 SSL initialized successfully
*/
int polarssl_init(void)
{
return polarsslthreadlock_thread_setup();
}
void polarssl_cleanup(void)
{
2013-02-19 13:11:55 +01:00
(void)polarsslthreadlock_thread_cleanup();
}
#endif /* USE_POLARSSL */